'Stop obsessing over leading-from-the-front approach', says Lt. Gen. HS Panag (retd)

Summary

In a riveting discussion on 'The Print', Lt. Gen. HS Panag (retd) delves into the ingrained military ethos of leading from the front, questioning its evolving nature as a potentially reckless trait. With historical anecdotes and contemporary incidents, he examines the disproportionate casualty rates among officers and urges for a balance between the noble leadership ideal and tactical responsibility. Emphasizing the empowerment of junior leaders within the ranks, Gen. Panag advocates for a more methodical approach to critical military operations.

Highlights

• Lt. Gen. HS Panag critiques the 'leading from the front' approach in military leadership. 🎖️
• The discussion highlights high officer casualty ratios in the Indian Army. 😮
• Examples from history, like the Charge of the Light Brigade, illustrate leadership flaws. 📜
• Modern examples in Jammu and Kashmir operations show tactical errors. 🗺️
• The empowerment of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) is crucial. 👥

Key Takeaways

• Leading from the front is noble but not without risks. 🎖️
• Histories provide cautionary tales of leadership gone awry. 📜
• Empowerment of junior leaders is crucial for balanced leadership. 👥
• Methodical approaches should not be overshadowed by rushing into action. 🚶‍♂️
• Not every mission requires extreme sacrifice from top leadership. ⚖️

Overview

In a thoughtful conversation, Lt. Gen. HS Panag (retd) and Dasha Baki dissect the traditional military leadership trait of 'leading from the front.' While revered, when misapplied, this approach can lead to unnecessary sacrifices. Gen. Panag reflects on historical and modern military operations, emphasizing the need for balance and measured actions.

With anecdotes like the historic Charge of the Light Brigade and modern challenges in Jammu and Kashmir, the narrative highlights the dangers of unbridled leadership zeal. Panag suggests that fundamental tactical norms should not be ignored in pursuit of valor, as it risks the lives of valuable leaders and disrupts strategic missions.

The discussion also underscores the need for empowering JCOs and NCOs, creating a robust leadership structure that doesn't solely rely on officers leading the charge. Panag calls for empowering junior leadership to adopt a more systematic approach in military operations, ensuring both efficacy and reduced casualty rates.

