In the third session of the cloud computing security series, the focus shifts to case studies from research articles analyzing cloud security's unique concerns. The video discusses the complexities and extra measures needed in cloud security compared to traditional computing. Highlighting a significant work from ACM CCS 2009, the video examines cloud cartography and information leakage issues in third-party compute clouds like Amazon EC2, revealing vulnerabilities in co-residence and multi-tenancy models. The importance of trust between customers and cloud providers, along with challenges in multi-tenancy, where multiple clients share the same physical hardware, are emphasized. Strategies and experiments around cross-VM attacks and co-residence detection methods are explored, shedding light on potential security risks and mitigation techniques. Key topics include the risk of shared infrastructure exploitation, co-residence strategies, and security assumptions in cloud environments.
Highlights
Explored the security nuances in cloud computing compared to traditional systems. 🌐
Discussed a case study from ACM CCS 2009 focusing on cloud cartography. 📚
Addressed issues of multi-tenancy and co-residence in public clouds like Amazon EC2. ☁️
Highlighted the importance of trust in cloud provider and customer relationships. 🤝
Reviewed strategies to detect and mitigate cross-VM attacks. 🛡️
Key Takeaways
Understanding cloud security requires different strategies compared to traditional security measures. 🌥️
Studying case examples like the ACM CCS 2009 paper provides real-world insights into cloud vulnerabilities. 🔎
Co-residence on shared virtual machines creates unique security challenges. 🖥️
Trust between cloud providers and customers is crucial for security assurance. 🤝
Deploying VMs on shared resources can result in data leakage and security risks. 🚨
Overview
This session dives deep into the intricacies of cloud computing security, distinguishing it from conventional computing security. The discussion centers around the additional complexities and strategies needed to protect data in cloud environments, which differ significantly from traditional network or system security approaches.
A pivotal case study from ACM CCS 2009 is used to illustrate current challenges in cloud security, particularly focusing on the concepts of cloud cartography and information leakage. The study highlights vulnerabilities associated with the co-residence in third-party computes, like Amazon's EC2, where multiple users share the same physical resources.
Through this talk, viewers gain insights into the challenges of establishing trust between cloud service providers and customers, particularly in environments that involve multi-tenancy. The talk explores various strategies to detect potential risks and the importance of understanding the security assumptions that underpin cloud infrastructure.
Chapters
00:00 - 00:30: Introduction to Cloud Security In the introduction to the series on cloud security, the speaker sets the stage for discussions about cloud computing with a particular focus on security aspects. This session is identified as part of a series, specifically the third talk, aimed at building understanding in cloud security challenges and practices.
00:30 - 01:00: Overview of Case Study This chapter introduces a case study derived from a well-known research article, aimed at examining differences in security between cloud computing and traditional network or computing security. Participants are encouraged to read the article, emphasizing its significance and the insights it provides into the specific security challenges and variations applicable to cloud computing.
01:00 - 02:00: Key Security Aspects This chapter provides an overview of key security aspects to consider within cloud security. While it does not dive deep into technical specifics, it aims to present a broad understanding of the security challenges and considerations necessary for cloud computing.
02:00 - 03:00: Article Discussion The chapter discusses the significance of security and trustworthiness even when utilizing well-established public cloud computing platforms. It references a specific article presented at the ACM CCS conference in 2009, which emphasizes these aspects.
03:00 - 04:00: Cloud Experimentation In the chapter titled "Cloud Experimentation," the focus is on exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds. The discussion highlights the first work in cloud cartography and aims to delve into the security aspects of the cloud. The main objective is to examine how different security measures can be implemented, rather than identifying any specific loopholes.
04:00 - 05:00: Customer Trust and Multi-Tenancy The chapter titled 'Customer Trust and Multi-Tenancy' discusses the importance of understanding cloud security through practical experiments. The focus is on using existing work as a case study to demonstrate the critical role of security in cloud computing, rather than analyzing the work itself. The chapter highlights how these insights can enhance our understanding of cloud security.
05:00 - 06:30: Multi-Tenancy Risks This chapter discusses the potential risks associated with multi-tenancy in cloud computing environments, particularly with a focus on attack vectors. The authors highlight an experiment conducted on a commercial cloud platform such as Amazon EC2. The experiment aimed to achieve co-residence with a target virtual machine (VM) to potentially exploit its vulnerabilities. The results indicated a 40% success rate in achieving co-residence, showcasing the real and present risks of multi-tenancy regarding security.
