The Rise & Fall of Under Armour

Summary

Highlights

• Under Armour broke through in the 2000s by innovating sports apparel with moisture-wicking fabrics. 💧
• Its footwear line gained traction, but aesthetics held it back from dominating. 👠
• Efforts to compete in the tech and fitness tracking arena were overshadowed by the Apple Watch. ⌚
• The company experienced spectacular stock growth before the inadequacies of its strategies were revealed. 📉
• Leadership misconduct and accounting irregularities further damaged Under Armour's reputation. 📉
• With changing leadership, Under Armour has shifted focus back to its apparel roots, but challenges remain. 🔄

Key Takeaways

• Under Armour rose fast by focusing on high-quality performance gear but struggled to maintain momentum. 📈
• The brand expanded too rapidly, losing sight of its core strengths and market expectations. 🌪️
• Founder Kevin Plank's leadership was a double-edged sword, driving initial success but ultimately hindering growth. ⚔️
• The company's foray into 'Connected Fitness' was costly and less successful than anticipated. 🚴‍♂️
• Corporate culture and governance issues plagued the company, leading to public relations disasters. 🏢
• Under Armour failed to establish iconic products akin to Nike's Air Jordans, limiting its sway in footwear. 👟

Overview

Chapters

• 00:00 - 00:30: Dominance of Nike and Challenge from Adidas The chapter discusses the overwhelming dominance of Nike in the sportswear industry, noting that competitors don't even refer to Nike by name, acknowledging its unmatched position. Nike is the top seller of athletic footwear and apparel globally. Adidas, considered the closest competitor, has struggled significantly in its attempts to challenge Nike. These attempts have been costly, resulting in notable failures that led to the CEO's job loss and setbacks in profits for Adidas.
• 00:30 - 01:00: Under Armour's Rise The chapter discusses the rise of Under Armour, highlighting its significant achievements in the 2010s. Under Armour managed to grow sales in North America by double digits every year for 13 consecutive years. The brand successfully took market share from Nike in its own backyard, which was a notable feat as no other American brand had achieved such growth in decades. This came at a time when competitors like Adidas were struggling, with its products like Ultra Boost reaching the end of their lifecycle and associated collaborations like Yeezy ending, resulting in an uncertain future for them.
• 01:00 - 01:30: Becoming a Contender The chapter titled 'Becoming a Contender' discusses how Under Armour ascended to the position of the second-leading sportswear brand in the United States, surpassing Adidas. The company, despite being smaller and less known compared to giants like Nike, managed to carve a niche for itself by focusing on quality rather than competing on price. It built a strong fan base and received endorsements from major athletes across various sports. While Nike boasted endorsements from stars like Ronaldo, LeBron James, Kevin Durant, Rafael Nadal, and Tiger Woods, Under Armour's roster included high-profile names such as Tom Brady, Steph Curry, Michael Phelps, Lindsey Vonn, Dwayne 'The Rock' Johnson, and even 'Captain America' Chris Evans. This array of endorsements helped solidify Under Armour's status as a significant competitor in the sportswear market.
• 01:30 - 02:00: Hype and Promise In the 2010s, Under Armour was regarded as a promising challenger to industry giant Nike, with media and investors painting it as a potential 'Nike Slayer'. This hype and promise led to a significant rise in Under Armour's stock prices. The narrative resonated with consumers, including the author, who personally experienced the brand's appeal during college through their products like SpeedForm and AMP 2.0 shoes.
• 02:00 - 02:30: Under Armour's Decline The chapter titled "Under Armour's Decline" discusses the author's experiences and opinions on Under Armour's shoes, particularly the Foris and Apollos models. Although the shoes were exceptionally comfortable and lightweight, comparable to no other, they were visually unappealing with unattractive colorways and design resembling clown shoes. Despite these aesthetic drawbacks, the shoes stood out in terms of quality and performance, especially as training shoes. Even though the Amps model had a slightly improved design, they lacked versatility beyond weightlifting. The author, however, maintained that Under Armour was underrated and possessed potential despite needing some design improvements.
• 02:30 - 03:00: The Four Eras of Under Armour The chapter discusses the evolution and current state of Under Armour, particularly highlighting its decline in the competitive sports apparel market. Once recognized for its innovative shoe technologies, Under Armour now trails behind major competitors like Nike, Adidas, New Balance, Puma, and Lululemon. Even their notable collaboration with basketball star Steph Curry failed to measure up to the iconic success of Nike's Jordan line and other popular sneaker models such as Air Force Ones and Yeezys.
• 03:00 - 03:30: Challenges in the Early Years The chapter 'Challenges in the Early Years' discusses the struggles faced by Under Armour in maintaining its market position. Despite the dominance of Jordans in both sports and fashion, Under Armour has struggled, facing declining sales, executive turnover, and failed strategic pivots. Additionally, there have been issues involving extravagant expenditure on non-business activities, and the company is also under federal investigation for questionable accounting practices. Over the span of five years, these challenges have transformed Under Armour into a declining brand, raising questions about how a once promising brand could fall so far.
• 03:30 - 04:00: Establishing the Brand In the chapter titled 'Establishing the Brand', the narrative focuses on Under Armour's evolution into a major market player. It discusses the company's distinct phases, starting from its inception as a niche brand catering to specialized athletes, as evidenced by endorsements from personalities like Steph Curry and Tom Brady, to its expansion into the mass market. This phase, occurring during the 2000s, marked Under Armour's attempt to appeal to average consumers, contrasting it against competitors like Nike, which boasted rich histories and legacies. The chapter also examines the company's rapid decline, framing it as a study on corporate governance, technological advancements, and the potential risks associated with companies led by their original founders.
• 04:00 - 04:30: Wholesale Strategy The chapter discusses the strategy of wholesale distribution, focusing on the company Adidos and Under Armour. Under Armour made a significant impact in the 2000s by transforming athletic apparel from simple cotton tees to moisture-wicking fabrics, thereby achieving brand differentiation. This innovation bolstered wholesaler confidence and laid the groundwork for a robust business model, despite Under Armour being a smaller player with revenues under a billion dollars during that time.
• 04:30 - 05:00: Retail Expansion and Pricing The chapter discusses Under Armour's strategy of selling products in bulk at a discount to retailers, including Big Five, Sports Authority, and Dick's Sporting Goods. These retailers then sell the products at the recommended retail price. Unlike Nike, Under Armour, as a growing brand, lacked the market influence to secure premium shelf space or compel retailers to purchase large quantities every quarter. Retailers tend to be cautious, aiming to avoid risks associated with unsold inventory and seek assurances that the goods they purchase in bulk will be marketable.