Chapters

• 00:00 - 00:30: Introduction The chapter titled 'Introduction' features Dasha Baki from 'The Print' who is hosting a discussion with Lt. General HS Panag about his recent column. The topic of the column is the Army's strategy of leading from the front and it questions the justification of sacrificing army officers for this traditional military approach. The chapter opens with a warm welcome extended to General Panag by Dasha Baki, emphasizing the importance and pleasure of discussing such a significant military topic.
• 00:30 - 01:00: Leading from the Front Explained The chapter discusses the concept of 'Leading from the Front' within a military context. It explores the idea that this leadership trait, while traditionally a virtue that can decide the fate of battles, may sometimes lead to reckless behavior. The text provides a scenario where enemy fire has pinned down troops, suggesting that while leading from the front can inspire and motivate soldiers, it might also lead to disregarding fundamental tactics.
• 01:00 - 02:00: Risks and Norms of Leading from the Front In the chapter titled "Risks and Norms of Leading from the Front," the focus is on a situation where a methodical approach is failing and the mission is in jeopardy. Amidst pervasive fear, it emphasizes the critical role of a leader who rises to the occasion, urges others to follow, and directly leads the charge to ensure success.
• 02:00 - 02:30: Casualties and Leadership Ratios The chapter explores the concept of 'leading from the front' as a critical military leadership trait. It emphasizes that this principle is ingrained in young officers and soldiers during their initial training phases. The focus is on how critical this trait is across all armies to ensure effective leadership in combat scenarios.
• 02:30 - 03:30: Psychological Compulsion and Ethos The chapter titled 'Psychological Compulsion and Ethos' discusses the balance between impulsive actions driven by adrenaline and the importance of adhering to technical and tactical norms in leadership. It emphasizes that although actions may seem brash, they are not recklessly foolhardy as they are grounded in necessary precautions. The text underscores the role of a leader who, while taking risks, inspires their troops by leading from the front.
• 03:30 - 05:30: Historical and Recent Examples The chapter discusses the high risk associated with leadership roles in the military, emphasizing that such roles are reserved for critical missions and should not be a common practice. The Indian army values leadership, particularly where officers lead soldiers from the front. The chapter provides statistics, noting that during the 1965 conflict, the ratio of officers to soldiers killed in battle was 1:18, indicating a significant commitment by officers in frontline leadership.
• 05:30 - 07:00: Disempowerment of JCOs and NCOs The chapter discusses the high ratio of officers to soldiers during certain wars, specifically noting that during the K War, the ratio was 1 officer to every 17 soldiers, which is significantly higher than the global average of 1 officer to every 35-40 soldiers. This has raised several questions and concerns regarding the empowerment and roles of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) within the army.
• 07:00 - 09:10: Training and Structural Weaknesses The chapter discusses the high casualties faced by leadership, pondering whether this is due to an obsessive trait among officers to lead from the front, thereby violating norms, or if it stems from inadequate empowerment of junior leadership. It highlights the layered structure of leadership beneath officers, including roles like JCO platoon commanders and NCO section commanders. The chapter questions whether the structural weaknesses in leadership training are contributing to these issues.
• 09:10 - 10:00: International Comparisons The chapter titled 'International Comparisons' delves into the ethos of armies, focusing on the concept of leadership within military contexts. It discusses the expectation and sometimes the psychological compulsion for leaders to 'lead from the front.' This is described as a tradition or norm that permeates through military culture, where the leaders are expected to set examples by being at the forefront. The chapter raises thought-provoking questions about the implications and effectiveness of such leadership styles.
• 10:00 - 11:42: Balancing Ideals and Tactics Chapter Title: Balancing Ideals and Tactics This chapter delves into the complexities of balancing high moral ideals with tactical actions. It explores the tension between having a comprehensive ethos that guides all actions and the challenges of treating each mission or action as an end in itself, without considering the relative importance of each action. The context of insurgency, particularly in regions like Jammu, serves as an illustrative example of how these tensions play out in real-world scenarios. The discussion examines how actions can be seen not just as means to an end but as crucial components of a larger ideological framework.

