Global Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict

Global actors in the war in Israel and Gaza

Estimated read time: 1:20

Summary

The Brookings Institution convened a panel to discuss the multifaceted roles of global actors in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza. Experts from Brookings examined the positions and strategic interests of Russia, China, India, and Turkey in relation to the war. Each country’s unique approach reflects its historical ties, regional interests, and geopolitical strategies, revealing a complex web of international diplomacy and internal politics. The discussion underscored the intricate dynamics at play, as countries balance their national interests with broader implications for global security and political alliances.

Highlights

Russia uses the conflict to divert attention from Ukraine, strengthening ties with the global South. 🇷🇺
China avoids direct involvement, urging for a diplomatic resolution and critiquing Western interventions. 🌏
India's dual approach signifies its regional interest and relations with both Israel and Palestine. 🇮🇳
Turkey's harsh critique of Israel stems from Erdogan's personal and political affiliations. 🇹🇷
Ongoing shipping issues in the Red Sea add economic pressure amid geopolitical tensions. 🚢

Key Takeaways

Russia sees the conflict as a distraction from its Ukraine activities, leveraging it to build ties with the global South. 🇷🇺
China maintains a detached stance, focusing on diplomatic neutrality while subtly critiquing U.S. policies. 🌐
India navigates a complex balance, supporting Israel's security while advocating for a two-state solution. 🇮🇳
Turkey's position is heavily influenced by domestic politics and Erdogan's ideology, leading to strong criticism of Israel. 🇹🇷
Global shipping disruptions in the Red Sea reflect broader concerns about regional stability and economic impact. 🚢

Overview

The Brookings Institution recently hosted an insightful discussion featuring experts opining on global actors in the Israeli-Gaza conflict. The panelists included specialists in Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Turkish foreign policy, each providing a unique perspective on how their respective countries are navigating the ongoing conflict.

Russia, as discussed, views the situation as beneficial in diverting global attention from Ukraine, using this shift to bolster relations with the global South. Meanwhile, China's official response has been traditional—maintain an appearance of neutrality while implicitly criticizing western approaches to the conflict.

India's approach involves a careful balance, reflecting its proximity and historical ties to the region. It supports Israel's self-defense while still advocating for a two-state solution. Conversely, Turkey has responded with pronounced criticism of Israel, a reflection of President Erdogan’s ideological stance and Turkey’s domestic political landscape.

Chapters

00:00 - 00:30: Introduction The chapter 'Introduction' sets the stage for the rest of the book, providing necessary background information and outlining the key themes and objectives. It serves as a roadmap, guiding readers on what to expect in the following chapters.
00:30 - 05:30: Opening Remarks and Speaker Introductions The chapter titled 'Opening Remarks and Speaker Introductions' begins with a greeting and an expression of gratitude for the attendees joining the event in Washington DC and the Middle East. The event focuses on global actors and the war in Israel, emphasizing the somber atmosphere of the past two and a half months. The speakers have been analyzing the situation closely, particularly at Brookings, focusing on the events occurring on the ground.
05:30 - 10:30: Discussion on Russia's Reaction to the Conflict The chapter titled 'Discussion on Russia's Reaction to the Conflict' appears to focus on broadening the scope of discussion to include key global actors, with a special mention of the Middle East. The discussion includes insights from four experts based in Washington DC, primarily from the Brookings Institution, who provide analysis on the role and reactions of these actors, with a particular reference to the expertise of Angela Stent, a senior advisor at the Center. The chapter highlights not just regional but also global perspectives on Russia's stance in the conflict.
10:30 - 15:00: China's Position and Reaction to the Conflict The chapter discusses China's approach and response to conflicts, particularly with reference to the geopolitical dynamics in Eurasia and Eastern Europe. It mentions a renowned expert affiliated with Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution, who has an extensive background in Russian and Eurasian affairs. This expert’s insights likely provide a nuanced view of China's strategic calculations and diplomatic engagements in response to ongoing conflicts, benefiting from her experience in the National Intelligence Council and the State Department. The chapter sets the stage for understanding China's role in global conflicts with a focus on its interaction with Russia and affected regions.
15:00 - 20:00: India's Response and Perspective The chapter discusses India's response and perspective on various international issues, with a particular focus on the Middle East. It introduces a visiting fellow with a specialization in U.S. and European relations, highlighting her as a new addition to the Brookings institution and mentioning her extensive background in journalism and policy, especially in Turkish affairs. She is associated with notable organizations such as the Washington Post and the European Council on Foreign Relations, bringing significant expertise to the Center for East Asian Studies. The narrative illustrates the diverse and interdisciplinary approach India employs in its diplomatic and international strategies.
20:00 - 25:00: Turkey's Reaction to the Conflict The chapter titled 'Turkey's Reaction to the Conflict' featured a discussion hosted by Brookings, focusing on the Foreign Policy Program. Special emphasis was placed on exploring India's global role, particularly India's interactions with China and the United States in the global arena. The event highlighted through the lens of a podcast called 'Global India', the book 'Fateful Triangle' was mentioned for its insights into how China influenced US-India relations during the Cold War. Additionally, Patricia Kim, a fellow at Brookings with expertise in the China Center and East Asian affairs, contributed to the dialogue.
25:00 - 30:00: Interplay of Russian Geopolitical Calculations In this chapter, the focus is on Russian geopolitical strategies and calculations. The discussion is led by an expert from the foreign policy program of Brookings, who specializes in Chinese foreign policy and US-China relations. The expert emphasizes the importance of understanding the politics and security dynamics of East Asia. Additionally, the chapter highlights projects like the Global China Project and the Brookings-CSIS project, which are pivotal in advancing collaboration amidst strategic competition. The panel consists of four distinguished experts providing in-depth insights on Chinese policy, particularly in Washington.
30:00 - 35:00: Chinese Interest and Evolution in the Middle East The chapter begins with Angela being asked to provide an overview of Russia's reaction to a recent war. The discussion focuses on Russia's public and leadership stance over the past two and a half months, highlighting that the situation has been positively perceived by Russia.
35:00 - 40:00: India's Diplomatic Balance in the Middle East The chapter discusses the shifting focus of global media from the Russia-Ukraine war to the conflict in Gaza, highlighting that the world's attention has been diverted. It notes how this shift has given Russia, particularly under Putin, an opportunity to enhance its standing with the global South.
40:00 - 45:00: Turkey's Regional Relationships and Hamas This chapter discusses Turkey's regional relationships, particularly in the context of the Gaza conflict and Hamas's role. It highlights how many countries in the Global South, which had not taken sides in the Russia-Ukraine war, now sympathize with Russia due to its solid support for the Palestinians. This support has strengthened Hamas's reputation and favorability among these countries. Moreover, the context involves Russian President Putin making his first international trip, indicating a shift in regional alliances and interests.
45:00 - 50:00: Impact on Maritime Shipping and Global Economy The chapter discusses the geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, highlighting Russia's changing role in the region. Before its war efforts, Russia was perceived as a neutral mediator among various conflicting parties. However, recent actions, including visits to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, indicate a shift in Russia's foreign policy. These changes are likely to influence maritime shipping and the global economy by redefining alliances and partnerships in the region.
50:00 - 55:00: US-Russia Relations and Middle East Impact The chapter discusses the complex web of relationships between Russia, the Middle East, and the United States. It highlights Russia's strong ties to countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, and its previously good relationship with Israel, cultivated by both Putin and Netanyahu. However, recent developments see Russia being critical of Israel and the US for their support of Israel, causing a distancing between Russia and Israel. Additionally, there is a resurgence of domestic anti-Semitism within Russia, a perennial issue that has resurfaced. The chapter also notes the lack of robust data about the Russian public's perception of these geopolitical relationships.
55:00 - 60:00: US-China Relations in light of Middle Eastern Conflict The transcript briefly discusses the Russian public's support for Putin's actions in Ukraine and the lack of public criticism of Russia's foreign policy. It then shifts focus to inquire about China's reaction to the situation and the public mood in China, although details on China's response are not provided in the given excerpt.
60:00 - 65:00: Implications for US-India Relations The chapter discusses the implications of recent international events on US-India relations, specifically focusing on China's stance. China's response to the October 7th terrorist attacks is characterized by broad, detached official statements. The Chinese government has avoided specifically condemning the attacks or naming Hamas, instead opting to condemn acts harming civilians and calling for an end to hostilities. On October 8th, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement reflecting this position.
65:00 - 70:00: Future of US-Turkey Relations The chapter discusses the future of US-Turkey relations amidst regional tensions. A statement emphasizes concern over escalating tensions and calls for calm among all parties, advocating for a two-state solution as the only resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. It highlights the delayed public comment by President Xi Jinping on the crisis, noting his first statement nearly two weeks after the October 7th attacks. The chapter also mentions diplomatic engagements by Chinese officials following the crisis.
70:00 - 75:00: Closing Remarks and Thanks Chapter 'Closing Remarks and Thanks' discusses China's release of a five-point position paper on a conflict, calling for an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, and humanitarian aid. It advocates diplomatic mediation and urges influential countries to help de-escalate the crisis, emphasizing an international peace initiative.