• 05:00 - 05:30: Footwear Market Entry The chapter 'Footwear Market Entry' discusses the challenges and strategies involved in entering the footwear market. It highlights that for a product to succeed, it must be quickly bought by customers at a maximum markup with minimal returns. Retailers are hesitant to stock products they believe won't sell, or they might demand discounts to mitigate risks. The chapter also notes that athletes, appreciating Under Armour's performance focus, helped build retailer confidence, leading to increased orders. This focus on performance and targeting athletes allowed Under Armour to set premium prices, differentiating itself from products aimed at casual buyers.
• 05:30 - 06:00: International Market Entry In the chapter titled 'International Market Entry', the focus is on Under Armour's pricing strategy and its impact on retail partnerships. Under Armour's approach of setting premium prices even amidst market conservatism allowed retailers to sustain higher profit margins despite lower sales volumes. This strategy contrasts with competitors like Nike and Adidas, who frequently discounted their products to move inventory quickly. Under Armour's steadfast pricing maintained product value and avoided the common retail cycle of aggressive discounting.
• 06:00 - 06:30: Kevin Plank's Role Kevin Plank played a significant role in Under Armour, steering the company through various stages of growth. Retailers initially hesitated to adopt Under Armour, but once the brand gained traction, it experienced consistent growth and opportunities for expansion beyond just apparel. Although the direct-to-consumer channel only contributed a small portion of sales, it was vital for the brand's presence. Unlike larger competitors like Nike and Adidas, Under Armour faced challenges in capital and supply chain constraints, affecting store expansion. Despite these challenges, Under Armour managed to establish two types of stores to solidify its market position.
• 06:30 - 07:00: Revenue Growth and Market Expansion The chapter discusses the strategies for revenue growth and market expansion, focusing on the role of brand stores and outlet stores. Brand stores are located in high-traffic areas to sell the newest products at full price and promote the brand image. Outlet stores, on the other hand, sell discontinued or excess inventory at a discount, thereby helping to uphold the pricing integrity of the brand across different channels. The text highlights the importance of having both types of stores for maintaining pricing strategies. It notes that in the 2000s, Under Armour had significantly fewer stores in the U.S. compared to its competitors Adidas and Nike, who had thousands of locations worldwide.
• 07:00 - 07:30: Entering the Mainstream Market In this chapter, Under Armour's strategic focus on its wholesale business is discussed as a primary driver for the company's growth. The company also leveraged direct-to-consumer channels, such as online sales and company stores, as a valuable aspect of their business model. These channels, while a slightly lower priority, offered higher profit margins since no cut needed to be given to retailers. During this initial growth phase, Under Armour prioritized three key goals: expanding its core apparel line, venturing into the footwear market, and increasing its international business credibility.
• 07:30 - 08:00: Challenges of Premium Positioning Under Armour leveraged its relationships with athletes and retailers in apparel to venture into higher-margin markets like shoes. The long-term goal was for the footwear business to surpass the core apparel business in driving profits, as shoes can command higher prices than shirts. The company adopted a gradual strategy, starting with forming partnerships with major shoe retailers like Foot Locker. They began by introducing football cleats in 2006 and baseball cleats in 2007, focusing initially on their core athlete demographic.
• 08:00 - 08:30: The Nike Slayer Era In the late 2000s, Under Armour expanded its offerings with training shoes in 2008 and mass market running shoes in 2009. By then, footwear accounted for 10% of annual sales despite a recession, as the company maintained its premium pricing strategy, selling shoes at $90 or more, compared to the customary $60. The core of Under Armour's business was still apparel, with accessories like mouth guards and gloves comprising the remainder. While focused on battling Nike domestically, the true competitive challenges were on the horizon.
• 08:30 - 09:00: Peak Success and Overconfidence The chapter discusses Under Armour's strategic moves for international expansion into high-growth markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The company couldn't afford aggressive competition abroad without strengthening its core apparel business and growing its market presence in the US first. In the 2000s, there were positive indications that Under Armour would succeed overseas. An example of this strategy was licensing marketing and distribution rights in Japan to a local partner responsible for demand generation, sales, and product adaptation.
• 09:00 - 09:30: Pursuit of Innovation The chapter titled "Pursuit of Innovation" delves into Under Armour's strategic approach to entering the Japanese market. The company focused more on brand presence and acceptance in international territories than immediate revenue. Initially, revenues from licensing in Japan accounted for less than 5% of Under Armour's total revenue. This long-term investment strategy demonstrated perseverance, as the Japan business took nearly 15 years to reach over $100 million in sales. The Japan venture served as a significant test for the brand's global reception, emphasizing the importance of innovation and adaptability in foreign markets.
• 09:30 - 10:00: Betting on Big Data and IoT This chapter focuses on the role of Kevin Plank, the founder and CEO of Under Armour, emphasizing his significant influence on both the success and struggles of the company. It draws parallels between Plank and Phil Knight of Nike, highlighting Plank's willingness to challenge the norms of corporate America and his pivotal role in championing the brand. As a founder, Kevin's influence was profound, shaping the company's journey throughout its various phases.
• 10:00 - 10:30: Connected Fitness Strategy The chapter titled 'Connected Fitness Strategy' discusses Under Armour's strategic approach to innovation in the fitness market. It highlights Under Armour's emphasis on developing superior products that justify higher prices, rather than relying on brand image alone. The narrative underscores the importance of innovation as a core value, positioning Under Armour in comparison to leading companies in other sectors, such as Google in technology and major firms in finance.
• 10:30 - 11:00: Technology Company Aspirations The chapter, titled 'Technology Company Aspirations', discusses Under Armour's impressive growth trajectory in 2010, highlighting the company's success and strategic partnerships. Despite an economic recession, Under Armour achieved over a billion dollars in revenue, marking the seventh consecutive year of double-digit growth and averaging 40% annual growth. The chapter emphasizes how strong sales, supported by high-profile sponsorships with the likes of Tom Brady and Auburn University, helped Under Armour establish itself as a significant player in the apparel industry.
