Trump's 'failure' in Ukraine risks war with Russia 'in three years'

Summary

In this engaging episode of Front Line on Times Radio, hosted by Philip Ingram, we delve into the complexities of the Ukraine conflict with General Ben Hodges. The discussion reveals concerns about America’s perceived failure in Ukraine and the potential risk of a broader conflict with Russia within three years. General Hodges emphasizes Europe's pivotal role in demonstrating its capability and independence from US influence amidst political and military challenges. The conversation also explores the strategic and operational developments in Ukraine, the evolving character of modern warfare, and potential geopolitical implications if Ukraine were to fail in its defense against Russian aggression.

Highlights

• Europe's potential to lead on Ukraine without US assistance highlighted. 🇪🇺
• General Ben Hodges warns of possible European conflicts if Ukraine fails. 🌍
• Ukraine's innovative military tactics under scrutiny. 🔍
• Concerns raised over US foreign policy and presidential decision-making. 🇺🇸
• Geopolitical implications of potential outcomes in the Ukraine conflict discussed. 🌐

Key Takeaways

• Europe urged to step up in Ukraine, potentially showcasing independence from the US! 🇪🇺
• General Hodges warns of potential broader conflict with Russia if Ukraine falls. ⚠️
• Discussion on the changing dynamics of modern warfare in Ukraine. 🚀
• Questions raised about US political strategy and its implications for global stability. 🤔
• Potential geopolitical realignments if Ukraine maintains its defense. 🌍

Overview

The latest episode of Front Line, hosted by Philip Ingram with guest General Ben Hodges, dives deep into the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict. General Hodges shares his insights on Europe's role, or lack thereof, in managing the situation independently of the USA. He emphasizes the need for Europe to demonstrate its military and strategic capabilities in the face of potential Russian aggression, suggesting a shift in geopolitical power dynamics.

The conversation also touches on the evolving nature and character of warfare as witnessed in Ukraine. General Hodges discusses how Ukraine's innovative tactics and strategies reflect a modern battlefield where smaller, resourceful nations can stand against larger adversaries. This shift could influence how other nations approach their military strategies in future conflicts.

A poignant part of the discussion revolves around the political approaches of the US towards the conflict, raising questions about the impacts of its current policy decisions on international political stability. General Hodges speculates on potential scenarios if Ukraine were to fail, suggesting that this might lead to more direct conflicts between Russia and European nations, thereby altering the global geopolitical landscape.