Global actors in the war in Israel and Gaza Transcription

00:00 - 00:30
00:30 - 01:00 good morning everyone and thank you very much for joining us this morning here in Washington DC and this afternoon in the Middle East for our event on global actors and the war in Israel andaza it's been a somber two and a half months U with many events and we've been looking especially here at Brookings on the events on on the ground and in the
01:00 - 01:30 Middle East today we're widening our aperture quite a bit and we're going to look at four very important actors one straddling the Middle East uh but others more Global uh in nature um I'm truly delighted to be joined by four of the very best experts here in Washington DC who also happen to be my brooking's colleagues um and I'll introduce them briefly now and then turn turn to them to discuss the different actors that we're talking about today um Angela stent is a senior advisor in the Center
01:30 - 02:00 of for Eurasian Russian and East European studies and a professor am at Georgetown University here in Washington and she's a non-resident senior fellow with us at Brooking uh she she co-chairs our huitt for huitt Forum on post Soviet Affairs she also previously served as a National Intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council of the United States and before that also served at the state department in the office of policy planning she is truly one of the very best experts not only on Russian Affairs but on Russian Affairs in other other regions and in
02:00 - 02:30 particular the Middle East as adash is a visiting fellow with the Cent on United States and Europe here at Brookings and a wonderful addition to our team uh just in the past year uh she is also Global opinions columnist of the Washington Post and a renowned journalist with a long history of uh excellent writing on Turkish and other Affairs as she was previously a senior policy fellow at the council and the European Council on Foreign Relations and joined us here at Brookings as I mentioned danan Madan is a senior at the center for East Asian
02:30 - 03:00 policy each policy studies here at Brookings and the foreign policy program she's also host of the Global India podcast which I highly recommend listening to here at Brooking uh her work explores India's role in the world and in particular she's an expert on India China relations in the triangle between India China and the United States she's the author of fateful triangle how China shaped us India relations during the Cold War and Patricia Kim is a fellow here at Brookings and hold a joint appointment between the John L thoron China Cent Center and the center for East Asian
03:00 - 03:30 policy studies here at in the foreign policy program of Brookings she's an expert on Chinese foreign policy us China relations and the politics and security of East Asia in general she co-leads the global China project which again I cannot recommend enough looking at our website for the global China project and the Brooking csis project on advancing collaboration in the era of strategic competition really one of the best voices now on Chinese policy in Washington and I'm delighted that she and all four of our of our panelists
03:30 - 04:00 have joined us today so Angela if I may I'm going to start with you and I'm going to ask about Russia and there's a lot to unpack here but if you can give us the uh quick overview of Russia's reaction to the War uh how it's public but especially its leadership has what stance they have taken uh with the events in the past two and half months thank you Natan for inviting me to be on this uh broadcast with my great colleagues um so this war has been a very positive development for Russia um
04:00 - 04:30 it's taken away the world's attention from the Russia Ukraine war and what Russia has been doing there um the media are full of obviously focusing on the on the war in Gaza uh and very little attention is being paid globally to what's going on in Ukraine so that's the I think the first point the second one is that Russia and Putin particularly have taken advantage of the war to really burnish Russia's credentials with the global South um even before the war
04:30 - 05:00 in Gaza broke out and the atrocities of um October 7th happened many countries in the global South had not taken sides in the Russia Ukraine war some of them were inclined to sympathize with the Russians in that War uh and what Russia has done uh by supporting very solidly the Palestinians uh Hamas has again burnished its credentials and endeared it to a number of countries in the global South um and we saw uh Putin finally making his first trip outside of
05:00 - 05:30 the former Soviet Union and and China to the Middle East um a few weeks ago going to Saudi Arabia uh going to the United um Arab Emirates and having a very warm reception there uh and I think the third point to make here is that Russia this war has really induced Russia um to change its stance in the Middle East before the war broke out Russia was seen really as an honest broker a country that talked to all sides on all disputes
05:30 - 06:00 strong ties to Iran to Saudi Arabia Egypt uh the UAE but also strong ties to Israel a relationship that both Putin and Netanyahu had cultivated and Russia has now been critical of Israel critical of the United States for supporting Israel distance itself from Israel and you've also seen uh the rise of domestic anti-Semitism in Russia never far away but it's come back again and so as far as the Russian Public's concerned we don't have very good data on their views
06:00 - 06:30 on the war but to the extent that the Russians to remain in Russia largely support uh what Putin is doing in Ukraine um and and support Russian foreign policy uh there hasn't really been any public uh criticism uh of Russia's stance in this war thank you so much uh paty want turn to you again for the quick kind of overview of how has China reacted to this what is the what is what is the mood in a sense both in ch public but
06:30 - 07:00 especially among the Chinese Elites well Nan thanks so much for inviting me to join this panel today uh China's official response uh has been characteristically Broad and relatively detached from the ongoing conflict uh since the October 7th terrorist attacks China has not condemned the attacks or referenced Hamas by name um instead it has condemned acts that harmed civilians and called for a cessation of hostilities uh the day after October Sant the Chinese foreign Ministry issued
07:00 - 07:30 a statement expressing concern around the escalation of tensions calling on all all parties to remain calm and saying that sort of the only way to resolve conflict between Israel and Palestine was through a two-state solution and then there was sort of Silence uh president XU Jinping only commented publicly for the first time on the crisis nearly two weeks after the October 7th attacks and then um and then since then we've seen some diploma engagements between Chinese top
07:30 - 08:00 officials and their counterparts uh on November 30th China released a fivepoint position paper on the conflict that essentially calls for an immediate ceasefire for the protection of civilians and the Deliverance of humanitarian assistance it also calls for more diplomatic mediation it says that countries with influence on quote relevant parties should play a constructive role in de-escalating the crisis and the paper also calls for an International Peace
08:00 - 08:30 conference led by the UN that can ultimately lead to a two-state solution what's really interesting about this position paper is that Beijing explicitly avoids any suggestions that it's seeking to take a leading role on advancing any of those five uh points that it's put forth instead it calls on the UN Security Council or the United Nations to assume a leading role uh whether it's on calling for a ceasefire or ramping out humanitarian assistance
08:30 - 09:00 obviously China is part of the UNC part of the UN but I think it's notable that Beijing has not signal that it sees a major role for itself in this conflict uh and just one other point you know what's striking is that four Chinese Nationals have been killed six injured and two have been reporting missing as a result of the ongoing crisis but the Chinese Ministry of uh foreign affairs as well as other government organs have kind of avoided highlighting the harm
