AOW GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS A PROCESS

Summary

In this discussion led by Brendan Anglin, the concept of negotiations is examined primarily from a military perspective. Highlighted is the importance of process-oriented negotiation strategies, as illustrated by efforts to train Palestinians in international negotiation techniques and military experiences in Afghanistan. Anglin introduces the 'pexx' model, detailing phases such as preparation, entering, exposing, exploring, exchanging, ending, and enforcing. He underscores the failure to effectively manage negotiations, like the misguided early interactions leading to the Gulf War, and questions how these insights could apply to business negotiations.

Highlights

• Brendan Anglin dives into how negotiations are approached in military contexts. 🪖
• An incident in negotiations highlighted by Shimon Perez showcases cultural misunderstandings. 🤔
• Highlighting the 'pexx' model: preparation, entering, exposing, exploring, exchanging, ending, and enforcing. 📈
• The importance of continuity in negotiations, especially with rotating personnel. 🔄
• A historical take on how poor negotiation strategies escalated tensions, especially during the Gulf War. ⚔️

Key Takeaways

• Negotiations are not just discussions; they're strategic processes. 🔄
• Military negotiations can teach us about commitment and long-term strategy. 🎖️
• Understanding cultural sensitivities is crucial in negotiations. 🌍
• The pexx model breaks down negotiations into phases for better clarity. 📊
• Success in negotiations often depends on consistent communication and information sharing. 🔄

Overview

Brendan Anglin takes us on a journey through the intricacies of negotiations, especially as seen in military scenarios. If you've ever thought of negotiations as mere table talks, prepare to rethink! From a humorous quote by Shimon Perez to serious situations in Afghanistan, Anglin sheds light on how prolonged and unpredictable negotiations can be. As he shares his insights, the often overlooked 'pexx' model is brought to the forefront, guiding negotiators through planned phases for successful outcomes.

In the heat of battle—not just in war, but in negotiations—understanding the process can mean the difference between resolution and escalation. Imagine rotating military personnel unknowingly restarting negotiation processes due to lack of information transfer! Anglin introduces a systematic approach, ensuring each new commander picks up where the last left off. This pragmatic framework underscores the significance of structured negotiation phases that can hold stability even amidst chaotic environments.

The narrative isn't just a lesson in military methods; it's a broader reflection on negotiation strategies. From tactical patience to cultural sensitivity, the lessons from history prompt contemporary implications, even in the business world. Anglin leaves us pondering: how can the robust, structured approach of military negotiations be adapted to the boardroom? In a world that swiftly shifts from digital interactions to face-to-face confrontations, knowing where to start, how to communicate, and when to concede can make all the difference.