• 11:00 - 11:30: Challenges with Connected Fitness The chapter 'Challenges with Connected Fitness' discusses how an up-and-coming company, striving to reach its next billion in sales, had to undergo significant evolution. Initially appealing solely to athletes through performance-focused products like moisture-wicking fabric, the company recognized that this approach was not sufficient for widespread daily use among the average consumer. Consequently, it began integrating elements of its athletic products into everyday wear such as hoodies, bras, pants, and t-shirts. The underlying strategy was straightforward: innovation would drive product appeal and expansion into the mainstream market.
• 11:30 - 12:00: Fashion and Market Struggles This chapter discusses how Under Armour is utilizing innovative technology and premium quality to penetrate the top end of the consumer market. By offering products like $70 water-resistant sweatshirts, $30 T-shirts that dry faster than regular cotton, $80 infrared cold weather jackets, and $100 carbon-plated running shoes, the company aims to achieve double-digit sales growth and industry-leading margins. Their strategy is to differentiate themselves and potentially challenge Nike's dominance in the market.
• 12:00 - 12:30: Brand Challenges with Curry Line Under Armour refrained from selling on Amazon to protect its brand's premium image. As the company shifted focus from elite athletes to everyday consumers, balancing premium brand positioning with wider market adoption became challenging. The brand's premium identity was crucial for market differentiation and success.
• 12:30 - 13:00: The Freefall Era This chapter discusses the challenges faced by a company during its expansion period. The high prices of its products, which initially brought in significant funds, eventually became a barrier to the company's ambitions of rapid growth and increased market share. This is because market share largely depends on the volume of goods sold rather than the profit margin on each unit. The company's premium product positioning also created obstacles in international markets, as the price point of $70 for a hoodie was considered excessive by many consumers outside of the United States, such as in Europe and Asia. In contrast, competitors like Nike and Adidas managed this by providing a range of products at various price points, making them more accessible to a broader audience, including budget-conscious shoppers. The chapter illustrates the complexity of pricing strategy in global expansion efforts.
• 13:00 - 13:30: Excuses and Reality The chapter 'Excuses and Reality' discusses Under Armour's strategic challenges and adjustments in the fast food industry akin to the barbell strategy. The company faced no significant issues in football and baseball markets, where full-price apparel, cleats, and accessories were sold to players. However, pricing became a notable issue in the running market, where the distinction between casual and serious runners was blurry. Under Armour realized the necessity of price reductions to appeal to mainstream consumers, particularly during recession periods, as the demand for high-priced ($100) running shoes was limited.
• 13:30 - 14:00: Big Data Vision vs Reality The chapter discusses the tension between innovation and market realities, focusing on Under Armour's pricing strategies for its footwear. Despite having a successful product, Under Armour faced internal disagreements on whether to aim for higher price points to leverage brand power, or to make products more accessible to a wider audience. This reflects the broader theme of balancing visionary goals with practical market considerations.
• 14:00 - 14:30: Leadership Changes and Cultural Issues In this chapter, the focus is on the strategic branding and market positioning of Under Armour. Despite being much smaller in sales volume, Under Armour sees itself as a significant player in the sports apparel industry, valuing its brand at $10 billion even though its business was only $2 billion. Around 2013, Under Armour experienced a period of significant growth termed the 'Nike Slayer era,' during which it surpassed Adidas to become the second largest sports brand in the United States. This remarkable achievement captured the attention of investors and media, establishing Under Armour as a prominent competitor in the sportswear market.
• 14:30 - 15:00: Financial Manipulation and Impact This chapter focuses on the financial manipulation and impact achieved by a company striving to become the next big sports brand, akin to Nike. It highlights a period of remarkable business performance, where annual revenue surged from $2 billion to nearly $5 billion by 2016. This rapid growth took only 3 years, compared to the previous 4 years it had taken to grow from 1 to 2 billion. The company experienced a 13-year streak of 27% average topline growth, all while maintaining a strong and consistent double-digit operating margin, illustrating that it did not sacrifice profitability for increased sales.
• 15:00 - 15:30: Current Leadership and Challenges Under Armour faced significant challenges as they competed against major players like Nike in North American markets, which are considered the most competitive and lucrative for sportswear. International markets seemed easier in comparison. During this time, Under Armour secured sponsorships with major institutions and teams such as Notre Dame, UCLA, UC Berkeley, the Naval Academy, Tottenham, Southampton, COO Colo, Steph Curry, and the US Olympic team at SOI and Rio. Despite these successes, the success may not have been sustainable, hinting at underlying challenges.
• 15:30 - 16:00: Future Directions and Reflections The chapter reflects on Under Armour's journey towards establishing itself as a premium brand, emphasizing their strategic focus on innovation to sustain competitive advantage. Recognizing that innovation involves high costs and unpredictable timelines, the narrative draws a parallel to Adidas' serendipitous discovery of boost technology in 2012 and their subsequent efforts over three years to integrate it into their products. This example underscores the unpredictable nature of innovation and the necessity for companies to either innovate continually or face decline.