'Stop obsessing over leading-from-the-front approach', says Lt. Gen. HS Panag (retd) Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 hello this is Dasha Baki for the print and we're back with leant General HS panag to discuss his column from this week stop obsessing over leading from the front it doesn't justify sacrifice of army officers welcome back General thank you for being here DHA always a pleasure to discuss my column with you so this week we discussed the Army's approach of leading from the front so firstly could you explain to our viewers what is this approach approach and why
• 00:30 - 01:00 do you believe it's become a reckless trait where the fundamental tactics are being disregarded within the Army see leading from the front is a military virtue a military trait a leadership trait that decides the fate of battles imagine a situation that enemy fire has pinned down attacking troops casualties are taking
• 01:00 - 01:30 place the methodical approach is not working mission is at stake and the the fear uh which is which is always there in such situations is omnipresent and uh the it's only the leader who gets up says follow me and leads the attack carries the day
• 01:30 - 02:00 so this is a Time proven um time proven um sort of military leadership uh trait you can also call it a call it a principle and all armies Endeavor to you know IDE this uh this trait in their young officers and young soldiers who are the main stay of combat at the very onset of the article I mentioned that leading from the front is not a
• 02:00 - 02:30 Brash ad adrenaline fed impulsive action but it also must adhere to technical Norms it is not a fool Hardy action it must adhere to Tactical Norms so that all necessary precautions are taken yet the leader is leading from from the front and inspiring his troops that is since the risk is high
• 02:30 - 03:00 casualties of leadership is high it is always reserved for most critical um critical missions and it should not be practiced uh practiced as a as a norm in fact Indian army takes great pride um that is leadership uh officer leadership leads from the front our ratios of officers to soldiers killed in battle for 1965 was one is to 18 for U 1971 it
• 03:00 - 03:30 was 1 is to 20 and for the K War it was 1 is to 17 which is relatively very high because the authorization of officers in the Army uh armies all over the world is generally one is to 35 to 40 one officer for 35 to 40 uh soldiers so the disturbing questions which you have highlighted that have been also raised is that uh
• 03:30 - 04:00 uh there are very high casualties U of uh of leadership that has it become an obsessive trait with the officers that they must lead in front and they are violating the norms and uh or is it that uh the junior leadership U is not being U has not been empowered adequately because it's it's a layered leadership below the officers there are jco platoon commanders there are NCO section Commanders ERS as to why are
• 04:00 - 04:30 they not leading from the front these are disturbing questions now to specifically answer as to why does this why does this uh why does this this thing take place one is uh that it's a it at times in it's the ethos of of an of an army where they say leaders must lead from the front so it's it's it's almost it almost becomes a sort of a um psychological compulsion that the officer has to lead it's a it's a kind
• 04:30 - 05:00 of a ethos and all Inc compassing all Inc compassing feeling the second is that every Mission every action is taken as as as a sort of as an end in itself that there is no relativity given to the importance to the to the to the various you know various actions like for example in an Insurgency uh in Insurgency in Jammu and
• 05:00 - 05:30 Kashmir has been going on for nearly you know 35 33 35 years from 89 onwards it's 34 years and U and today it is at a very Lowe there are sporadic terrorist actions in fact terrorists are not proactive so now to treat every action every encounter as a be all and end all and uh you know in the hurry to get the
• 05:30 - 06:00 terrorists disregard tactics disregard the the precautions that we all are supposed to take and suffer casualties is is is is the reason why this why this is why this is happening and uh I have given two examples there of one is of of Lord cardigan now here was a case of uh uh obsession with obsession with the with the with the principle of U of
• 06:00 - 06:30 leading from the leading from the front and also disregarding your command responsibility the Lord cardigan at balalawa that is the famous Charge of the Light Brigade he received the orders through the ADC of Lord regnal Lord regnal was his Superior that you have to go and capture the guns the guns to be captured were actually on on to on on a
• 06:30 - 07:00 hill feature to the South uh to the South and uh whereas Nolan once he reached uh Lord cardigan he misinterpreted the orders instead of pointing out the guns to the south of on the South Hills that is the cosway heights they were known as cosway Heights he pointed the guns at the end of the valley no so it was a kind of a cauldron the cosway Heights on the South were held by the Russians the Northern
• 07:00 - 07:30 Heights were also held by the Russians and at the end of the valley about a mile long valley there were the guns so instead of pointing to the causeway Heights to the South he pointed to uh the um the guns at the in the end of end of the Valley now uh Lord cardan's command responsibility should have been that this is uh probably a wrong order and it is the suicidal uh kind of of a charge and he must sort of
• 07:30 - 08:00 check back with the superior and then proceed you know and if at all at any stage you felt that a disaster is taking place he could have called off the charge but what he did he was uh obsessively possessed with leading from the front he put himself at the head of the charge so there was 700 men that took tap part not 600 as it often understood 700 men and they were in three lines and he was five horse