Chapters

• 00:00 - 00:30: Introduction to Military Negotiations In the 'Introduction to Military Negotiations' chapter, the concept of negotiations is introduced as a process specifically related to the military. The chapter promises a quick look into this topic, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of military negotiations in subsequent discussions.
• 00:30 - 01:00: Shimon Perez Quote and Ramala Project The chapter titled 'Shimon Perez Quote and Ramala Project' starts with a quote from Shimon Perez: 'The good news is there is light at the end of the tunnel. The bad news is there is no tunnel.' This quote reflects on the negotiations with the Palestinian negotiators. There was a perception that the Palestinians lacked understanding in international negotiations, which was a point of contention at the time. To address these challenges, the Ramala Project was established, primarily funded by European countries, to assist in negotiations.
• 01:00 - 02:00: Challenges in Military Negotiations The chapter titled 'Challenges in Military Negotiations' discusses issues encountered when training the military in negotiation tactics, initially aimed at instructing Palestinians in international negotiation processes. The author reflects on unexpected challenges that arose during interactions with military personnel, contrasting the different priorities and approaches within civil and military contexts. The chapter begins with an anecdote highlighting a saying, 'you might have the watch, but we have the time,' illustrating differing perspectives on time and patience in negotiations.
• 03:00 - 03:30: Pexx Model for Negotiations This chapter discusses the Pexx Model for Negotiations, using a historic reference to illustrate a key point. It begins with a quote from a US soldier during the early 1990s conflict in Afghanistan. The quote highlighted the strategic outlook of the adversaries, emphasizing that even if one side possesses superior technology, the other side may have the advantage of time. This perspective became evident two decades later as the United States withdrew from Afghanistan while the Taliban remained, thereby demonstrating the power of endurance in negotiations and conflicts.
• 04:30 - 05:30: Flexibility in the Negotiation Process The chapter titled 'Flexibility in the Negotiation Process' discusses a significant issue identified during negotiations with military commanders. The problem was related to the 'tours of Duty' system. Locals in various contexts, including Afghanistan, were aware that military personnel would rotate out after their tours of duty ended, impacting the negotiation dynamics and outcomes. The knowledge of rotations allowed locals to potentially exploit timing, creating challenges in maintaining long-term stability and trust. As a result, flexibility in the negotiation process becomes critical to addressing these issues effectively.
• 05:30 - 07:00: Context of Iraq-Kuwait Negotiations The chapter discusses the strategies used during Iraq-Kuwait negotiations, emphasizing the advantage Iraq had in restarting negotiations with new military commanders, aiming to secure more concessions. A process was developed to aid commanders in these negotiations.
• 07:00 - 09:00: Impact of Negative Negotiation Tactics The chapter titled 'Impact of Negative Negotiation Tactics' discusses the development of a process to aid in negotiations, focusing on the transition between commanders. The process, called the pexx model, aims to ensure continuity by allowing new commanders to pick up negotiations from where their predecessors left off, rather than starting from scratch. The model includes a preparation phase followed by a repetitive cycle indicated as e multiplied by six, represented as 'p than e X6.'
• 09:00 - 09:30: Conclusion and Discussion Question The conclusion chapter focuses on the nuances of negotiation. It highlights several stages: creating rapport, which can set a positive or negative tone for negotiations, and explaining, where parties lay down their interests and attempt to uncover those of the other side. Exploration involves looking at potential proposals to reconcile differing positions, while exchanging involves the traditional bargaining phase.