06:30 - 10:00: Placement and Extraction Concepts The chapter discusses the challenges involved with the concept of VM (Virtual Machine) placement and extraction. It emphasizes the difficulty in managing the co-residency of a potentially malicious VM with a target VM. The lecture highlights the complexity due to the lack of transparency in how cloud providers allocate VMs, making it a significant concern in cloud security.
10:00 - 12:00: Threat Models in Cloud Security This chapter discusses the new risks associated with cloud security, focusing on the themes of trust and dependency. Customers need to establish a trusting relationship with their cloud providers as they rely on them for hosting a significant portion of their data and processes. The trust aspect is critical because customers depend on the cloud infrastructure to handle their operations effectively and securely.
12:00 - 16:30: Challenges in Co-Residency The chapter titled 'Challenges in Co-Residency' discusses the importance of privacy and integrity within cloud services. Customers must have trust in cloud providers to preserve data privacy and ensure that computations are performed correctly and securely. This trust is a fundamental expectation for any customer using cloud services.
16:30 - 20:30: Cloud Cartography The chapter 'Cloud Cartography' explores the concept of multi-tenancy, focusing on security threats that arise from sharing virtual machines (VMs) among different customers. It discusses the potential for physical resource sharing to lead to transparency issues, where one customer's VM is hosted on the same physical machine as another's. This raises concerns about data security and privacy, as sensitive information could be exposed or shared unintentionally across tenants. The chapter underscores the need for robust security measures in cloud environments to ensure customer data protection despite the inherent resource-sharing nature of cloud services.
20:30 - 25:00: Instance Placement and IP Addresses The chapter discusses the challenges of instance placement and IP addressing in a cloud environment, focusing on the issues of path establishment and security. It highlights the risks involved in multi-tenancy, where multiple virtual machines (VMs) share the same physical resources. The key concern is the potential for malicious VMs to compromise other VMs on the same network, which poses significant security risks for cloud service providers and users. Ensuring the security and integrity of each VM in such a shared infrastructure is deemed crucial.
25:00 - 30:00: Co-Residency Verification Strategies The chapter discusses strategies for verifying co-residency, particularly in multi-tenancy cloud environments where multiple virtual machines (VMs) from different customers share the same physical hardware. It highlights the challenge that customers do not have control over which other tenants their instance will co-reside with, which could potentially include adversaries. The chapter suggests that the logic for deciding resident instances is managed by the cloud provider, emphasizing the importance of understanding this from a cloud provider perspective.
30:00 - 34:30: Experimentation and Networking Tools The chapter titled 'Experimentation and Networking Tools' delves into the critical aspect of resource management within systems. It emphasizes the importance of optimizing customer-level performance by effectively managing limited resources. The text explains how virtual machines (VMs) are deployed based on an analysis that seeks to balance resource management with providing optimal performance to customers, thereby enhancing their service experience.
34:30 - 39:00: Risks and Prevention Strategies ## Chapter Title: Risks and Prevention Strategies
The chapter discusses various risk factors associated with cloud computing, particularly focusing on multi-tenancy environments. One significant risk highlighted is the side-channel exploitation, where cross-virtual machine (VM) information leakage can occur due to shared physical resources. This leakage poses a notable security challenge as it has the potential to expose RSA and AES secret keys. The text emphasizes the need for preventive strategies to mitigate such vulnerabilities inherent in cloud infrastructures.
39:00 - 43:00: Conclusion: Emerging Cloud Security Challenges The chapter discusses the emerging security challenges in cloud computing, focusing on side channel exploitation and vulnerabilities in virtual machine (VM) isolation mechanisms. It emphasizes the risks posed by hypervisor vulnerabilities, which could potentially be exploited to compromise systems. Additionally, the chapter highlights the lack of control over shared server space in cloud environments, raising concerns about knowing who shares these resources.