09:00 - 09:30 that's come to Chinese citizens uh the news barely got any coverage it was just very sort of briefly matter of factly uh covered at one press conference and the tragedies have also received less attention on Chinese social media than one would expect although again you know of course it's hard to tell whether the relative lack of interest in Chinese Media or Chinese social media is due to censorship or due to genuine disinterest in the issue but I think you know on the whole there really hasn't been too much of a public reaction in China to the War
09:30 - 10:00 uh which is very different from the reaction Preen here in the United States or in other countries where the conflict has really stirred strong emotions concern activism and debate I think for most average Chinese as well as those Chinese who are very embedded in the policy Arena and so what I mean by that are like Think Tank experts or Scholars uh even for these types of folks who follow foreign policy as a living I think the Middle East remains very much
10:00 - 10:30 a distant region for them even as China's economic interests and diplomatic engagement with this region has grown over the last two decades you know just one final example uh chinga University's Center for International Security and strategy conducted a public poll last November um asking you know what what do what do Chinese believe should be China's top priorities when it comes to International Security issues and in this poll they found 3.3% of
10:30 - 11:00 Chinese believe that the Middle East should be among China's top priorities it was essentially the lowest ranking issue coming behind terrorism supply chain security and a host of other topics and my sense is that if this poll were conducted again today uh even with the conflict raging on actively I don't think that number would change very dramatically I think it kind of illustrates uh sort of the the sort of the Detachment that the Chinese political system and their people have
11:00 - 11:30 from the region thanks so much tanvi um an outlier a giant outlier could you tell us a little bit about about Indian Indian reaction I think you've seen kind of an Indian response that has kind of operated on Parallel tracks but also evolved over the course of the crisis uh and I think is reflective of both U various drivers that are at play and motivations for Indian interests at Play but second and kind of a you know very
11:30 - 12:00 different from what Patty was talking about in China's case which is for India this region matters deeply it is not far away it is essentially part of India is what India considers its ex extended neighborhood and so what you've seen in terms of that Evolution or that parallel track approach is initially a very kind of quick Modi tweet Prime Minister Modi tweet condemning the terrorist attack against Israel did not name him Mass but was very unequivocal no kind of caveats
12:00 - 12:30 or conditions or contexts and this kind of you know comes from both India's own experience of dealing with counterterrorism a certain empathy that Indians feel uh you know recall it was about the 15th anniversary of the Mumbai attacks uh not so uh not so long ago and so you s saw kind of of a shared sense of needing to deal uh with counterterrorism and in some cases for for prime modi's base against Islamic
12:30 - 13:00 extremis extremism as they see it but also a reflection I think this condemnation of this attack reflection of India's very close relationship with Israel uh a country that uh has been a reliable perhaps India's most reliable military supplier during every crisis or war that India has fought more so than Russia more so than the US um or France for that matter I think the other kind of concern that was at play very quickly or very soon for India was evacuating
13:00 - 13:30 Indian citizens who did want to leave Israel and number did and a number of of citizens of State as well but while you saw that from particularly the political leadership you saw very soon after uh the foreign Ministry uh kind of issue a broader response that did reiterate India's long-standing support for a two two- State solution and while it's not well known even the Modi government and Prime Minister Modi himself have not backed down from that as much
13:30 - 14:00 as they've been very forward leaning about support for Israel uh generally his government he's been the first Indian Prime Minister to go to rala to talk about uh you know the need for a thriving a viable Palestinian State India essentially de facto recognizes a state of Palestine uh and so you've seen and and givel has always given a lot of humanitarian assistance including under this government so I think you've seen that kind of broader broadening out of also mentioning that at the end of the day India thinks the only viable
14:00 - 14:30 solution to the turmoil uh in the Middle East is a two-state solution you've seen a number of diplomatic calls uh both in terms of Prime Minister Modi and foreign minister J shanka uh speaking to uh their kind of counterparts uh not just in uh in in kind of Israel uh and uh you know the Palestinian territories but also uh with a number of regional leaders particularly amongst the gulf Arab uh Gulf Arab states Prime Minister Modi also took the opportunity while he
14:30 - 15:00 was went for cop 28 to have some of those uh discussions uh as well uh and then I think one other thing that I would highlight in terms of and just to mention uh Prime Minister Modi just spoke to uh uh prime minister Netanyahu just today and we can talk maybe about that later when we discuss the maritime security dimension of that uh but I think that was a specific uh a specific agenda item today but I think one other thing that I will mention is kind of India's not just just broadening out and mentioning its support of a two-state
15:00 - 15:30 solution uh but also how India's position at the UN General Assembly has uh has kind of evolved somewhat uh initially you saw India and you know when there were resolutions calling for a ceasefire India abstained from that position uh but you've seen India just in this last Angar resolution uh vote in favor as other kind of us allies like Australia also changed their position um while mentioning and what you've seen with this evolution is India now not
15:30 - 16:00 calling for restraint or ceasefire which I think this government will not do but talking about one uh condemning the terrorist attack condemning The Taking of hostages and calling for their release at the same time expressing deep concern about attacks against uh violence against civilians the killing of civilians uh as well as reiterating that it wants to see International humanitarian law respected and as and the third element of India's approach that has changed both the un uh and
16:00 - 16:30 today on the call between the Modi Netanyahu call uh was the Prime Minister saying India wants to see a peaceful resolution or a return to peace and stability in the region as soon as possible uh partly in because this region as I mentioned at the beginning crucially important uh for India 9 million plus Indian citizens here this is a crucial uh source of imported oil and natural gas for India uh and India is this matters not just for geopolitical stability but for the Indian economy as well and therefore for
16:30 - 17:00 Indian politics at a time when India is going into an election year and so I think uh this India sees this and has responded to this crisis very much because this region has not just been important but is getting even more important as not just Israel but the gulf Arab states are becoming partners of India and as India becomes concerns about Chinese influence uh growing uh in this region thanks so much t i last but certainly not least the most involved in
17:00 - 17:30 the region and the closely involved in the in the Affairs and the actors itself how has turkey responded um to these events thank you Natan and thank you for organizing this panel but also for noting uh that this we are having this conver conversation at a very somber moment uh acknowledging the continued human suffering as we talk about geopolitics uh continued suffering in Israel and Gaza um turkey's position has been unique in a number of ways uh it's
17:30 - 18:00 been shaped very much by President erdogan's personal reaction to what is happening it is a personalized regime but erdogan has also uh been very much uh the uh showing ownership of the Palestinian issue has used it in the domestic discourse over the years and um his reaction has been uh emotional ideological some have called it Neo ottomanist