Chapters

• 00:00 - 00:30: Introduction and Context The chapter titled 'Introduction and Context' discusses the challenges in achieving a ceasefire with Russia regarding Ukraine. It highlights Russia's staunch stance as articulated by Lavrov, emphasizing no European troops in Ukraine. The narrative critiques the lingering perception of Russia as a dominant Soviet-like force, poised to overpower others, and argues this view is outdated as Russia cannot defeat Ukraine. The importance of demonstrating strength and resistance against Russian aggression is underscored.
• 00:30 - 05:00: Implications of U.S. Policy and Political Dynamics This chapter discusses the implications of U.S. foreign policy and political dynamics, with a focus on Europe. It suggests that due to perceived failures in U.S. policies, Europe has the opportunity to establish itself as an independent force rather than a follower of the United States. The chapter sets the stage for a conversation with General Ben Hodges, an experienced military figure who served as a commanding general in the U.S. Army Europe until 2017.
• 05:00 - 10:00: Military Situation and Strategies in Ukraine This chapter begins with an introduction acknowledging the guest speaker's expertise in military analysis, particularly regarding the situation in Ukraine. The focus then shifts to discussing the broader implications of warfare and defense strategies in Europe, highlighting the importance of understanding the ongoing military dynamics within Ukraine. The conversation is noted to extend beyond just the military tactics to include strategic comments and perspectives emerging from Washington, indicating a multi-dimensional approach to the discussion.
• 10:00 - 15:00: Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests In this chapter titled 'Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests,' a discussion is initiated about a recent statement made by the President of the United States, suggesting that Ukraine started the war. The speaker expresses surprise and frustration at this statement, questioning why the President's advisers have not corrected him. The speaker indicates that this perspective seems to align with the Russian standpoint and accuses the current administration of siding with the Kremlin's narrative.
• 15:00 - 20:00: Ceasefire and International Involvement This chapter discusses a topic involving a ceasefire and international involvement, focusing specifically on the U.S. President's stance or actions regarding Ukraine and its history. The speaker expresses uncertainty about deeper psychological motives behind the President's actions and explicitly refutes the notion that the President is a Russian asset. Instead, the speaker suggests the President may lack an appreciation or respect for the significance of the situation in Ukraine.
• 20:00 - 25:00: Comparison with Past Conflicts and Strategic Planning This chapter discusses the geopolitical importance of a certain region, emphasizing its significance for both Europe and the United States. The narrative touches on the lingering resentment from a previous administration, particularly surrounding an incident involving an attempted bribe or blackmail of President Zelensky. The discussion suggests that these past events continue to influence current strategic planning and relations.
• 25:00 - 30:00: Potential Outcomes and European Responsibilities The chapter discusses the complexity and challenges in international politics, emphasizing the mix of unclear strategic thinking and responsibilities among political figures in the US. It highlights an incident involving Marcus Rubio and JD Vance, showing Rubio's passive stance and Vance's aggressive role during a meeting in the Oval Office. The title suggests a focus on the potential outcomes and responsibilities within European contexts.
• 30:00 - 33:00: Conclusion and Expert Insights The chapter concludes by discussing Witoff, an individual actively moving around the Middle East and recently in Moscow. Witoff, identified as a real estate lawyer with international experience and known to play golf with the President of the United States (POTUS), lacks diplomatic credentials. The narrative seems to highlight the disjointed nature of his involvement in geopolitical matters, suggesting a mismatch between his background and the roles he appears to be engaging with.