Cloud Computing Security III Transcription
00:00 - 00:30 hi so we will be discussing on ah cloud computing
primarily looking into the cloud security so this may be the ah this series of lectures
the third third talk on cloud security so
00:30 - 01:00 in in this discussion we will be basically
ah trying to look at a case study taken ah from a ah well known research article it might
so happen that many of you have gone through the article or if not i it will be good to
go through these articles that is ah pretty ah one of the interesting ah article which
shows that where these security in cloud computing ah varies ah or how it differ from our generic
network or computing security or where what
01:00 - 01:30 are the extra things we need to look at when
we look at the cloud security per se so it may ah it may not be possible to go
for all ah deep into the technical details of this ah article this such article but i
will try to give you that a overview of the ah problem which will ah which will ah help
us in understanding that ah how how how security
01:30 - 02:00 matters even when you are ah you are using
is ah a a standard secured ah trusted ah well used public ah cloud computing platform ok
so one ah that article we are talking about is ah came in ah acm ccs two thousand nine
ah and ah by this it ah title says that hey
02:00 - 02:30 you get off my cloud exploring information
leakage in third party compute clouds right so what the demand is the first work in cloud
cartography ah but ah apart from that it is interesting to see that what are the different
way ah things will be there so it is the the our major objective of this ah particular
discussion is to more look into ah the ah the security aspects of the cloud it is ah
it is ah not on looking into any loophole
02:30 - 03:00 of a particular cloud ah provider or ah security
of any particular provider we try to look at this paper which is a which is done ah
which is there are some practical experiments which may help us in understanding the security
aspect of the cloud in a better way that is our objective it is not to analyze the work
but say but to ah take that work as a example case and see that how security ah it playa
a important role in a in this cloud computing
03:00 - 03:30 ah aspect
so ah the experiment that the done in this particular work is this ah some sort of a
so called quote unquote attack launched against a commercially available real cloud like typically
amazon ec two and what they claimed that forty percent are [sa/success] success in co residence
with the target vm right so if we ah remember
03:30 - 04:00 ah our earlier lectures what we are telling
that one of the major issue is that if you whether we can co residence ah my a a particular
what we say ah attacking vm or a malicious users vm to a target vm so that that is a
very challenging task because i i really dont know how a cloud provider allocates the ah
allocates the vm to other things
04:00 - 04:30 so ah what we have seen ah in the new risk
in cloud one is that trust and dependency dependence right establishing new trust relationship
between the class customer and ah cloud provider that is important because i am basically as
a customer leveraging all my ah means most of my data most of my processes on the cloud
and i am my i am somewhat going dependent on that cloud infrastructure so customer must
trust their cloud provider to respect the
04:30 - 05:00 privacy of the data and integrity of the computations
right so when we look at ah the security point of
view the customer must trust the cloud provider for the preservation of the privacy of the
data and the integrity of the computation if there is a process the process is supposed
to is ah is performing the way it is supposed to perform that is one of the objective of
this ah of any any customer right so that is expected now the ah other ah problem
so that is that is how much you trust and
05:00 - 05:30 dependent on the thing other thing is the
multi tenancy right at ah threats from other customer due to the say they are basically
deciding on the same vms and ah physical records can be transparently shared so what is happening
that ah i am that the [va/virtual] virtual machine what i have been allocated the in
the same physical machine some other customers
05:30 - 06:00 are also allocated so what is the what is
the chance that there is a there is a path establishment between these two vm and if
there is a malicious ah vm or the this processes running in a malicious vm what is the chance
that ah my vm or my process is likely to be compromised so that is the usual [pro/problem]
problem or multi tenancy when you have multi tenant data these are the things which is
a ah which becomes a big issue
06:00 - 06:30 so multi tenancy as ah we have discussed earlier
multiplexing vms of disjoint customers upon the same on the same ah physical machine so
your machine is placed in the same server with other customer problem you dont have
the control to prevent your instant from being co resident with the some adversary resident
right so if it is a multi tenant so this multi tenancy how it will be residing that is at
the ah that is the logic the ah cloud provider doing
so for the cloud provider point of view its
06:30 - 07:00 one of the major thing is is resource management
right it has a limited resource or it has a particular resource and it has to manage
the thing so that it optimize the performance of the customer level so based on that it
basically ah try to try to deploy the vms ah based on its this ah analysis of that how
resource can be properly managed and maximum ah performance level can be provided to the
respective customer visa vis their service
07:00 - 07:30 level agreements right
so they here the with this this with the multi tenancy some of the new risk factor came into