18:00 - 18:30 whatever it was it ended turkey ended up being the harshest critic of Israel in the region uh May if we were to exclude Iran maybe uh there is no NATO country uh or Arab state that has come out in such strong terms as turkey has and uh both in criticism of Israel and its uh military operations in Gaza but also in coming out and uh legitimizing Hamas which is what
18:30 - 19:00 president erdogan has done very early on in the conflict saying that Hamas is not a terrorist organization a week or two after October 7 so that set turkey apart from Regional players it has isolated turkey to a large extent and prevented turkey from playing the type of role it wants to play in the region in Palestinian Affairs and in post post war uh reconstruction or even governance of
19:00 - 19:30 Gaza U so it's been a question to me and something I have tried to Grapple with in my own analysis for Brookings why is erdogan coming out in such strong terms why has he self- sabotaged in a sense preventing undercut a role that turkey could play in the region in hostage negotiation in mediation efforts and so on and so forth obviously the answer is ideological personal emotional but also
19:30 - 20:00 it is clear that Israel Israeli Palestinian issue is an anomaly in erdogan's geopolitical uh pragmatism on pretty much every issue in the region and in whether it's Syria whether Libya UK the war in Ukraine he has shown enormous amount of pragmatism ability to deal with different sides change course normalize with former
20:00 - 20:30 enemies and so on and so forth but not on this issue uh he has come out in defense of Hamas ER going back to sort of the Affinity he's held with Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements during the Arab Spring before the Arab Spring during the Arab Spring and afterwards and the issue has also uh created an extra layer of complication in turkey's relationship with the United States an ongoing drama there's been efforts over
20:30 - 21:00 the past few years to put a floor put some sort of guard rails into what has been very much a declining relationship but we've seen that the sort of anti-israeli sentiment that is expressed in Turkey the harsh criticism of Israel's conduct has now seeped into the Turkish American space really uh continuing uh really preventing efforts uh ongoing efforts for a reset that uh I think that um Israeli Palestinian issue
21:00 - 21:30 is front and center to how erdogan views turkey's role in the region it's also front and center to the contract he has tried to establish with Turkish Society based on his domestic platform that this is the century of turkey turkey is rising we are panica new version of pax Tom manica is inevitable it's coming under his leadership The Rebirth of the Turkish Empire in a sense so on and so
21:30 - 22:00 forth all these are constant incessant themes in Turkish uh Turkish media Turkish domestic space and so on and I think the Palestinian issue has long been described as the one issue where Turkish exceptionalism is going to manifest itself uh the sort of Turkish influence is going to provide a solution to Palestinians and and the reality is on a narrative level yes erdogan has come out criticizing ing Israel standing up for what he sees as Palestinian uh
22:00 - 22:30 rights and statehood and so on but he also has created a political uh environment a division with a Divergence with turkey's allies so much so that it it has become very difficult to for turkey to achieve its goals specifically in the Palestinian space uh trying to take part in mediation trying to take part in governance humanitarian issues turkey is frozen out of the conflict
22:30 - 23:00 right now and that is a reality I think thank you very much ASA and I'd like to point out also for the audience um an excellent piece you wrote for us on Brookings on our website and recently also an interview with Kevin hugard uh Q&A exactly on these issues Andel if I may turn to you also discussed um Turkish preference for Hamas in a sense and Affinity between uan himself uh for Hamas not only over Israel but also over
23:00 - 23:30 the Palestinian Authority the secular strands in Russia it's it's an interesting development we've seen uh Putin um speak very fondly in a sense of Hamas or certainly choose that that side but obviously Russia has had a very different approach in the path towards islamist groups and a deep fear of of Islamic extremism in particular how do you think this has evolved uh in Russian thinking right now is this purely instrumental you're quite right um that Russia has had its own very bad
23:30 - 24:00 experiences with fundamentalism particularly emanating from the north Caucasus and it's taken a very tough line uh with its domestic terrorists Russia does not define as never said that Hamas is a terrorist organization um I think largely um there was an interesting interview with the Russian um ambassador to Israel a number of years ago where he said well Hamas doesn't threaten Russian citizens uh you know and therefore we don't Define it as a terrorist organization um so somehow uh you know the r the Russian government
24:00 - 24:30 the Kremlin has managed to separate its own concerns about fundamentalism and terrorism domestically from its you know support for Hamas as an actor in a region where Russia would like to have more of a say um and you you saw the Hamas delegation come to Moscow um you know after uh the the hostilities broke out um there are questions about how much Russia knew before the October 7th attacks about what was going to happen and we don't have any definitive answers
24:30 - 25:00 to that but there's certainly a discussion about that Hamas has received financial support um from Russia so somehow the Russians are able to uh to designate Hamas as as a as an organization was supporting because it doesn't directly threaten them um and you know the the Russians haven't condemned Hamas for what they did uh in Israel uh and so that I think they're quite able to to manage that that separation there and could you could you speak more
25:00 - 25:30 broadly about the Russian calculation how how is Russian geopolitical calculation changed both in the region and more broadly you already mentioned Ukraine Russia was uh heavily involved in the in the Syrian Civil War and it still has troop station there you mentioned the Israeli Russian relationship that had a lot to do with DEC conflicting Israeli operations in Syrian airospace from Russian air defenses um how how has that calculation changed is Russia continuing uh with the same posture in Syria how does it think
25:30 - 26:00 this might affect its operations in Ukraine well I mean the Russians are still involved in Syria but less so than before just because they you know focusing on the war with Ukraine and therefore they have fewer resources to devote to the conflict in Syria um they've had this arrangement with the Israelis uh for a number of years now a deconfliction Arrangement uh whereby if the Israelis need to take action against Hezbollah um and they inform the Russians the the Russians make make sure that they can do it my understanding is
26:00 - 26:30 that since October the 7th some of this cooperation is continuing but it's fraying so I think that will be something to watch going forward depending how long uh the conflict lasts um but in general I think the Russians have been trying to increase their presence in the region I think uh Putin and the Kremlin were not happy that it was the United States that um arranged the that negotiated the Abraham Accords and that they were really sort of shut out of that so on the one hand they've
26:30 - 27:00 they've moved very strongly to support the Palestinians um and Hamas but on the other hand they would still like to play uh some kind of a mediating role and they've been explicit about that since the conflict broke out so they're trying to again raise their profile there maintain uh their relations with uh uh with the countries uh that they have been dealing with for a number of years and I think the other new dimension is Iran uh the Iranian Russian relationship uh has always been there um it's been
27:00 - 27:30 somewhat contentious some of the time but now it's really changed I mean Iran is a major supplier of drones to Russia um uh the the Russian Iranian relationship has gotten much closer uh we just had another visit uh um from the Iranian president uh in Russia and as far as we can see and I think this is something to watch Russia may also be altering its stance on Iran's own nuclear program uh it may may be taking uh uh less of a tough stance on this so