The Rise & Fall of Under Armour Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 in the world of sports wear Nike is so strong so dominant and so Invincible that its Rivals never refer to it by name there are simply no equals as Nike sells the most athletic footwear and apparel in the world the closest adversary would have been adidos but as we covered back in season 1 their attempts to challenge Nike only resulted in expensive mistakes these mistakes eventually cost the CEO his job and set adidos back years in profits and
• 00:30 - 01:00 popularity it was only through Ultra boost in Kanye West that adidos caught back up but now that Ultra boost is at the end of its life cycle now that Yeezy is dead and the latest CEO is on his way out the future looks uninspiring for the Germans in the 2010s there was one American brand that was doing what no one else had been able to do for decades to grow sales in North America at double digits every year for 13 years straight and to take market share from Nike in its own backyard this company seemingly came out of nowhere to Elite frog passed
• 01:00 - 01:30 adidos as the new number two sportsware brand in the United States with endorsements from major athletes this tiny brand had everything it was an upstart company with a passionate fan base a business that competed on quality over price and its marketing was backed by some of the most celebrated athletes in the world while Nike had Ronaldo LeBron James Kevin Durant Nadal and Tiger Woods this brand had Tom Brady Steph Curry Michael Phelps Lindsey vaugh The Rock and even Captain America America this was under arour under arour
• 01:30 - 02:00 in the 2010s was hyped as a promising Scrappy Underdog just a few years away from taking on Goliath while Under Armour was nowhere near the scale of the swoosh in the eyes of the media and investors it was the closest to a Nike Slayer that the industry had ever seen and that enormous potential was quickly priced into the stock at the peak of under armour's hype I was in college and as a consumer my own personal experiences were similar to the market consensus I'd picked up Under Armour speed from foris Apollos and amp 2.0's
• 02:00 - 02:30 the foris and Apollos were mind-blowingly light soft and had a level of comfort that I've not found anywhere else since not even in the latest Ultra boosts the biggest issue was the Aesthetics the foris and Apollos were like clown shoes the colorways were hideous the heels were ugly but in terms of quality and performance they were memorable as training shoes the amps had slightly better design but no utility Beyond weightlifting while the design needed work I would swear to friends and classmates that Under Armour was underrated and that the company had some
• 02:30 - 03:00 genuinely compelling shoe Technologies yet fast forward to the present just a few years after the hype in my own personal experiences Under Armour today is a shadow of its former self Under Armour these days lags behind not just Nike and adidos but also New Balance puma and Lululemon even the company's collaboration with Steph Curry which was meant to rival Nike's billion dooll Jordan product line has fallen short while Air Force Ones Yeezys Ultra boosts Air Maxes Blazers Converse 574s and
• 03:00 - 03:30 Jordans dominate on the field and on the streets year after year Under Armour has remained non-existent and every year things only seem to get worse declining sales executive turnover failed pivots expense trips to strip clubs and federal investigations into dodgy accounting have plagued the company year after year Under Armour these days has been reduced to a little bit more than a penny stock how could so much have gone so wrong in just 5 years how could a promising brand
• 03:30 - 04:00 that had generational athletes like Steph Curry and Tom Brady collapsed in such a short time in this episode we'll cover the four eras of Under Armour and how their rapid downfall is a Timeless case study on governance Tech and the unspoken dangers of founder-led companies in the 2000s Under Armour was in its first era of transitioning from a specialized athletes only brand into a mass Market brand aimed at the average consumer since under arour lacked the history Prestige and Legacy of Nike and
• 04:00 - 04:30 adidos the company had to compete on Merit to cut through the noise through the 2000s Under Armour successfully made a name for itself by Reinventing Athletic Apparel from plain cotton teas into moisture wicking Fabrics this exclusive focus on athletes helped Under Armour not only achieve differentiation but also built the confidence of wholesalers and by extension established the fundamentals for a healthy business in the 2000s Under Armor was a small player with revenues of less than a billion dollars the majority of the company's business came from wholesale
• 04:30 - 05:00 where under arour sold its products in bulk at a discount to retailers like big five Sports Authority and Dick Sporting Goods these retailers in turn sell these products to customers at the recommended retail price as an emerging brand Under arour didn't have the star power of Nikey to occupy the best shelf space and to demand these retailers to buy as much product as possible every quarter retailers by Nature are cautious creatures they want to minimize every risk of being stuck with unsellable goods and any guarantee possible that the products they're buying in bulk will
• 05:00 - 05:30 be bought quickly by customers at maximum markup and with minimal returns if retailers don't believe that a product will sell they won't stock it or if they do they'll ask for a huge discount in exchange for taking on that risk while athletes were a niche they appreciated under armour's focus on performance and would seek out the brand at the mall this gave retailers the gradual confidence to buy more under armored products every quarter the other benefit to winning athletes was that Under Armour could charge more since they weren't going after the Casual soccer mom or belly dad just looking for
• 05:30 - 06:00 a cool weekend t-shirt retailers appreciated under armour's premium pricing which allow them to reap higher profits on each unit of clothing sold even at lower unit volumes Under Armour set high prices in an era where most brands were conservative like selling $25 T's when everyone else was selling for 10 to 15 under armoured products were also rarely discounted in comparison Nike and aidos would push tons of products every quarter to the point that retailers were accustomed to having to aggressively discount the sold inventory just to make room for the new
• 06:00 - 06:30 and latest Styles it took years for retailers to warm up to Under Armour but once that channel was established it led to consistent growth and opened up doors for the company to expand Beyond apparel only a small slice of sales every year was generated through Under Armor direct to Consumer Channel but just like with wholesale Under Armour didn't have the capital or supply chain like its competition to open up stores everywhere it wanted to be similar to Nike and adidos Under Armour owned and operated two types of stores the first was a
• 06:30 - 07:00 Brand store that sold the newest products at full price and evangelized the company to customers in a hi trffic area the second was an outlet store where the company would funnel and sell all their discontinued or excess inventory to sell to the public at a discount so they can maintain full price for inseason products in every other Channel having both outlet and brand stores are essential for Brands to maintain their pricing Integrity through the 2000s Under Armour had less than 100 stores in the United States whereas Adidas and Nike each had thousands of locations worldwide as a brand for
• 07:00 - 07:30 athletes Under Armour relied most on their wholesale business to propel the company forward yet direct to consumer in the form of online sales or transactions at company stores was still valuable as a slightly lower priority but higher margin Channel where profits could be captured in full without needing to give up a cut to a retailer in under armour's first era the company had three clear goals to grow the core apparel business to expand into Footwear and to drive the internet international business The credibility
• 07:30 - 08:00 that under arour established with athletes and retailers in apparel enabled entry into adjacent higher margin markets like shoes the long-term Hope was that the Footwear business would eventually overtake the core apparel business to drive higher profits since you can charge more for a shoe than you can a shirt the company opted for a crawl walk run approach as it forged relationships with Foot Locker and other major shoe retailers Under Armour started off with its Bread andb Butter athletes by Rolling Out football cleats in 2006 baseball cleats in 2007