picture one is that slight channel exploitation that means cross vm information leakage due
to sharing of the physical resource so that is another a big challenge right a cross vm
information leakage sharing of the physical resources is there has the potential to extract
rsa and aes secret keys we dont know whether there is a potential to extract rsa and aes
secret keys of this cross channel all this
07:30 - 08:00 ah side channel exploitation there are vulnerable
vm isolation mechanisms like via a vulnerable vulnerability that allows an escape to the
hypervisor right so the if there is a hyper if there is a vulnerability so if that can
be exploited and ah this hypervisor sub to some extent can be compromised lack of [contrary/control]
control you are sharing the server space right so lack of control who you are sharing with
right
08:00 - 08:30 so you dont have any control that who you
are co residing with right or this you are saying the simple way so these are the new
risk ah which come into play and ah the attack model specifically the attack model ah which
in being also followed in this particular work we are what we are ah discussing is that
the one of the ah motivation of this attack model is to study the practically practicality
that whether it is practical or mounting cross
08:30 - 09:00 vm attacks in existing third party compute
clouds so i if i am having existing third party compute cloud is it possible to do ah
to launch um some sort of a ah cross vm attacks right if ah on the case all right so what
they did the experiments have been carried out on realize cloud provider like i am as
an ec two and ah this can be carried out to any any type of i s provider
so there are two steps and this is these two
09:00 - 09:30 steps are irrespective whether is a cloud
or network or anything that is one is placement adversary arranging to place the malicious
vm on the same virtual machine as that of the target customer this is important if i
want to do across some sort of attack or something first thing i have to do is that whether i
can physically place my vm into the into the same space or the same physical machine or
the same server space where the adversaries
09:30 - 10:00 machine is there so that is one important
thing and secondly it is a extraction thing so once i am place so extract confidential
information by side channel attack so these are the two type of so next is the threat
model ah like assumption of threat model is that the provider and the infrastructure to
be trusted right so what we do when we this is one of the basic
assumption is the provider and the infrastructure need to be trusted do not consider attack
that that rely on subverting the administrator
10:00 - 10:30 functions all right do not exploit vulnerabilities
of the virtual machine monitor or others software right so ah it will not exploit that hypervisor
and other things so adversaries non providers affiliated malicious [party/parties] parties
so advisories are not provider affiliated they came as a ah user or customer victims
user running confidentially requiring services of the cloud so ah victims are running some
of the operations which needs some basic privacy
10:30 - 11:00 and convenience confidentiality is not public
operations of public data and ah services through the cloud so focus on new cloud related
capabilities of the attacker and implicitly expanding the ah attack surface right
so we try to see that what are the things and try to see that what type of other attacks
so there are other threat models ah consideration like any customer a the malicious party can
run and control many instances of the cloud
11:00 - 11:30 right so that is another thing attackers instance
might be placed on the same physical hardware as the potential victims are attacks might
manipulate the shared physical resource to learn otherwise confidential information so
that ah attacker can basically do some surface [ca/cause] cause vm attacks so two type of
attacks can take place attack on some known hosted services or attack on a particular
[vic/victim] victim services right
11:30 - 12:00 so one attack is that i am i know that these
are the hosted services i want to attack on the things or i want to have particular victim
service to be attacked so it is more ah what we say targeted attack so in order to do that
so what they ah proposed or what they ah did is basically need to answer a few questions
one is that can one determine where the cloud infrastructure and instance is located right
so is it possible to determine that where
12:00 - 12:30 a particular ah instances located right very
very difficult not only difficult something apparently impossible right you you take a
login from amazon or azure or google platform or any other sales force or anything and that
that is they are way of handling the things like at the back of his management or the
backbone management things question two can anyone can one easily determine
if two instances are co resident on the same
12:30 - 13:00 physical machine right one is that finding
that where the one instance is there another is that whether it is possible that i can
determine that ah whether these two instances are co resident right number three is that
can a adversary launch instances that will be co resident with the user instances right
so other ah question is that whether the adversaries launch instances so that you want to co residents
with some ah targeted instances and number
13:00 - 13:30 four can an adversary exploit cross vm information
leakage one co resident so if it is a co resident somewhere rather whether there is a possibility
that then i can have a cross vm information leakage right so these are what they did the
experiment or what we are trying to it get overview of the whole thing is primarily ah
working on one of the very popular cloud provider