27:30 - 28:00 I think this is this is a relationship that was developing before October 7th but I think it's strengthened since then Natan you need to unmute yourself thank you tandi apologies all P continuing on the same theme um China historically has always had a position of viewing the Middle East as uh a
28:00 - 28:30 remote region someone else's problem to a certain degree but in recent years there has been more involvement at least in at least in the periphery uh we saw of course um very visibly Chinese mediation or at least the signing of the Saudi Iranian deal in China and we've seen also the presence of Chinese um forces in of jibuti and and elsewhere he tell us a little bit about the Chinese Evolution and thinking about its interest in the Middle East to the degree that this war intercedes with
28:30 - 29:00 those at all sure so Natan China has long prided itself in its ability to talk to quote all sides in the Middle East it's thought to Brand itself as a neutral player as a peace broker in the region while painting the United States as a biased hegemonic power whose policies have brought chaos to the region and um I think this has largely been China's goal related to the conflict in Gaza Prim beijing's objectives have been to
29:00 - 29:30 again portray itself as a neutral proponent for peace and while at the same time signaling its alignment with many non-western states by lending support to the Palestinian cause so that's kind of the balance that China has tried to strike as you mentioned in March of this year uh China helped broker a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran to restore relations the following month it offered to mediate between Israel and Palestine um but I think since the October 7th response China's
29:30 - 30:00 tepid response has basically damaged its ties with Israel and I think Beijing has made the Strategic calculation that it would rather alienate Israel than alienate all of its other Middle Eastern counterparts uh the Chinese State media has really leaned into using the current crisis to criticize the US it's pointed to the history of military US military interventions and the support for Israel for destabilizing the region it's criticize the United States for being unable to serve as a great power force
30:00 - 30:30 for peace in the region um but notably I think Chinese leaders top leaders themselves have refrained from really leaning heavily into this kind of criticism uh given the events and Israel and Gaza were unfolding in the leadup to the Biden shei meeting last month which Beijing was very intent on uring was a success and I think today still there's there's a desire not to rock uh us China relationship and so they they're not leaning as much directly into this
30:30 - 31:00 narrative although the Chinese media is um and Chinese commentators are sort of um not shying away from from accusing the United States of stoking the fire or criticizing Washington's one-sided support uh to Israel um but again while Beijing is critiquing the United States performance in the region it's not suggesting by any means that it's interested in stepping up as a great power savior um you know I've spoken with a number of Chinese colleagues and
31:00 - 31:30 delegations who've come to DC since October I've also gone to China um earlier this month and in all of these conversations I've asked my counterparts what role do you see China playing in the current conflict and the answer is not much at all I think as one expert put it it's really the ball is in the US court that's how they see it uh this you know you would also think that uh the crisis is an area where China might actively coordinate with the United States given shared interests in preventing the spread of conflict and shared concerns about sea lanes and and
31:30 - 32:00 um ensuring that Commerce and energy can flow through uh but there seems to be very little interest or appetite for coordination which is you know interesting I think it's because Beijing just really doesn't see much benefit by waiting in too deeply um or by working with the United States directly on the Middle East and uh you know I think China has been happy to expand its diplomatic profile um over the last two decades this has sort of accompanied its expanding um
32:00 - 32:30 economic footprint in the region uh but it has no interest really in taking over or sharing with the United States the traditional role of serving as a security provider to the region I think that's that's essentially where the Chinese are they believe that it's precisely the United States Misadventures as a security provider that has fueled the united states decline and they have no interest in stepping into uh America's shoes as the
32:30 - 33:00 world's police thanks KY could you touch a little bit on on the same kind of uh question for India India's positioned towards the Middle East but in particular towards Israelis and Palestinians has changed a lot in recent decades um perhaps in tandem with a change in in India's Global position how do the two interact and and could you explain the The vaunted Hyphen to us what how is how is the Modi government approached Israelis and Palestinians more generally how does that differ from
33:00 - 33:30 previous eras of Congress government I think it's quite interesting in some senses uh you know was a it was a congress party government that normaliz or established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 uh but you have seen a Modi government that has taken an approach which the Prime Minister himself has on many fronts which is look if this is what we're doing let's just be open about what how we are actually U you know dealing with particular countries
33:30 - 34:00 so for instance even with the US you know this is a person who said why has no American president ever been invited for India's national day and when he's told that's just because we don't do that he said well we will and so you've seen this is even with kind of Israel and Palestine where uh this is a prime minister who became the first Indian Prime Minister to go to Israel uh who has been much more open about what India does with Israel uh previous governments have engaged with them particularly on
34:00 - 34:30 the defense and security side that's always been kind of quieter it is to some extent even now but you've just seeing a much more forward-leaning open relationship uh where you've seen now India also at the UN for instance moving from often voting to in kind of these resolutions that were condemning uh Israel more because of its traditional support for the Palestinians now it has often abstained uh rather you see that shift having said that as part of this kind of open uh more open policy
34:30 - 35:00 that uh that Modi has had as I mentioned he has also done more in terms of de facto recognizing a state of palestin so for instance his own visit separate from the visit to uh uh Israel uh the Indian president visited uh ramala as well now most of this as as you uh you'll see from the place I'm mentioning is with kind of the West Bank uh with the Palestinian Authority it's not with uh what with Hamas and Gaza but nonetheless
35:00 - 35:30 you've seen that you've seen this government established foreign office consultations with the Palestinians the last kind of iteration was held just a few months ago continuing to support uh the Palestinians through humanitarian assistance through setting up IT training facilities those kind of things and during covid even kind of making the case to the Israelis that it was important for India to send vaccines uh to the for alians and so you've seen this kind of uh essentially India say we
35:30 - 36:00 are kind of deying uh uh hyphenating uh these two but you're seeing at this point when crisis like this happens how difficult that becomes to navigate and I I'll just quote uh something the U Indian permanent representative the UN after this most recent vote said in in their kind of explanation of why they moved from uh to abstaining uh on this call uh recent resolution or S sorry voting for The Resolution uh and she