• 08:00 - 08:30 lengths ahead that's about 35 to 40 ft and for the mile of the charge first they began at Trot caner then Gallop he was right in front he didn't even look back because he felt it in insult to look back and he was the first man to enter the Russian guns but he had attacked the wrong guns and the entire Light Brigade was decimated this is one example I give the
• 08:30 - 09:00 second example I give is that in Jammu and Kashmir in the Insurgency environment there is a repetitive pattern the terrorists are few they're not proactive they in trigger a small incident and the Army sort of focuses on that on that incident the terrorists also plant information at times through their sources who are through their sympathize ERS who are the sources of
• 09:00 - 09:30 the Army and the police that there are terrorists in so and so area and they then move in that is and that area is difficult forested and the troops are lured into an ambush the normal procedure the fundamentals are that you never move without security you carry out reconnaissance you always assume that information given by civilians is is a trap is a lure then after you have carried out the Tactical movement you
• 09:30 - 10:00 establish cordons there's a outer Cordon there's a inner cordon and then methodically you approach the place where the terrorists are now what is happening is that the officers are in a tearing rush and of course they lead from the front but they disregard all these fundamentals and walk into the Trap and as a result the casualties are heavy in the kokernag um uh um operation which we
• 10:00 - 10:30 discussed about you know three four months back in the month of September U there were three officers killed one commanding officer one company Commander one police officer and only one soldier killed and only two terrorists killed then in the recent operation that took place last month in in lari again there were two officers two more soldiers were killed and only two terrorists were killed so this High ratio of officer casualties you know
• 10:30 - 11:00 being equalent to the number of terrorists killed is it it it it shows that we have we have we are disregarding fundamentals and we have also become obsessive with this particular with this particular um you know Noble ideal which is reserved for very critical situations uh of course I mentioned earlier that it it's the non- empowerment of jcos and NCO leadership which is also the cause of this so you highlight some important
• 11:00 - 11:30 uh significant issues firstly the high cost the high ratio between soldiers skilled and terrorist skilled but you also talk about the disempowerment of jcos and ncos and question why they aren't leading from the front in the within the army so what do you think is causing this see sections are commanded by NC that is an NCO and platons are
• 11:30 - 12:00 commanded by Jos in our rria rifle battalions as well as in our infantry battalions and uh at times young officers are also given the charge of commanding commanding a platoon uh in a battalion there only um 21 officers authorized but there over 60 jcos authorized and they are over 150 ncos authorized so we have a layered structure for Clos comeback fact that is sexual platoons which three platoons
• 12:00 - 12:30 constitute a a company so logically they are the main stay and like officers if the leadership with thought of the Indian army is that we off they must lead from the front there so much the havalar and so much the Jesu need from the front so either the officers do not have that much of faith in the subordinates that they want to lead themselves or as I mentioned they are in a tearing
• 12:30 - 13:00 tearing tearing hurry or the jcos and the ncos are not adequately empowered I have given example how in the second world war the Indian army fought in vast theaters North Africa Burma right up TOA you name the place where Indian army did not fight and we had only 11 officers per per per Battalion and now we have 21 double the number of officers that means we have
• 13:00 - 13:30 put more officers that means relying less upon jcos and ncos in second world war the company second in command was a subar at times he commanded the company so this is is is is a is a kind of a cultural weakness uh as well as a a training weakness in the sense that Jos and ncos are not empowered uh are Institution training for them that is our ncos and jco academies firstly we
• 13:30 - 14:00 don't have dedicated academies we run courses for them you know kind of capsules uh at the training establishments then the vacancies are only 25% that mean only 25% jcos and ncos get a chance to do institutionalized training to command effectively command platoons and sections and their training is supposed to be within the unit within the unit the training is handicapped due to to
• 14:00 - 14:30 um various commitments of in operational areas in peace time there so many commitments and then infrastructure so it it is just it is very difficult to carry out proper training so consequently there is a gap in the empowerment of the jcos jcos and jcos and ncos the German Army you know the Allies used to wonder and even after after the war second
• 14:30 - 15:00 world war there was various studies carried out why did not the German Army lose its cohesion uh it began the war with one officer per 30 soldiers it ended the war with one officer per 300 soldiers and as I said the last battles was in the seers of of of Berlin so why how did they retain their cohesion their main strength was their NC core even during the war they did not allow
• 15:00 - 15:30 any n to become either a section Commander or a platon commander unless he had spent six months in the mil in the NC's Academy and they had adequate number of them and they also had a system of direct intake of High Caliber Caliber material who joined directly as section commanders and as platoon commanders so this was the main stay of the of the Army so whereas we have as I told you