• 08:00 - 08:30 training shoes in 2008 and then Mass Market running shoes in 2009 by the late 2000s Footwear had grown to account for 10% of annual sales even in a recession the company stuck to its premium positioning selling shoes for $90 or more in an era where customers were usually used to paying $60 for a pair the majority of under armour's business remained in apparel while accessories like mouth guards and gloves made up the rest while most of under armour's resources went towards duking it out against Nike at home the real battles
• 08:30 - 09:00 were being waged overseas in growth markets like Brazil Russia India and China Under Armor wanted a piece but could not jump into Wars it couldn't afford growth in the core apparel business and in the US market was necessary to funding International expansion there were some signals in the 2000s that the brand would translate well overseas Under Armour licensed away its marketing and distribution rights in Japan to a local partner who took on generating demand closing sales and tailoring existing products to the
• 09:00 - 09:30 Japanese Market the Japan business was significant not so much in the dollars that it brought in but more so what it represented as a barometer or Proving Ground for how the brand would be received overseas revenue from licensing represented less than 5% of under armour's TopLine in this first era as the company willingly gave up monetary value in exchange for presence in the East yet this was not some overnight success as it took nearly 15 years before the Japan business broke $100 million in sales
• 09:30 - 10:00 it's impossible to analyze Under Armour without talking about Kevin plank as the founder and CEO Kevin is the single common factor in every era of Under Armour he is as much responsible for the rise as he is for the eventual downfall of his own company Under Armour was a founder-led company in every sense of the term Kevin was not afraid to Champion the brand and to break the conservative cryptic speak of corporate America just like what Phil Knight had done for Nike as a Founder Kevin's voice was naturally the loudest the most meaningful and always correct Kevin was
• 10:00 - 10:30 a natural Storyteller and that skill was on display in under armour's first era quote we charge $5 or $10 more because we have a better product and that is something that the consumer will pay for in any Market the last thing the market needs is someone else to come in and say buy my brand because my logo is cooler than the guy next to me that's not at all what we're doing it's all about Innovation the smartest college graduates in the world say if I want to work in it I'm going to work at Google if I want to work work in finance I'm
• 10:30 - 11:00 going to work for Goldman Sachs if Google is developing the next great software then who is thinking about your apparel spurred on by its three growth goals Under Armour broke a billion dollars in Revenue in 2010 this would be the seventh consecutive year in which Under Armour had posted double-digit growth in Revenue the company was averaging 40% growth every year even during a recession and the brand was hotter than ever strong sales combined with sponsorships with Tom Brady Auburn University Cam Newton and Buster Co all helped establish under arour as a major
• 11:00 - 11:30 upand cominging player in this new decade but to reach the next billion in sales the company had to evolve and appealing to athletes and on performance alone was no longer going to cut it moisture wicking fabric was good for workouts but had no place in the day-to-day Leisure or work of the average American to enter the mainstream audience under arour reported over elements of its athletic products to Everyday wear like hoodies bras pants and t-shirts the underlying thesis was simple in inovation would drive product
• 11:30 - 12:00 quality which would then enable pricing premiums and differentiation $70 water resistant sweatshirts $30 te's that dried five times faster than regular cotton $80 infrared cold weather jackets that captured body heat better than anything else on the market and $100 carbon plated running shoes were all aimed at the top end of the consumer Market if Under Armour could somehow combine annual double-digit sales growth with industry-leading margins the company could challenge Nike in ways that no one else had ever done before
• 12:00 - 12:30 Under Armour even went so far as to keep its Products off Amazon as it believed the promotion heavy online environment would dilute the Brand's premium positioning yet the line between adoption margin and pricing is a difficult one to balance the more Under Armour transitioned away from specialized athletes and towards Average Joe's the greater the tension became below the surface Under Armour was anchored to its premium positioning it was the company's DNA it had been essential in cutting through the market and it was NE necessary in generating
• 12:30 - 13:00 funds for expansion but these same high prices restrained the company from realizing its Ambitions of rapid growth and greater market share which is a function of unit volume rather than unit margins premium positioning made International expansion even more complicated most Americans were already boing at $70 under arour hoodies to the average European or Asian that same price tag would be unfathomable Nike and Adidas had their own high-priced products but both Brands still offered plenty of options for budget conscious consumers and this is identical to the
• 13:00 - 13:30 barbell strategy of the fast food industry which we covered in the Burger King episode this had not been an issue in the football and baseball markets as Under Armour had sold full price apparel alongside cleats and accessories to players but pricing became an issue in running where the line between the average Joe and the serious Runner is a lot less clear as Under Armour progressed the company learned that if they were serious about going mainstream there were instances where they just had to come down on price the market for a $100 running shoe especially in a recession was Tiny no amount of
• 13:30 - 14:00 innovation or marketing would convince the average Joe to make such a big purchase for a hobby under arour begrudgingly walked back on price to make its Footwear more accessible and Kevin couldn't hide his frustrations quote we have a product in the market that's done nicely it's a $70 running shoe it's a fine shoe but the fact is a brand as powerful as Under Armour should be building a much higher price point than that what I believe is we're supposed to appeal at such a broad level that we should be driving price points for our Retail Partners so Under Armour shouldn't be 30% off on Black Friday you
• 14:00 - 14:30 won't find us there because we don't participate we may have an item that we'll use with some Partners but Under Armour is not for discount or on sale we believe we are a 10 billion brand doing $2 billion of business today in 2013 Under Armour entered its Nike Slayer era a 4-year period of red hot growth and hype where the company blew past Adidas to become the number two sports brand in the United States in investors and media crowned the brand to
• 14:30 - 15:00 be the next Nike in the making the company enjoyed its greatest business performance in history with annual revenue exploding from $2 billion to nearly $5 billion by 2016 it had previously taken under arour 4 years to go from 1 to 2 billion this time it only took 3 years to go from 2 to 5 billion the streak continued for 13 consecutive years of 27% average Topline growth and the company had not sacrificed its bottom line to drive sales as Under Armour had maintained a consistent consistant double digigit operating
• 15:00 - 15:30 margin under arour had gone toe-to-toe against the king in his own backyard in the most competitive and lucrative sportsware Market in the world the international markets in comparison would be a cakewalk Compared to North America as the new sponsor for Notre Dame UCLA UC Berkeley the Naval Academy Tottenham Southampton coo Colo Steph Curry and the US Olympic team at SOI and Rio under arour looked the part of a king Slayer yet it was also in this era in which the success would go to their