36:00 - 36:30 said our challenge in this extraordinary difficult time is to strike the right balance and I think that's become that becomes tough for India but whether with Israel uh uh the Israelis and Palestines or if you look at India in the Middle East more broadly this kind of trying to strike this balance is basically the name of the game for India uh you know how do you strike a balance with these relationships also with Israel uh with the gulf Arab states uh and uh even Iran the Abraham Accords
36:30 - 37:00 the potential Israel Saudi deal was going to make one aspect of that easier uh but uh now that looks complicated as well thank you um as we got a question from the audience about us turkey relations I wonder if you can uh tell us a little bit about about that you already touched on that in your previous answer but I wonder if you You' expend a little bit about where that is going with relation to to this crisis and otherwise but second L turkey you know immediately after the terrorist attacks
37:00 - 37:30 of October 7th turkey seemed to be in an awkward position uh it host some of the Hamas leaders and there seemed to be question of whether they would be expelled or not today perhaps turkey's in a different position perhaps it's on the side of much more of public opinion how does this relate to turkey's more broader Regional relationships with Saudi Arabia with the gulf with others it's those relations have gone through a roller coaster in recent years could you tell us a little bit of where they stand and uh and where they might go from here thank you Natan let me start with
37:30 - 38:00 Hamas and the region uh obviously turkey has come to defend Hamas uh publicly um and um this is in line with long-standing policy advoc arguing that Hamas is a legitimate Palestinian actor and should be part of the political process Eran has publicly invited Ed khed mashal the then Hamas head of political Wing in 2006 and since
38:00 - 38:30 then there's been public and regular contacts with Hamas turkey does make a distinction between the political and Military Wing uh they have they say they have no relationship with the military wing and as far as I know there's been no accusation of Turkish support in that sense we know that Iran is behind hamas's military operations and has been providing logistical help and so on but uh the fact that uh turkey has continued
38:30 - 39:00 to Advocate Hamas uh to be a legitimate actor has long been an issue with Gulf Arab Arab states who do not like Hamas do not like any type of political movement that comes from political Islam or the Muslim or Muslim Brotherhood root and argues for um essentially uh participation in a political Pro process competitive polit political process that is is very much what erdogan uh thinks is legitimate that's
39:00 - 39:30 very much his understanding of politics legitimate politics Eran uh would say you know when he is uh reminded that he's been criticized for his support for Hamas he says they have won elections right haven't they therefore in his understanding of democracy or politics or competitive politics if you win elections uh you can establish a type of major majoritarian rule like in Turkey like in other parts in some other parts
39:30 - 40:00 of the liberal world and that is legitim enough of a legitimization so I think on the Hamas issue this is a big division between Gulf States Gulf Arab states and turkey and uh what needs to happen in Gaza is a continuation of that a huge difference turkey want turkey has suggested some type of a guarantor stat guarantor ship trusteeship for Palestinians in Gaza obviously uh isra
40:00 - 40:30 Israel has no interest in seeing turkey play that role at the moment nor does Egypt nor does UAE nor Saudi Arabia there is this clear division that has to do with what what Hamas is what politics is what legitimacy is that I think will continue uh and um when it comes to I think uh United States and Turkey is US relationship I often use sort of a tired old cliche of a failed marriage I'm
40:30 - 41:00 sorry to bring it up but it is essentially some type of a failed relationship or marriage where the two sides know they cannot divorce but they cannot live together either so it's a big dispute about separation how to do it who gets to keep the car who gets to keep the house or the kids and so on and so forth I think turkey sees the Middle East as essential to it power projection Regional role it wants to play and
41:00 - 41:30 increasingly us positioning in the region is seen uh either as encirclement or as an impediment to the role turkey wants to play and here think of not just Israel Palestine but also Syria also Iraq also maybe the uh parts of Eastern Mediterranean that is a longstanding issue and will continue I uh listen to Patty described how China Chinese V media views and talks about uh us role
41:30 - 42:00 in the region and that's not any different in Turkey I think increasingly both in media and in some of the public political discourse we're hearing us role in the region particularly after the October 7 more described as uh us being an agent of chaos not a source of stability but instability uh when we we us buildup in eastern Mediterranean after October 7
42:00 - 42:30 very much intended to dissuade Iran from escalating Turkish reaction uh was not uh support for this position if it was in fact quite very clear expression of concern that us presence there was provocative what do they intend to do president erdogan has asked publicly what is US intention by sending warship so I think the Turkish American relationship is a drama that will
42:30 - 43:00 continue on there may be moments where we can um you know find establish guard rails I think uh obviously this is not just about the Middle East about NATO about the war in Ukraine about Syrian Kurds there are many elements for about of it but um you know perhaps uh if uh there could be um there could would be a Turkish ratification for Sweden's NATO accession
43:00 - 43:30 there would be a more of a stabilizing moment in the relationship and and and following that a dialogue with the US on Syria on Regional issues and so on but when it comes to Gaza I think the divisions the the will remain uh Turkish vision of how Palestinians should be governed will be different from what UAE thinks what Egypt thinks what Regional layers thing and it's not clear to me
43:30 - 44:00 that uh us has a clear understanding of what the future will look like who can play important roles and whether or not they feel turkey is an actor they can work with on these issues so um what Israel thinks is a different matter I think uh there erdogan has burned more bridges than he is willing to recognize but this has become a structural issue I think thank you very much um Angela
44:00 - 44:30 we've gotten several questions about a very important topic we haven't discussed yet which is the disruption to Maritime to shipping already that we've seen this is one of the forms of escalation of this conflict that's well beyond its borders alongside perhaps public opinion and the possibility of escalation of course uh in in Lebanon but here we're already seeing major um shipping Giants stopping their shipping through the red which could have effects on cost worldwide um how does this relate to to
44:30 - 45:00 Russian calculations does this does this affect Russia or do sanctions perhaps obviate the question for them um so I mean it's it's an issue obviously of I can't hear you at least Angela I a paron can you hear me okay okay all right yeah I mean it's an issue of concern to Russia I don't think it's the major um issue sort of determining what Russia is doing doing uh in the region at the moment um as you said the sanctions have already disrupted uh
45:00 - 45:30 Russia's trade although we know that a number of countries have helped Russia um uh evade these these sanctions so um I haven't seen very much in in what the Russians are publicly talking about this conflict um that has to do with this with this issue okay thank you very much um I want to I'll open the same question up more broadly um in terms tanvi or Patty anyone else in terms of shipping and
45:30 - 46:00 what do you think this might affect uh for for long-term interests um going forward T go ahead uh I mean I I'll say I think you know you've seen India I don't know if they'll forget example join this new uh operation Prosperity Guardian that the uh the dod announced the US dood announced but we have seen reports this morning that India is is deploying a second Destroyer uh into the kind of Northern Arabian Sea area uh closer to the kind kind of coast