13:30 - 14:00 and it follows all all possible base practices
even with that whether it is possibilities they are or not that is that thing what we
are trying to look at so if you look at the amazon ec two service
per se so it is a scalable pay as you go compute capacity of the cloud customer can run different
operating system within the virtual machine three degree of freedom instance type region
and availability zone so when you do select
14:00 - 14:30 so there are three degree of freedoms so you
can have instance type what type of instant or ah which region you want to launch and
the availability zone in the things right so three computing options instances are available
one is is m one small m one medium thirty two bit architecture m one large m one ah
extra large and so and so forth so these are the different instances are available right
so there are different region available right
14:30 - 15:00 ah u s e u and asia this is the time one ah
what the paper tells that is what when they are ah the came up in two thousand nine so
region split into availability zone so if you look at that uci in us it has a east in
the east virginia west oregon and ah and west another thing is not done not done care earlier
right so ah similarly infrastructure will separate power and network capacity connectivity
right so these are the different physically
15:00 - 15:30 different ah located different places so they
have ah not only different power line that means they are not on the same ah power backbone
so that that means that in other sense that is they are not ah subject to failure if there
is a power failure of one instances and it is likely they are ah network also is ah different
right so that means the ip block used in one will
be different another end type of things customers
15:30 - 16:00 randomly assigned to a physical machine based
on their instance region and availability zone choices so customer has this option of
choice in taking a ah make a choice of this and based on that they are ah given to the
different machine so typically amazon ec two service using ah
hp hypervisor and if you a xen hypervisor sorry so if you look at the xen hypervisor
so there is a dom zero what we say ah portion what is the privileged virtual machine which
have manages guest images it provisions physical
16:00 - 16:30 ah resources access control rights configure
to route packets in its guest images and reports itself as a hop to the trace route right so
it it routes the things and that can get it it is a hop on the thing so when an instant
is launched it is assigned to a single physical machine for its lifetime right so the instant
particular anything so secondly each instance is assigned internal
and external ip address and a domain names
16:30 - 17:00 so that is the philosophy of amazon so external
ip address something internal ip address based on some standard and respective domain name
within the cloud both the domain names resolve the internal ip address so within the cloud
both the whatever you have seen internal external add thing outside the cloud external name
is made to the external ip address so when we go to the outside the cloud then the external
name is mapped to the external ip address
17:00 - 17:30 now if we look at the ah is ah different aspects
or the different queries which we ah which we raised or where which the article raised
that try to address those and ah those queries the query one is the cloud cartography ah
instant placing is not disclosed by amazon but ah is needed to launch ah whole residency
attack so if i want to do some sort of a co residency attack then i require the instant
to be placed into ah into the victims ah things
17:30 - 18:00 but the amazon will definitely not disclose
this and map the ec two service to understand where the potential targets are located in
the cloud right so we need to map or what they have shown
they have tried to map the ec two service to understand um that where the targets are
located in the cloud so determine the instance creation parameters needed to attempt establishing
co residence at an adversarial instance so
18:00 - 18:30 it is needs a create a parameter to attempt
establishing a co residence on the thing and the basic hypothesis different availability
zone and instance types correspond to different ip address right so if i have different availability
zone and different instance types it is ah likely that they are in the different ip ranges
so whether we are able to whether we can there is a possibility of exploiting this
so in order to do that those who have worked
18:30 - 19:00 on network security or networking per se you
know that there are different type of network probing tools are available so network probes
are available and which are ah which are um many of them are open source and ah fairly
able to map the thing so similarly here also we require a network
probing identify public servers hosted in ec two and verify the co residency so open
source tools have been used to probe the ports
19:00 - 19:30 port eighty and four forty three that is the
http and https secure port right rsn port so because these are ah these are mostly used
for external access and likely that they will be opened and allowed the things
so one such tool is in map other is hp and wget right so there are the these are the
three popular there are several others ah tools and it is ah sometimes ah someone can
write their own tool and type of things but
19:30 - 20:00 they are using the tool of probe so external
probe probe originating from a system outside ec two and has an ec two instance as the ah
destination so that can be the external and internal originates from ec two instant and
his has destination another e c two instance right
so this is ah internal and external thing so given external ip dns resolution queries