Trump's 'failure' in Ukraine risks war with Russia 'in three years' Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 We have to assume that Russia is really probably not going to agree to a ceasefire outright. They Lavrov has said from the beginning, no European troops in Ukraine. Who is he? Ukraine is a sovereign country and we we should quit acting like these guys, these are the old Soviet Union with massive formations and they're going to crush the rest of us. That's not going to happen. They can't defeat Ukraine. And so this is where I think uh we need to demonstrate.
• 00:30 - 01:00 I mean this is Europe's moment because of the failure of the US. This really is Europe's moment to demonstrate that it is no longer a vassel of the United States and that it has capability or it never will. I mean that that's all there is to it. Hello and welcome to Front Line with me, Philip Ingram. Now today we're talking to General Ben Hodgeges. Now, General Ben was an infantry officer, a military planner, and a former commanding general for US Army Europe, uh, relinquishing command in 2017. And you've co-authored a few books
• 01:00 - 01:30 on the future of warfare and defense in Europe, and you provide analysis in lots of different programs. Um, but if ever there was an individual to get us to try and understand what's going on from a military perspective inside Ukraine, um, you're the person. So, welcome back to Front Line. Phil, thank you very much for the privilege. Yeah. Well, I I have to start and we'll lift it up above the military. We'll have to get into the strategic um with some of the comments that are coming out of Washington at the moment.
• 01:30 - 02:00 Um you know, we've just had this week um POTUS say that Ukraine started the war. Why are his advisers not correcting him? Does he really believe that? Um what a what a great question. Of course, I was gobsmacked when I when I heard him say that myself. Uh and uh it's very uh frustrating because it's clear that the the White House, the this administration has taken the Russian side and that they parrot Kremlin
• 02:00 - 02:30 talking points better than Lev. Um I can't I can't figure out exactly what this is about. I I don't know that there's some deep psychological reason for it and I don't believe that the president is a Russian asset. Uh not an intentional asset as is sometimes described. I just think he has a uh doesn't appreciate or respect what's at stake with Ukraine with its history,
• 02:30 - 03:00 its geography, why this matters for Europe, frankly, why it matters for the United States. I I even I hate to say this, I don't think he even cares. And um and I think there's also uh probably some hangover from his first administration when he tried to bribe or blackmail, I should say, President Galileinsky ahead of the re-election campaign, um I guess Joe Biden, and I think he's still angry about that. All of these things unfortunately are part
• 03:00 - 03:30 of the mix rather than really uh clear strategic thinking. But but but again, you know, I'm I'm a simple Brit and I don't quite understand US politics. I always thought um international politics dealing with different countries around the world was the responsibility of the secretary of state Marcus Rubio, but we saw JD Vance taking the role of the attack dog in the infamous Oval Office um meeting and Marcus Rubio sat there silently on the
• 03:30 - 04:00 sofa and we're now seeing Witoff um who's seems to be moving around the Middle East and has now gone into Moscow and from what I can work out is a real estate lawyer who plays golf with POTUS and has got some international experience but isn't a diplomat in any way, shape or form. How's all this coming together? Well, obviously it's not. Um the uh I I think first of all anybody that's watching the uh uh this
• 04:00 - 04:30 administration has to recognize that they do nothing that is in accordance with normal convention tradition uh you know how to even act presidential. I mean, it's just it's it's so different from everything we've known in the past. Uh, and so, you know, eventually we'll get used to it. And and while it it drives me crazy because I see an assault on our Constitution almost daily um and as well as on our allies uh and on what I think are are
• 04:30 - 05:00 our strategic interests. The fact is he's the elected president and that's who we that's who we've got to deal with uh until there's there are new elections. Well, I'm I'm glad I'm glad you see that. So, it's not it's not just me getting confused through naivity. No, no, no. It's it's uh it's difficult to uh it's hard to watch. I mean, there's there's no other way for me to describe it. Um but it's not just him. I mean, he's obviously enabled by a codery of people around him who I would describe
• 05:00 - 05:30 as uh different from Trump one. he now has made sure that the only people around him are those who will agree with him or who will carry out what he wants. Now, what you've described when it comes to foreign policy is an interesting situation and I think that uh you've got a case where um who does what is not necessarily the traditional way of doing it. Almost every president has a special
• 05:30 - 06:00 envoy for specific tasks. That in and of itself is is not unique. But it's clear or at least it looks to me that the Secretary of State is not the one organizing and coordinating foreign policy on behalf of the president. U Mr. Woff is involved. Uh he he clearly is in over his head. Um he's not the right person to be doing this. But it almost doesn't matter because Trump, President Trump's voice is the only one that actually matters. the vice president's
• 06:00 - 06:30 role is uh I mean this is a I'll just have to say it's an unusual sort of connection between him and President Trump. Um and then you've got a national security advisor who does not seem as prominent as he was before the famous signal chat group u scandal. Um so I I can't quite make it out but it's clear that there is only one voice that matters in all of these things and that's the president. Yeah. Well, we we