• 15:30 - 16:00 our institutionalized training is suffering from lack of capacity and the Battalion training due to lack due to commitments is not um not is inadequate so we are not making full use of our jcos and and ncos and very interesting example I have given off of all the armies I have given off Israel and now the the most interesting example is that the IDF their standing army is just
• 16:00 - 16:30 about 1 lakh 70,000 and out of these only 30% are regulars and 70% are conscripts who come in for two years two and a half years service men and women and uh they have reserves you know like they have mobilized 300,000 reserves for the for the for the Gaza War now um still there have been reports published in the Israeli newspapers in
• 16:30 - 17:00 the Jerusalem times and uh it is updated as of yesterday 440 uh five uh 445 Israeli soldier officers and soldiers have died since the 7th up to 14th of uh uh 7th of October up to 14th of December and uh out of these 116 have died once the ground offensive began that is towards end of November you know around about 27th 28th of November now
• 17:00 - 17:30 almost 300 were killed on 7th October itself in the initial action of the Hamas and then in the counteraction that was taken to to with Hamas and you know from from uh from the area where they had entered um so um now the point is point here is that 112 officers have died 112 officers including the colonels left
• 17:30 - 18:00 Colonels Majors captains and a large number of captains very few second lefts the ratio of Officer to Soldier casualties is 1 is to4 why one is to four whereas we as Indian army takes pride and mean we we said ratio in Kill was 1 is to 17 here it was 1 is to four because here is the
• 18:00 - 18:30 mass the officers were leading a mass of poorly trained and poorly motivated conscripts and the mission was critical mission was very critical so that is the reason why it happened if you do not Empower your jcos and ncos there'll be it's almost uh compulsion there is no choice for the
• 18:30 - 19:00 officers but to lead from the front and consequently the leadership casualties will be high right so how do you think we can strike a balance between following this ideal as you mentioned of leading from the front but also maintaining the fundamental tactics that are so important in ensuring this High ratio is avoided and this High Cost of losing so uh high ranking officers avoided you see firstly it's an ideal
• 19:00 - 19:30 that all armies must possess because at the critical time it is this ideal that pays dividends you know once earlier I had written a article long back I had given the example of Raja post Raja post was a critical Post in 1965 War you know at a height of about 8,000 ft and uh normally we attack at night to avid fire and the Battalion second sick was the Battalion
• 19:30 - 20:00 it got stalled just below the crest that means it was getting daylight either the attack had to be abandoned or it had to be now pressed on it was now on never and uh the casualties were taking place um enemy fire had pinned down everybody the entire unit was stalled there was Colonel NN Kaa he uh he stood up on a rock and he had a Jersey he was instructor from the hu warwarfare School
• 20:00 - 20:30 of white and you know green jersey he waved it and moved his hand like this and told the soldiers follow me uh so the few men next to him got up then others then others then finally 300 you know small teams rather the 300 total soldiers in a number of small teams of sections and platoons they all started moving forward and the objective was captured colel K died in the
• 20:30 - 21:00 operation he was later wounded but here is a classic example Vision was very critical because this had to establish the UR punch link and attack earlier two attacks had failed on on on on the post so it was a critical Mission and here was the officer who you know galvanized his unit but at the same time he was not fool Hardy he had taken tactical precautions which just that in the subsequent operation he he got he got hit so it's a virtue that must be must
• 21:00 - 21:30 be emed it must be sustained and all leadership must possess it but not only officers it also must be possessed by jcos and ncos it must be cultivated in them also they must be adequately adequately empowered so normally when you carry out any operation any Mission you execute there's a methodical approach it's laid down it's time proven since centuries so it is that you have a firm base you take all
• 21:30 - 22:00 precautions you have a fire base and you advance towards the objective with fire and movement taking all precautions right so it is only when this method is failing this method has failed and the mission is critical and the mission is critical that leading from the front must uh must be exercised by the by the by the leader but if the mission is not
• 22:00 - 22:30 critical then he must exercise his discretion there's no point being a lord cardigan every time every time this repeatedly so it will only lead to more and more more casualties follow the methodical approach Empower your Junior leadership and use this Noble ideal only for critical missions and it should not become a kind of it the worst thing that can happen is that if it becomes a compulsion because
• 22:30 - 23:00 your Junior leadership is not empowered as it has happened in the case of Israel which I exam gave you an example one is to four casualties so it's an ideal which I would like every leader to have officers jcos as well as as well as ncos but exercise with this kind of tempering which I have mentioned thank you general for your insights I think you brought up some very interesting points firstly talking about the leading from the front
• 23:00 - 23:30 approach but also looking at how this approach can be used without disregarding the fundamental tactics and most importantly the need to empower the jcos and ncos within the Army to follow this approach and avoid the high cost uh so thank you so much and for viewers interested in reading the full article by General panag the link to it will be in the description below thank you and we will see you next
• 23:30 - 24:00 [Music] week