are used to determine external name and internal ip address right so this is by the dns query
so survey a public server on ec two because
20:00 - 20:30 the to have a ah if we survey a goal to enable
identification of instant type and availability zone of one or more potential targets right
so our primary or the primary goal of this particular work is to whether i can basically
identify the instant type and availability zone of one or more potential targets that
is one of the major thing e c two public ips
20:30 - 21:00 are in this prefixes like and there are public
ips of those those tuned as reported by the ah particular article use external probes
to find the responsive ips right which are responsive for from tcp connect probe on port
eighty ah and ah followed by wget port at port eighty and performed tcp scan at port
forty three and then they see that what are
21:00 - 21:30 the ips which responses
so use dns lookup translate each public ip that correspond to either port eighty or port
forty three to an internal ec two address and then ah do again the probing on the things
so some fourteen thousand odd unique internal ips are obtained
now ah this next is the instance placement parameters right what parameter you need to
say that the things now ec twos internal address
21:30 - 22:00 space is cleanly partitioned between vary
ah between the availability zone right they are partitioned into thing three availability
zone five instance type of ah instance type and zone as we have seen twenty instance launched
for each of the fifteen the what the experimental ah things they have done and they have shown
that samples from each of the zone are assigned ip address from disjoint portion of the observed
internal ip address spaces right assumption
22:00 - 22:30 internal ip address are statically assigned
to physical machines ah to ease out ip routing otherwise it will again routing routing parameters
will be their availability zone are used physical infrastructure
so these are the things which are ah there so in other sense what we try holistically
see there are these are the different ah zones and different type of instances they are on
different ip block in other sense if i if i somehow select ah the same zone and etcetera
n whom i am targeting it is likely i i i may
22:30 - 23:00 be in the same ip block if i know that in
the same ip block then whether it is possible to launch again some of the probes and some
of the attacks with the same ip blocks right so they what they experimentally they shown
that hundred instances has been launched in zone three using two different account a and
b thirty nine hours after terminating the account instance a and of hundred zone three
ninety two has a unique slash twenty four
23:00 - 23:30 prefixes four prefixes has two instances each
so these are the their resultant out of hundred b zone three instances eighty eight unique
and six this a single slash twenty four had both m one large and m one extra large instance
of hundred accounts of these ips fifty five were repeats of ip address assigned to the
instance of that account a that is interesting right
so out of that assign thing which are a and
23:30 - 24:00 b so what they are launched in different time
scale like a and after ah terminating thirty nine hours of b so i can i got that ah address
etcetera so in if you look at it gives some sort of it tries to give in some ah may be
very ah grossly some cartography of or in other sense that the ip address blocks and
etcetera how they are spared and so on and so forth
now if i have this type of things like roughly
24:00 - 24:30 know that these are the ip address blocks
and type of things are there then whether determining co residency can help or what
what can be done so network based co residency at a checks instances likely to be co residence
if they are matching domes zero ip address that as we have seen that domain zero ah is
that ah primarily do we their management part small packet rounder trips if i have a round
ah trip times so that will be the small packet
24:30 - 25:00 in is in the same block numerically close
ip range typically within seven hum so that is another things what we are having
so verifying co residency is ah check is another challenge that if two under self control instances
are successfully transmit via the covered channel they are co residents and so on and
so forth you can if you can connect them experiment ah the hard disk base covert channels ah they
have shown so three m one small account control
25:00 - 25:30 victim probe ah what they need determine dom
zero address for each each pair of a b so what they try to do that what is a checking
the co residency of that two ah to vms and type of ah things
so effective co residency check for checking constancy with the target instances compare
internal ip address to see if they are closer so if it is within the ah within the typical
seven thing then it is a closer if he has
25:30 - 26:00 performed tcp sync trace route to open port
to the target and see and see if there is only one single hop dom zero ip check check
requires sending at most two tcp syn packets no full tcp connection is established very
quiet check little communication with the victim
so these are the checks which are done ah known some sort of a quote unquote non invasive
manner that means the ah victims is not aware
26:00 - 26:30 of the things so you are basically cross checking
that whether it is ah some co residency thing and the third thing is causing co residency
two strategies to achieve good coverage co residency with a good functions target one
is brute force placement you want to do some brute force placement of the things by run
numerous probe instances and find out that where things are there and you do a brute
force other is target recently launched instances
26:30 - 27:00 take advantage of the tendency of ec two to