• 06:30 - 07:00 could spend all program talking about the politics of it, but I want to drill down into more of the military side of things and and look at that and get back to what's going on on the ground. Um, and for the military-minded audience, um, we're going to get into some jargon. Um, apologies to those that haven't got it. But, you we're seeing Ukraine continuing to have some success at what I class as deep fires, but almost into the operational level. you know, they um they carried out a drone attack against the 112th Guards Missile Brigade, which was the unit that launched ballistic missiles on Sunumi and killed 34 last
• 07:00 - 07:30 Sunday. Um at least 10 drones hit the military target. Um the target was hundreds of kilometers northeast of Moscow. So massive massive range, but we seem to find that most of the commentators that are out there are talking about um what is going on the front line and movements in front line. And I've heard you talk about, you know, that nothing really happening on that beforehand. Why do you think everyone is focused on purely the tactical battle rather than actually the operational level and how that's influencing what's
• 07:30 - 08:00 going on tactically and how that's influencing the decision-m at the strategic level? Well, first of all, you've got too many people that don't understand the geography um and don't appreciate the nature of war in general and the character of this particular war. Um you know, if I' I've been seeing reports now for three years about how there's no way Russia could lose. They
• 08:00 - 08:30 just too big, too many. Ukraine has all these problems and uh and people have lost sight of the fact that Ukra Ukrainians are fighting for their life, for their survival. They're literally defending their homeland. And also um even when the president yells at President Galinsky and says, "You got no cards." I mean, well, the Taliban had no cards against us, but they certainly won. The Vietkong had no cards against us. They won. Uh and so history is full of examples of where um small
• 08:30 - 09:00 outnumbered ragged uh armies or whatever defeated on paper much larger armies and navies. Uh and so um you I was thinking I heard this today somebody said the last time that an empire tried to protect save the crown jewel of the empire was when France tried to hang on to Algeria. They killed a million Algerians and the Algerians did not buckle. So, um I think we we
• 09:00 - 09:30 need to take a look and understand what's at what the Ukrainians are doing. And then when you look at uh you know the Russian economy and and what they're doing, how they're grabbing people off the street. Um you know, these Chinese soldiers are the latest example. Um but soldiers are going into the attack on golf carts and and civilian cars. they just don't have anything. Um, but of course the Russians
• 09:30 - 10:00 are willing to u because Putin doesn't care about casualties, they'll just keep doing this as long as he thinks he's going to win. And his assessment that he's going to win is based on the belief that the United States will not help Ukraine and that Europe will not help Ukraine. And so, you know, we know from history that war is a test of will and it's a test of logistics. Right now, the Ukrainian soldiers have superior will, but do Western leaders have superior will to the Kremlin? I'm not sure. Yeah.
• 10:00 - 10:30 Well, it's it's interesting. Putin seems to be focusing again on the front line and throwing all of his resources at that. But if we look at, you know, the Ukrainian HUR General Badanov's actions, he's almost resurrected World War II special operations executive type actions throughout Russia. um and taken that to the next level, you know, almost with a revolution in deep tactics in your long-range drone attacks against um oil refining capability against
• 10:30 - 11:00 airfields against because he he he can't generate the conventional capability to do that through um a conventional Ukrainian air force or a conventional missile force or other things. So you are are we really seeing um this changing character rather than nature of modern warfare? Is is is that something that is going to influence the way the west is going to develop um in in coming months and years? Well, certainly as Clausswitz tells us, the nature of war is unchanging, but the character of war
• 11:00 - 11:30 is definitely changing and Ukrainians uh and to their credit, the Russians are are doing certain things at a level well above what we could be doing that we just we don't have the experience uh or the necessity yet. But certainly um as General Cavoi the Sakur said, you can defeat Russia's advantage of mass with precision if you have enough time. And by that of course he's talking about you go after headquarters, you go after logistics, you go after their long range
• 11:30 - 12:00 fires, their bases. And I think the Ukrainians also recognize that Russia is only able to stay in this war as long as they can export oil and gas to China and India. So wrecking Russia's oil and gas infrastructure is would be the equivalent of strategic bombing. U and I think uh what one of the most fascinating aspects of this war is how Ukraine has grown its defense industry during the war despite Russia going
• 12:00 - 12:30 after pretty much every city and its power infrastructure for three years now. Of course, we should have known. I mean, Germany, the Nazi Germany could not Great could not knock Great Britain out of the war with strategic bombing. We, the US and the Royal Air Force, bombed the hell out of Germany for years, and that didn't knock Germany out of the war. Um, so the Russians are not able to do that against Ukrainians, but the Ukrainian approach to going specifically after the Russian oil and