AOW GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS A PROCESS Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 so in this particular Forum we're going to very look quickly look at the concept of negotiations as a process specifically related to the military so this kind of brings us with this in
• 00:30 - 01:00 quote the good news is there is light at the end of the tunnel the bad news there is no tunnel this is Shimon Perez talking about the negotiations with the Palestinian negotiators uh as a direct result of this concept that the Palestinians didn't understand how to negotiate in international negotiations that was one accusation made at the time we're not going to go into the whether that's true or not but the ramala project was set up which was a funding from um European countries mainly to
• 01:00 - 01:30 train the Palestinians in negotiation techniques um that was the initial objective of the ram project so that they would understand the process behind International negotiations now in this case what I started to do was not because of teaching people how to negotiate in international negotiations but because of a problem that presented themselves when I was teaching with the military and this first sentence here you might have the watch is but we have the time
• 01:30 - 02:00 was a quote that I heard many many many years ago very early on in when when the United States and um their allies went into Afghanistan in the early 90s and this was said through a US Soldier and sometimes you could say that you know we have you might have the technology but we have the time means we can Outlast you which is exactly what happened 20 years later and the United States is not in Afghanistan and the Taliban in this
• 02:00 - 02:30 case still there so when it came to the negotiations however the idea was that I discovered from speaking to many of the military commanders that I was speaking to that that they had a big problem and that problem was tours of Duty that what would happen was that the locals in all contexts not just in Afghanistan understood that the military personnel would be rotating out after their tour of Duty was finished and that meant that if things weren't going so well for them
• 02:30 - 03:00 that they could start again at the beginning of the process um knowing that the there was no information being pass about how far they had gone or what they had achieved so therefore they had a big Advantage because if they felt that things weren't going well for them they would just wait out that particular Commander's Tour of Duty and start again with the next one to see could they get more concessions in the negotiations so as a result I started creating a process to help these military commanders um
• 03:00 - 03:30 create an entire process that they could then pass on to the incoming commanders to show where they had got in the process and that the new Commander should start at that point in the process not from the very beginning and start the negotiations from the very beginning so this uh process that I initially created for them I called the pexx model and it was basically a preparation phase and then e multiplied by six so there's the p uh X6 so started
• 03:30 - 04:00 with entering creating Rapport creating um in this case either a positive or A negative um working atmosphere for the negotiations exposing and explaining is where you lay down your interests you try to uncover the interests of the other side the exploring is where you look at possible proposals to try to bring the different positions together the exchanging is what we would traditionally call the bargaining or the haggling stage of the negot negotiation
• 04:00 - 04:30 which may or may not happen depending on if the proposals were very good and actually satisfied both sides already maybe there's no need to go to The Exchange stage then the ending is where we actually finish the agreement or finish the negotiation and hopefully reach an agreement or end on hopefully a positive note not necessarily going to war and then enforcing is where we have to actually Implement whatever was agreed so by looking at as a process you can also then see in this military
• 04:30 - 05:00 negotiation uh maybe where other sites have failed in the process or at what point they've got to so that you need to look for specific information related to the different parts of the process it's also worth knowing that you can go back and forth in the process so you can go enter Expose and explain and then you can go back to entering again when there's new people joining you can go to exploration then you discover maybe your proposals are not working because you have you're missing information so you go back to the exposing and explaining
• 05:00 - 05:30 stage then maybe you move to the exchanging stage you realize again you're not reaching agreement maybe you have to go back again to uh uncovering information stage two so again it's not that this is a linear process that you cannot go back and forth um but by identifying it as a process it will help especially in a tour of Juicy situation where you're changing negotiators and an example of understanding the
• 05:30 - 06:00 negotiations the process is understanding the context and then understanding the different stages and making sure that you have a plan for each stage so in this particular um negotiation going back uh 30 years back to the first Gulf War at that point the there was after the Iran Iraq war there was the the disaster economically inight in Iraq that owed a huge amount of money which they were not rec recovering from
• 06:00 - 06:30 their oil fields which had also been damaged uh after the war they had demobilized thousands hundreds of thousands of soldiers who were now unemployed and there was also the context that historically they felt that they had claims on Kuwait and um they were now starting to also uh set themselves up against the United States and the general The Wider context as the United States was looking for other allies in the area um Kuwait was also getting closer to um Iran at this moment
• 06:30 - 07:00 and at this particular point we have to understand as well that um the Kuwaiti lead negotiators had a a very negative perception of their Iraqi counterparts so this is the context within which everything happened so all of the context was pushing um pushing them closer to war because there was internal Dynamics in Iraq which meant that they they needed they needed to expand or they needed to solve their uh their debt
• 07:00 - 07:30 crisis basically now when the negotiation started so we're now on to enter and creating empathy um and then at this stage we're also then going to try to get to the discussion point and you know uncover information which would be the ex exposing and explaining situation we never even got the exposing and explaining situation because the interests were laid out before the negotiations ever started but in create instead of creating a positive work relationship with the other side and
• 07:30 - 08:00 instead of trying to actually create a situation where we might find peace as it's been widely reported but here I'm taking it from the Wikipedia Gul or Source it's um is that the Amir Alaba who was uh negotiating from the Kuwaiti point of view insulted uh pretty badly U the Iraqis as you can see the expression that's written there the quote that they would turn every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute Ute by
• 08:00 - 08:30 bankrupting the country and that this offense was reported directly back to Saddam Hussein and as a result that was it were not even going to try to find a solution here and War was the inevitable um conclusion these negotiations so it's not that war would not have happened um definitely not have happened if the insult hadn't happened but it was almost inevitable as soon as you entered this kind of aggressive Offensive start to
• 08:30 - 09:00 the conversation so what we're doing here by understanding it as a process is identifying that maybe you've done your preparation very well but you actually haven't planned how to start it and how to create a working relationship well in some of the later Forum entries we'll look at other parts of the the process as well and in that brings us to the question from Forum one so we can see therefore that negotiations in a as a process can help in the military and conflict negotiations but how can perceiving negotiations as a process and
• 09:00 - 09:30 identifying different parts of it um how can that help you in negotiations in the business world so I'm looking forward to hearing your comments and seeing what you have to say related to this particular uh question