assign fresh instance a small small set of machines so if it is a after studying etcetera
that is it can be think that the service provider are doing that is that ah close ah which are
very ah instances launched in the within a particular small time span are ah placed into
the thing into the same type of ah hardware or server then then there is a chance of ah
doing a target recently launched instances
27:00 - 27:30 and try to co residency
so leveraging placement of locality one is the placement of locality instances launched
simultaneously from the same account do not run on the same physical machine sequential
placement locality existing when two instances run sequentially right as we have seen that
ah previously a and b parallel placement locality exist when two instances run at roughly the
same time are often assigned to the same machine
27:30 - 28:00 so these are the things which can be exploited
and there is a other ways that instance flooding launch lots so parallel instances in the appropriate
availability zone and appropriate type and try to see that what they happen
similarly ah they did a lot of ah experimentation to see that ah how this ah locality can be
exploited and finally exploiting ah co residents that is cross vm attacks can allow ah information
leakage how can we exploit shared infrastructure
28:00 - 28:30 is one that it means i am co resident then
how to exploit this like gain information about the source uses of the other instances
create and use covert channels to intentionally leak information from one instance to other
so these are the other things which can be ah which can be exploited by the ah ah attacker
some application of these covert channels are co residence detection whether it is the
ah thing ah that is whether i can have some
28:30 - 29:00 secret ah detection scheme to look at it whether
timing of the keystroke allow me to look at the password and so on and so forth and ah
other type of techniques which are there in other cases ah other ah this type of ah hum
covert channel attacks is one is that measuring the cache uses that and try to see that the
what is the normal pattern and whether the there are there is a whether there is a ah
any attacks etcetera there and try to map
29:00 - 29:30 that what sort of processes are they are based
on the cache uses pattern so one is that exploit a load based co residence
checking that exploit in co residency so co residency check can be done without network
base ah network or adversary because i am co residence so i dont require again now the
resident a bigger other ah network ah infrastructure i am on the same machine so ah here they have
shown this ah with the experiment that the
29:30 - 30:00 trial one and two were co resident on distinct
physical machine instant three were not co resident so that what if you look go through
the paper there this has been shown and it has been shown that estimation traffic rates
that what sort of ah traffics are there with with no http with http connection and so on
and so forth these are the figures and data taken from that particular research article
and other things are keystroke timing ah attacks
30:00 - 30:30 right
so ah based on that keystroke and ah this is a very popular ah or very well known type
of things based on that whether you can basically look at that passwords and against the password
and try type of things so finally that whether the what type of preventive measures ah we
can ah think of one is the mapping use randomized scheme to allocate ip address ah block some
tools like in map and trace route so blocking
30:30 - 31:00 tools may be ok but randomized allocation
may basically ah may be going against and some cases that the ah optimization or resource
management of the things right so what they are the [fa/from] from for the from the ah
prospective of the service provider so that is that may be a challenge so co residency
check prevent identification of the dom zero that may be one of the way so what ah of that
so that that they cannot check that what is the domain zero co location not allow co residence
at all right so that means beneficial for
31:00 - 31:30 cloud user but not efficient definitely not
efficient for the cloud provider and information leaks leakage via side channel still is a
big [chall/challenge] challenge like different type of sites challenge things are there and
it is not only that you create a covert path like that you you basically judge different
other parameters look at like like maybe the ah as well looking at that the ah looking
at the cache behavior or the how the cache
31:30 - 32:00 uses pattern i am trying to look at that what
sort of ah activities are going on so with this we end our talk today that that
new risk from the summary of that security thing that new risks from cloud computing
ah are they are which is little different from our conventional computer or information
or network security shared physical infrastructure may and most likely will cause problems exploiting
software vulnerabilities are not addressed
32:00 - 32:30 properly here practical ah we have not there
may be some software vulnerability if that the sas level cloud etcetera which are not
being addressed practical attacks are in that particular paper they have shown that particular
attacks are performed and some countermeasures also proposed in this work
so i encourage you to go through this paper ah so that it is a good again i am repeating
it is not to particularly look into particular service provider or look at the they are loopholes
etcetera more things we want to see a look
32:30 - 33:00 at an overview that these are the things possible
or this at the things which open up new risk etcetera which are not there in our traditional
network or computer or information security so with this ah we will end our ah talk today
um thank you