• 15:30 - 16:00 heads and would Mark the beginning of the end for the company as Under Armour matured the company embraced its premium positioning as a positive force and accepted the reality to innovate or Die the challenge with Innovation is not only the high cost but also the indeterminate timeline and unexpected Origins it was around this time in 2012 and 2013 when adidos had stumbled onto boost technology from a random demonstration at a local chemical manufacturer and it took the Germans another 3 years to figure out how to harness that material into a shoe under
• 16:00 - 16:30 arour had been making running shoes for nearly 5 years and now only in year four did the company finally achieve the Breakthrough it was looking for to win the mass Market speed form was built off of under arour investments in everyday apparel from its first era the company applied the lightweight breathable abrasion resistant material and design from its women's bra line into its shoes speed form shoes were manufactured in bra factories and were some of the lightest ever made weighing in at just 6 o the St strong strong reception to speed form propelled under arour
• 16:30 - 17:00 Footwear business from $300 million in 2013 to becoming a billion doll business by 2016 Kevin couldn't resist the chance to talk up the company's achievements quote if you look at the football cleat market we've been at it for 7 years which means we have the most depth and experience we've created the number one football cleat $130 per consumer it's an unbelievable product that's been authenticated on the field with more than 60 NFL players the cool kid on the field is wearing our product as for running we're in year four the new speed
• 17:00 - 17:30 form was just on the cover of competitor Magazine with 100,000 Runners who are putting 80 mil a week in these shoes We're going to keep getting better the fact is that if we believe it bleeds we can kill it we definitely think we're drawing some blood and we're going to keep running very hard and do a good job Kevin's comments could be interpreted as standard founder bravado just as much as arrogance as a former High School football player and aspiring D1 walk-on at the time I can say that the number one football cleat was in no
• 17:30 - 18:00 way Under Armour the cool kids wore Nike Vapors and Nike speeds there are also over 1,600 active players in the NFL so validation from 60 players would represent just 4% of the entire league in its first era Under Armour took a Bottoms Up marketing approach to match its product Le differentiation relying on athletes to generate awareness to peers and fans in this second era the company poured money into advertising to achieve top- down Mass marketing but Under Armour had not actually made it into the big leagues there were only so
• 18:00 - 18:30 many teams and athletes that the company could afford on its smaller budget Under Armour tried to sign Kevin Durant in 2014 with a 10-year $250 million deal which would have cost 75% of the company's annual ad budget in comparison Durant's final $350 million deal made up just 11% of Nike's annual $3 billion marketing budget sportsware was evolving and quality was no longer enough for differentiation Adidas had achieved its own breakthroughs in 2015 with ultra
• 18:30 - 19:00 boost and Yeezy which captivated the market with style and comfort now that performance was ubiquitous the market was placing a greater weight on Aesthetics speed form was like all Under Armour products performance and comfort without style but to Kevin investing in design was not enough that Playbook was too boring too straightforward and too slow to be the main growth story for his company in an industry where Under Armour was always playing catchup Kevin was desperate for a first mover Advantage he opted for a hard pivot in pursuit of futuristic pastures that
• 19:00 - 19:30 would on paper amplify penetration into the mass market and create competitive advantages that Nike could never replicate Kevin found his inspiration in Tech the one sector that you can count on every year to come up with new buzzwords and Grand Visions to cover up the failures and undelivered Promises from the years past this cycle happens all the time in Tech take this year for instance the crash of crypto the mass layoffs the startup implosions and the unsustainability of SAS comp companies have all been swept under the rug by
• 19:30 - 20:00 hype for AI and the buzz around chat GPT Tech is always about the new shiny thing during under armour's second era big data and iot were flavors of the Year big data promised a world where companies could harness data and derive deep insights that would increase sales lower costs and identify consumer Trends before they even appeared Silicon Valley warned that any company not leveraging big data and not making datadriven decisions would be had a permanent disadvantage internet of things or iot
• 20:00 - 20:30 promised a future where everything in the world would be connected to the internet and that would forever transform how humans work live and play with iot the lights in your home would automatically turn on when people entered the room your fridge could track how many eggs you had left your bathroom mirror would show you the weather your shirt would measure heart rate and the gym mirror could teach you form and technique in real time wearables like Jawbone Pebble and Fitbit jumped into mainstream attention Big Data vendors like works and Sumo logic exploded and
• 20:30 - 21:00 startups who built their entire business on analytics like Stitch fix got funded big data and iot spread through hype alone to every industry even home security as we covered earlier this season with ADT to Kevin the future was coming and he was determined not to miss it big data and iot are both based on the idea that data is power he who collects processes and analyzes the most data can do things that no one else can by 2015 Under Armour had spent over $700 million buying up the three most popular
• 21:00 - 21:30 fitness tracking apps map my fitness Endomondo and my fitness pal through these three Acquisitions Under Armour had amassed the largest base of Fitness users and by extension the largest consumer data set of nutrition workouts and Biometrics in the world in Kevin's mind these millions of users and the billions of metrics they generated every day on these apps would fuel a big data engine at the company which would uncover insights into product development and cons consumer Trends this would give Under Armour the leg up
• 21:30 - 22:00 on its competition quote connected Fitness is the future of sport and a place where under arour has to be if Facebook is social if LinkedIn is business then who owns health and fitness we've now created the world's largest digital health and fitness Community with more than 120 million members and growing every moment we want to be the ones to synthesize all this data to make it easy and digestible for anyone to get a complete view of themselves in terms of sleep activity exercise and nutrition think about the
• 22:00 - 22:30 scale at which this community is growing 136,000 registrations a day 40 million new users combined in 2014 one in five Americans are on one of our three apps 62% of which are women and 43% live outside of North America a large percentage of users may be seeing our logo for the very first time we'll have the ability to impact and mind consistent elements about individuals that can help inform new markets the data is going to be extraordinary
• 22:30 - 23:00 by 2016 Kevin was showing up at Tech conferences and banging a new drum on national TV proudly proclaiming Under Armour as a tech company you're an apparel company what are you doing at CEO no no no we're a technology company anybody's going to live in the future better be there imagine just think about the fact that if I asked anybody on the planet how many days were you sick last year we just don't know we know nothing about but why do you why do we think that's okay like again of all the things like I could deposit $300 into a checking account and I could have RS and rs of dat of the floating interest rate that went back and forth but if I ask
• 23:00 - 23:30 you about your health and say how many days were you sick last year you have zero idea like your most important asset you know the least amount of information about it that's something to me that I find absolutely criminal despite the rawness of both the space and the vision connected Fitness suddenly became the main identity and principal strategy for Under Armour yet it became obvious that no one at the company not even Kevin had given thought to how these apps would actually tie back into selling shirts and shoes Under Armour shifted its R&D Focus away from conventional material Innovation and design and towards