46:00 - 46:30 of Aiden uh what I think you're seeing is and I suspect even if India doesn't formally join some sort of kind of Coalition effort that this will be coordinated uh with friends uh in the region but also friends like the US for instance India is now part of now Prosperity Guardian is part of the uh kind of combined Maritime force uh India has now forly joined that fairly recently so I suspect maybe some coordination happening there as well um
46:30 - 47:00 so I think for India at least this disruption is actually would be very crucial and as I said you know it becomes an economic issue it's an it's about energy supplies but it's also about kind of anything economic becomes a political issue as well if it leads to higher prices and kind of inflation so I think India is deeply concerned and you know this adds to if you think about it for India but for everybody else this has been whether or not you like the term poly crisis somebody called it Omni
47:00 - 47:30 shambles uh the last few years it's been one crisis after another uh that India and other Regional countries have been grappling with and for India it's been everything from covid a border crisis with China the US withdrawal from Afghanistan the Russian invasion of uh Ukraine and now this and all of this has fall out uh even though they might seem like they're not kind of directly related or India is not directly involved so I think ition of shipping is a crucial crucial element of this so Natan U the the news this
47:30 - 48:00 morning in in China was that Costco which is a Chinese shipping giant had suspended its uh its shipments through the Red Sea along with many other um large international shipping companies and oil companies and that they'd be rerouting uh shipping through the Red Sea and so uh for China I mean the instability in that region is definitely impacting China's business interest China is the world's largest oil importer and about half of its oil
48:00 - 48:30 imports come from that region um the Red Sea is a critical trade route for China uh it's it's critical for ensuring the flow of Chinese trade to markets in Europe and Africa in the middle of East um and so there's a lot at stake for China but also for the rest of the world uh in 2017 China opened its first overseas base in Djibouti um and part of the re you know said that it did this so that it could contribute to peacekeeping
48:30 - 49:00 operations and anti-piracy operations in the Red Sea region which it had been doing since about 2008 um but my understanding is that China you know has been regularly doing these counter piracy operations but I'm not really sure how big uh it is compared to the United States and its partners and it's certainly not part of the of the new sort of Red Sea task force that's been announced for helping SE lanes open keep SE lanes open thank you
49:00 - 49:30 Asen um natana uh I don't think turkey would be Keen to join uh Red Sea task force to keep shipping lanes open for a number of reasons I think uh clearly uh they feel the danger of regional escalation is not over and it's not just who is in Yemen of course we that we need to watch out but also the very dangerous uh situation on North of
49:30 - 50:00 Israel on the border and the back and the situation with Hezbollah so while we think uh occasionally there's commentary suggesting that is under uh that's relatively uh predictable uh controlled conflict you know I I don't think anyone can be confident about that so uh I do not see turkey joining a na evil Mission because inevitably it may involve a direct escalation with Iran but more
50:00 - 50:30 importantly I I think that turkey sees this whole notion of uh India Middle East Trade route that was announced recently as an alternative to its own uh its own economic prospects it's so the trade route that it that encompasses turkey I think uh that uh when this announcement came at G7 uh at G20 sorry
50:30 - 51:00 Turkish reaction was very mixed this is clearly something uh that Turkish officials feel is an alternative to the middle Corridor that passes from Turkey into aeran Armenia into sort of Central Asia and China a route that they regard as the second silk rout Silk Road and and very important for long-term turkey's geoeconomic calculations so I
51:00 - 51:30 don't think there is great interest in stabilizing that that route in a military u in in a joint military task force I should also add on a on a different note there continues to be trade and shipping between turkey and Israel despite this sort of uh enormous criticism of Israel's uh action in Gaza specifically targeting uh Israeli Prime
51:30 - 52:00 Minister binyamin Netanyahu accusing him war crimes and so on uh turkey has not cut off trade with Israel uh much of it via uh shipping lanes it's not a huge amount 79 billion depending dollars depending on what year to look but it is largely in turkey's favor so there's a trade uh deficit in in favor of Turkey turkey and that is also something Turkish Society has come to accept that
52:00 - 52:30 we that our government takes action to try to uh to to bring case a case against nanahu in international criminal court but that you know we continue to trade with uh Israel and that has been the the type of pragmatism that erdogan has convinced Turkish Society on this issue and very interesting thank you I know that that was the case
52:30 - 53:00 also after um the flotilla incident Turkish Israeli trade continued almost uninf for years and in fact it grew over the years yeah okay uh in the little time we have left I'd like to turn a little bit and think about us policy so Angela you you were a US government official and in more than one very Central agency um how does this affect us policy especially Vis Russia obviously the US has an enormous investment both uh in uh the Ukraine but now also in the Middle East we've seen
53:00 - 53:30 attempts by the administration to pass supplemental uh budgeting via Congress that has hit some roadblocks can you tell how does this affect us calculation towards Russia to the degree that it does well first of all um if uh as was talking about uh you know the bad marriage between the United States and Turkey you know the US Russian relationship is by now a failed marriage uh and it doesn't look as if it's going to be redeemable uh for some time to come um and and in general from the US
53:30 - 54:00 point of view you know Russia has been unhelpful um in all of these situations so if we start with the domestic obviously what's happened uh since the since the war broke out is that the Congressional attention which was anyway skeptical uh on the Republican side about continuing to to support Ukraine has been distracted also by the need to support Israel and so the debates that you've seen in Congress and the um unwillingness and inability actually to
54:00 - 54:30 give the to allocate the money to vote on the money for Ukraine um where Israel is certainly prioritized over Ukraine it's also affected of course um Congressional uh assistance and money for um for Israel so it's really deepened The Divide within us society and within uh the US political establishment um about how far the US should continue supporting Ukraine that was there anyway but that I think has
54:30 - 55:00 been exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East and of course that's something which from the Russian point of view is ex extremely welcome um if you watch their nightly talk shows they were uh very happy they were gloating about the inability of Congress then to vote this money for Ukraine um and and otherwise I mean it's the US it's the US officials that are flying to the Middle East that are going to the different countries um that are trying to uh you
55:00 - 55:30 know bring an end uh to this conflict um you supporting Israel but also understanding that the situation in in Gaza is pretty catastrophic it's not Russian officials that are doing that they might like to play a greater role there uh and I think from the US point of view the you know Russia has seen in so many areas of the world as a spoiler um in this particular conflict um the Russian uh you know their support for Hamas Cy isn't welcome but I they haven't played
55:30 - 56:00 as much of a spoiler role as they have in other parts of the world uh but certainly um we see no sign now uh that um you there could be a dialogue between the US and Russia on um resolving the this issue uh in the Middle East so I think it it's um it hasn't affected us Russian relations uh that much much but certainly Russia um you know hasn't from the US point of view hasn't contributed
56:00 - 56:30 towards the solution of this issue thanks so much Patty there's been a lot of debate um very heated debate in Washington about us attention to Europe to the war in Ukraine and what that might mean for the ability of the United States to pay attention to what the Pentagon defines as the pacing challenge which is the the PRC um now you add this complication the US which had finally sort of managed to pay attention less to the Middle East is now paying an enormous amount of attention to the Middle East how does this affect us
56:30 - 57:00 policy towards uh a potential crisis with Taiwan or just the ongoing competition I suppose with h with the PRC well Natan it's interesting I think there's a lot of hand ringing in the region outside of China about the fact that this crisis or other priorities May draw the United States away from Asia and Dent through the United States ability to think about Taiwan or other Regional contingencies that might involve China uh interestingly the
57:00 - 57:30 Chinese don't see it that way they still believe that the United States is dead set on sort of focusing on China as the pacing threat um as the US government has outlined uh in various strategies and so they don't see it that way which is which I think is is notable um I think for the United States you know we the it's always had to keep its eyes everywhere around the world right that's what distin ises the United States from China it has Alliance commitments everywhere it's managed to juggle these
57:30 - 58:00 of course you know the resources are limited um but I just don't think just knowing um how Folks at the White House or DOD are thinking I don't think that they're taking their eyes off the ball when it comes to sort of uh deterring China or or competing with China out in the region thanks so much doni similar questions they're looking forward with the crystal ball how does does this affect us in US posture towards India if at all um is does it bring it closer
58:00 - 58:30 because of the relative alignment compared to other major Powers I mean it's quite interesting because there is you're right there is relative alignment of this subject and particularly under the Modi government I mean you did have the uh the kind of leader or not now the leader of the opposition but a leader of the key opposition party the congress party in India who who did call for a ceasefire while condemning the Hamas attack but under this government I think you you have seen alignment on this issue for India's own reasons and so I think what this actually reflects and I
58:30 - 59:00 think even moving forward is going to be the case which is the the kind of immediate narrative that you saw after India's response to the Russian invasion which was here which was oh look India is not aligned and look they don't make uh choices uh it's like automatic you know favoring Russia and those kind of things suddenly that picture gets complicated right because you have an India that's actually on on this issue aligned and on China even more aligned uh and so I think one of the thing even
59:00 - 59:30 more broadly than the US India relationship and I think where you will see that actually work is more perhaps coordination diplomatically but also on the maritime security side but I think more broadly what we're seeing with these multiple crisis and as you know uh um as I used the term pragmatic then you know we can draw these kind of very ideological boxes or say that blocks and I don't think this is a block party that we're going to see in the future I think what we're going to see is a much more
59:30 - 60:00 fluid world where it's really going to be countries taking stances on particular issues and this also complicates that category of the global South uh where yes you have seen a lot of countries uh on this including India um or sorry a lot of countries unlike India taking a very different stance a more Pro Palestinian stance uh whereas you know for a country like India that was calling itself the a voice of the global South much more complex so suddenly for even the US which had been
60:00 - 60:30 seeing India as that voice of the global South engaging with the global South through in some ways India suddenly India doesn't become uh it becomes important as a partner but not necessarily as a conduit to the global South on this particular issue so I think this this is just reflecting this Crisis coming on top of the others is just reflecting the complexity that we're going to see geopolitically in the world uh that all of us are going to have to kind of deal with and grapple with where there's not black and white
60:30 - 61:00 there's going to be a lot of gray thanks so much asley last question to you um looking forward uh We've not seen the end of by any means the end of the extremely difficult events going on um likely we're going to see a draw down of ground operations the next few weeks but it's probably not the end of the prices by any means how do you view Turkish and US Turkish uh positions going forward assuming a long protracted and tragically bloody crisis to
61:00 - 61:30 go Natan as I mentioned this has created a new layer of complication in an already difficult and fragile relationship uh I think it's important to stabilize us Turkish relations and that's been a challenge for both countries and an effort an ongoing effort but uh we are at a dangerous geopolitical moment and the pacing Challenge from China and the sort of Russia's challenge to the uh
61:30 - 62:00 International order I think require some type of stability in the Turkish us relationship and how to get there is easy and this is certainly is not easy and this has certainly made it made the question more difficult by turkey's very overt in public support for Hamas you've seen secretary blink can bypass turkey in his first few rounds of diplomacy in the region you've seen and when he did end up going to
62:00 - 62:30 anara erdogan refused to meet him you've seen President Biden not really engaging much with uh president erdogan for for the reasons we've talked about but there has to be a way uh to harness turkey's interest in the Palestinian issue in a more constructive way that of course requires turkey to change its tone on Hamas uh they Ankara has to also see
62:30 - 63:00 that Israeli public it's not just Min in Nan but also Israeli public that has to agree to a greater Turkish visibility and role uh in this part of the world even in in Gaza so I think that finding a way for a constructive Turkish rule at some point down the line maybe under an different Israeli government would be uh something that people will think over and focus on over the next few years but
63:00 - 63:30 another reason why this maybe is important is yes we have talked about turkey as an outlier in within the NATO context perhaps regionally as well in its uh strong criticism of Israel and support for amas but president erdogan is enormously popular on the Arab Street and increasingly in the global South and so having turkey somehow on board in a
63:30 - 64:00 constructive format would also provide legitimacy to help provide legitimacy to whatever post postc conflict Gaza structure governance whatever it is emerges at the end of the day we don't know what that is we don't know how far down the road that is but at some point there will be need to have have um Regional stakeholders sign off on whatever structure emerges in Gaza and I
64:00 - 64:30 think turkey will be very important in that uh element in that part of the situation thank you very much ASA thank you uh very much to everyone for joining wherever you are uh we hope you will stay tuned for a lot of programming um and other content from The Brookings institution and the foreign policy program i' like a especially to thank very much as Tash bash Angela Sten tan Madan and Patricia Kim for joining it's
64:30 - 65:00 truly a PR privilege to have you as colleagues and I I'm glad we were able to share some of the wisdom that I benefit from all the time with our broader audience uh we will have more events coming up uh just in January even on this topic of the war in the meantime wishing everyone happy holidays and happy New Year and most hopefully a calmer slightly more peaceful time uh given the true tragedy uh ongoing in the region so thank you all very much for joining and thank you to the audience at
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