• 23:30 - 24:00 realizing this connected future launching $150 smart running shoes that would log your steps and Pace a $150 chest strap that measured heart rate a $180 Fitness tracker a $180 Bluetooth and Wi-Fi integrated weight scale and a free mobile app called records that would consolidate all your health data into a single pan of glass while no other sportsware company had bet the farm on this like Under Armour Nike and Adidas still Place chips on the table by launching Fitness trackers of their own
• 24:00 - 24:30 yet all these products would be rendered obsolete as Tim Cook would single-handedly crush this Market with deeper tracking full color displays Superior software better sensors and an unmatched form factor the Apple watch sucked up all the demand for fitness trackers smart apparel and connected shoes within 2 years for Under Armour connected Fitness as a business in itself was unsustainable My Fitness Pal endoo and Mt myfitness had all been bleeding unprofitable Venture back startups whose only Revenue sources were through inapp advertisements and
• 24:30 - 25:00 membership subscriptions My Fitness Pal which was purchased for $475 million posted a $6.5 million operating loss on just $14 million in Revenue before its acquisition the denmark-based Endomondo which was purchased for $85 million posted a million doll loss on revenue of $2 million it's apparent that all three companies were purchased for their user data and talent and not for their technology or fundamentals connected Fitness contributed less than 3% of under armour's annual revenue throughout
• 25:00 - 25:30 its existence Kevin was quick to remind people that the purpose of connected Fitness was not to generate income but instead to enhance its apparel and Footwear businesses yet there was nothing that big data would discover that the company didn't already know you didn't need a billion data points hundreds of software engineers and fitness tracking apps to tell you that under armour's biggest problem was that it products were ugly by 2016 that answer was staring Kevin in the face there were cracks in the core apparel business as Revenue had
• 25:30 - 26:00 slowed connected Fitness had become a costly diversion that had resulted in the company seating market share and ironically losing touch with the same customers whose data it was harvesting even fast fashion brands were bringing Innovation to their products which made under armour's differentiation on performance and quality alone an inadequate sell quote we need to become more fashionable with the products we have out there we were counting on the core basic products to generate more sales but the consumer today frankly has more options the core basic apparel
• 26:00 - 26:30 business is no longer just a few Brands and Sporting Goods that are participating consumers now want a product that looks great that wears great but also performs so performance has just become a given the long awaited debut of the curry signature off Court shoes and apparel line was seen as not just an invaluable entry into the mass Market through the NBA's hottest player but also a huge opportunity for Under Armour to break into mainstream Consciousness yet the $120 Curry sneakers were widely mocked before the product even went on sale the company
• 26:30 - 27:00 combed the negative press by pushing out new models months later with upgraded materials and revamped design but these moves only reinforced that Under Armour simply couldn't make good-looking shoes while the Curry basketball shoes sold well on the court the company had to admit that signature sales were sluggish and that the lifestyle business was significantly softer than expected like the tale of Icarus Under Armor had flown too close to the Sun in the 3 years between 2017 and 2019 the company found itself in its third era of Freefall incapable and helpless to stop the drop
• 27:00 - 27:30 Revenue which had grown at 27% on average every year since 2003 plummeted to the single digits as low as 1% the bill had come due for connected Fitness and under armour's operating margin was decimated into single digits Under Armour blamed their multi-year underperformance on a hostile retail environment that had disrupted their wholesale Channel and reduced consumer demand for premium products in the 3-year span between 2017 and 2019 major American retailers like pis and Sports
• 27:30 - 28:00 Authority went bankrupt as consumers went online to shop yet this excuse rang Hollow as Nike and adidos did not experience the same nose dive in sales even if we compare their results by geography anecdotally this excuse seems even less credible as people were still going bananas at this time for $300 Yeezys and $100 Lululemon yoga pants people were clearly still spending just not on Under Armour My Fitness Pal Endomondo and Matt by Fitness had collectively grown from
• 28:00 - 28:30 120 million users in 2015 to over 220 million users by 2019 but no business value had actually been generated after millions in R&D the internal Big Data engine was still incomplete the company had built out the capability to ingest millions of data points in real time but had no idea how to interpret and apply those findings it was now 2019 six full years since Under Armour first embarked on connected Fitness and Kevin was still out here rehashing the same incoherent script about its opportunity and potential quote connected Fitness will
• 28:30 - 29:00 become a powerful instrument to address this rapidly changing consumer environment from Insight driven product creation to purchase through use this data field ecosystem creates one of the most powerful and unique Consumer Connections in our industry a true two-way consumer-led conversation that will directly integrate and strategically influence our strategy this highly sophisticated engine represents a critical asset and competitive Advantage as we work towards becoming a 10 billion business the enormous data opportunity that we have
• 29:00 - 29:30 here is incredible what's different now is that we have an ability to act on it we have an ability to take that and make it actionable and I think this is what is so exciting about our future unintelligible statements like these made it even more apparent that Kevin was in over his head connected Fitness remained the top priority despite the lack of results even with a flashy multi-million dollar Topline connected Fitness posted loss after loss with nearly $600 million of Goodwill tied to this failing business the company replaced speed form with hover as its new flagship technology and running shoe
• 29:30 - 30:00 but it was an obvious Ultra boost knockoff in design and material to show off its Tech prowess Under Armour launched its own data- driven Subscription Service where you could get a box in the mail of personalized Under Armour merchandise every month none of these products succeeded in breathing life into under armour's Footwear and apparel business the diversion of connected Fitness and the years of product flops fractured under armour's wholesale business retailers lost confidence and quietly gave away under armored shelf space to better selling
• 30:00 - 30:30 brands overseas traction was slower than expected as sales in Europe China and Latin America combined for less than a quarter of under armour's annual revenue in an attempt to restore confidence Kevin subjected investors to an in-person 8 hour long 200 slide fire hose filled with some of the most over dramatized overdesigned and meaningless slides ever produced in Corporate America if it wasn't apparent before it was certainly clear now change was needed Under Armour would enter its fourth and
• 30:30 - 31:00 present-- day era in 2020 led by a new CEO for the first time in company history under Patrick Frisk Under Armour would return to its roots with a laser focus on apparel Innovation and selling shirts and shoes there was no more talk of Big Data Insights Tech or connected Fitness less than a year on the job Patrick gutted connected Fitness armor box was cancelled endoo was shut down and my fitness pal was sold to private Equity at a loss under Patrick under armour's top line and bottom line
• 31:00 - 31:30 recovered but it was still not anywhere close to the Double Digit growth of the past Patrick was burdened with turning around not just product Direction and strategy but also company culture and corporate compliance reports soon emerged that under Kevin company employees visited strip clubs on company dime while male Executives regularly engaged in sexual misconduct had romantic relationships with subordinates and threw parties where female employees were invited based on their attractiveness things only got worse when the SEC announced anounced fraud in under armour's financials in the 4-year
• 31:30 - 32:00 Nike Slayer era in which under arour had enjoyed the biggest hype the greatest stock appreciation and the most significant sales Growth Company Executives had manufactured some of that growth by pulling forward revenue on weak quarters to hit analyst targets and to exceed guidance under Kevin's leadership Executives would ask finance and sales to look for orders that retailers had placed for the future and then ship them out early in order to recognize the sale in the current quarter this meant that retailers would to take on inventory well in advance before they could even be sold like
• 32:00 - 32:30 taking on shipments of spring products during winter to convince retailers to take on this inventory they were given bigger discounts to accept early delivery Under Armour had secretly pulled forward nearly half a billion dollars of orders between 2015 and 2016 to maintain their double digit growth this manipulation is a much better explanation for the massive drop between 2016 and 2017 when under armour's growth plummeted from 22% to just 3% in a single year in reality the Nike Slayer era was just 2 years long and the
• 32:30 - 33:00 decline in apparel and Footwear had been happening long before 2017 while Under Armour was still trending down the company was objectively in a better place under Patrick's leadership by the measure of business Performance Brand identity and culture growth was solid but unspectacular yet Patrick lasted just 2 years at the helm before unexpectedly stepping down in 2022 without an explanation Under Armour has since appointed a new CEO in and Stephanie lards a Marriott Executive with nearly
• 33:00 - 33:30 30 years of experience in the hotel industry but at this point it's unclear who's still really paying attention the media has tried to explain under armour's collapse pointing to the typical doing too much too fast as the root cause but to chalk it up to a few incompetent Executives is poor analysis as that kind of dirty laundry exists in every company while Kevin was out chasing iot and Big Data the market was actually evolving to the point where sportsware Brands were better defined by their shoes rather than their slogans if you look at the messaging and marketing
• 33:30 - 34:00 across Nike under arour adidos and Puma it's all very homogeneous it's all about positivity Fitness empowerment inspiration speed performance grit determination Etc when everyone is saying the same thing no one is actually saying anything adidos is actually better defined by its Ultra boosts nmds St Smiths and Yeezys while Nike is best defined by Jordans Air Maxes and Air Forces under Armor's lack of a flagship shoe and product meant that there was
• 34:00 - 34:30 nothing visible to Anchor Define and embody the brand for modern consumers throwing half a billion dollars in advertising every year won't fill that void and Under Armour should have kept iterating on speed form until they perfected its design the second piece is connected Fitness it's a little unfair to fault Kevin for falling victim to Silicon Valley hype as he's not the first nor will he be the last CEO to get caught up in a venture capitalist pump and dump scheme but the founders behind my fitness pal and Endo Mondo and map my fitness all deserve some attention as
• 34:30 - 35:00 these were individuals who were paid very handsomely and were the ones who had actually come up with the vision for connected Fitness while it's not politically correct to judge people based on their physique most of these Founders were clearly not even people into fitness or nutrition for themselves the point here is not that you have to be an athlete to create value for athletes but more so that these were just nerds For Better or Worse who lucked their way into a big payout they had all built their apps when smartphones were just taking off and they had achieved rapid adop option through first mover Advantage Kevin
• 35:00 - 35:30 certainly should have been more cautious about Greenfield Technologies but at the same time he entrusted connected Fitness to these Founders by po pointing them as sea-level Executives after acquisition these Founders All bounce as soon as they vested at the 2 and 1 half year mark leaving behind a trail of conflicting visions and half-ass work that would Doom any team or project from the start the other lesson here is that data is garbage while big data and iot are both based on the idea that data is power the reality is that data is is only useful if you can interpret and apply it collecting data for the sake of
• 35:30 - 36:00 ingestion and aggregation in itself is useless the central problem with my fitness pal Endomondo and map my fitness is that even if all these apps had a billion active users the data that they would generate in sleep nutrition and fitness has no inherent business value knowing that 10 million people on the west coast run on average 3 miles a day consume 2400 calories and prefer to eat chicken for lunch is more useful for a census taker a data broker or a market research firm than it is for a
• 36:00 - 36:30 sportsware company the last lesson is about corporate governance while the market regards founder-led companies favorably today corporate governance is like a spectrum in which founder-led companies are one extreme and private Equity is on the other as we covered in the Burger King episode private Equity can be a problem as the owners are too detached they oversimplify business into a spreadsheet their tunnel visioned on short-term optimization and they take an uncreative peanut butter approach with strategy founder-led companies are the
• 36:30 - 37:00 opposite where the founder can become Overly Attached despite having good intentions they're too involved in every single aspect of the company they suffer from a God complex they feel pressured to produce Grand Visions like Steve Jobs and they turn the company into a platform for personal Fame while Founders are invaluable for the Charisma and passion that they bring to early stage startups they can just as easily turn into liabilities where they develop too much power influence and personality as the founder and CEO Kevin vision and enthusiasm were essential for the survival of Under Armour in its first
• 37:00 - 37:30 era the company's early success cemented Kevin as a Visionary and granted him unchecked autonomy Authority and freedom to run Under Armour in any way he saw fit even if that meant allowing employees to expense visits to the strip club it also allowed him to assemble a boardroom of obedient Executives who wouldn't challenge his decisions like dropping 700 million on unprofitable fitness apps whose own private post money valuations were nowhere near their final purchase price PR only founders with their unparalleled privilege and
• 37:30 - 38:00 mythical reputations can make such drastic radical changes in a company's Direction so quickly and can stick on with bad Investments for so long without being directly challenged by the board employees and investors in 2020 Kevin was not actually forced out as CEO instead he voluntarily stepped down before that conversation could even happen in doing so he gave himself a position where he would still have control over the company even though Under Armour has had two external CEOs in the past 3 years the CEOs formerly still reported into Kevin and not to the
• 38:00 - 38:30 board exclusively under Armor's finances even point to a mysterious Chief Operating decision maker an individual who is not the CEO who makes CEO like decisions about allocating resources and assessing performance all signals point to Kevin as this Chief Operating decision maker which leaves the CEO as nothing more than insulation and a political puppet if Under Armour had a conventional corporate structure this kind of hierarchy would never exist CEOs would not be reporting in into Founders Kevin would not have been allowed to bet
• 38:30 - 39:00 the farm on connected Fitness without first performing significant due diligence but at the same time Under Armor might not ever have been successful and the brand would likely have been sold to private equity for parts during its initial freef fall when you come from Millions you seek billions and when you achieve your billions you value purpose as a billionaire who was born into millions the last thing Kevin needs is more money for Kevin under arour is his life's work as long as the company stays alive and he gets to run the the show through a proxy that keeps him out of public scrutiny Kevin has
• 39:00 - 39:30 demonstrated that he's happy to do so even if that means running Under Armor into the ground