• 12:30 - 13:00 gas infrastructure, I think, is going to have strategic effect. Yeah. Yeah. No, s surgical. Now, the the other thing is you've you've commanded troops on the ground. You know what it's like when you're engaged with the enemy and you're dealing with the troops in the kit and everything else you've got. You for those that are watching this, you know, how big a thing was it for Ukraine to re-equip, to change doctrine, to change tactics whilst engaged in a highintensity conflict with the enemy? Um, and how do you think they've done
• 13:00 - 13:30 it? And could could you could the US have done it? I know the UK couldn't have done it. Um, I I've always thought that the best organizations were learning organizations and having the ability and the culture to make changes necessary um when you had to do it. Now, uh I don't want to paint the Ukrainian side uh as having done everything exactly right. Obviously, they haven't. uh General Zalusni when he was of course
• 13:30 - 14:00 now Ambassador Zalusni but when he was General Shalolni uh he went he worked very hard to try and change that old Soviet culture that was in the Ukrainian armed forces particularly at the higher levels uh he worked very hard to change that and I think General Sirki of course is continuing to do that as well even though he's a pretty tough old guy himself um the the thing is the Ukrainians had no choice but to unleash the talent of their young people. Uh the
• 14:00 - 14:30 vast majority of the army are people that joined within the last three years. So it's not like it's a big huge old professional force. Um and and so uh the uh nature the character of this war and the fact that they have been uh outnumbered so much so vastly they've had to find ways to counter Russia's advantage of mass. The best example we've seen, of course, and well, let me say it this way. There are several very
• 14:30 - 15:00 good examples at sea. The fact that Ukraine was able to basically defeat the Black Sea fleet, even though Ukraine had no traditional navy of their own anymore, that's because of a combination of, you know, uh, using weapons provided by UK and France, uh, with maritime drones, uh, special forces, sabotage, on and on. uh they this uh counter offensive they launched into Kursk I think caught everybody by surprise
• 15:00 - 15:30 because people were assuming that well Russia's winning they're just keeping marching in the east but the Ukrainian general staff looked at the map and said wait a minute they haven't they barely moved in months and only at enormous casualties so they were pretty sure they could accept risk in the east although it would suck to be a young company commander out near between Pocrosk and Abdiva um in order to build up force to launch an operational strike into Korsk
• 15:30 - 16:00 and they were there for months. I these are the kind of things that um I think only creative innovative leadership um and a willingness to take risk can do and and Ukrainians have demonstrated they can do it. I would I would say that most British officers with whom I have ever served are absolutely capable of of doing that as as would be most but not all American officers. Yeah. But a major
• 16:00 - 16:30 um feat for for any military to be able to do. Now I'm changing tactics slightly. Let me let me let me let me push press on just one thing. uh you make a good point and the way to do it I believe is you're either in combat where you get killed if you don't adapt or you do it in your training centers and that's always been the best place for the US Army to change things was at out in the box in the training area where
• 16:30 - 17:00 the dreaded OP four crushes you unless you do do the things you're supposed to do and then the schoolhouse the academic side will will catch up with all that but doing it either in combat or in your in your really most rigorous training centers. That's how you make those adaptations. Yeah. So, politically at the moment, everyone's hoping that there's going to be some form of ceasefire and you the debate over the last few days as to whether there has been this ceasefire against critical infrastructure which quite clearly the Russians have ignored and ceasefire in
• 17:00 - 17:30 the Black Sea which I don't think there was continuing activity in in the Black Sea. So, we haven't really noticed that. But, you know, if we make an assumption, like all good planners like to do, that there is a path to ceasefire and a potential path to more permanent agreement. Um, do you think my assumption is sound? Uh, do you think Ukraine can continue the fight if the United States withdraws all support as pus keeps threatening to do? Yeah, I absolutely believe it. Uh, first, just look at where we are now. the United States is I don't think we've had
• 17:30 - 18:00 another uh aid package uh approved since the Biden administration. So there's no new US stuff coming in. Um and I don't anticipate that this administration is going to do anything different unless the president gets really really angry and annoyed with Vladimir Putin who's making him look like a making him look foolish. And I think the president, that's the last thing he wants is to be seen as a loser. And so, you know, he's
• 18:00 - 18:30 capable of hard left turns, hard right turns, or complete reversals. Uh, and and so he may change his mind, but I don't see that happening right now. So, um, even without US help, Ukraine and with the help of European countries, they've stopped Russia. Um, now my here's a couple of assumptions from my side. Number one, it it's it's obvious that the Kremlin has zero interest in a real uh negotiated outcome where Ukraine
• 18:30 - 19:00 survives as a sovereign nation or even the idea of Ukraine as a sovereign nation survives. They have no interest in that. And as long as Vladimir Putin is alive, he's not going to go along with that unless he is forced to. So there's going to have to be something that will compel him to uh to come to the table in a meaningful way. Uh and that means um he would have to recognize that Europe is really strongly united
• 19:00 - 19:30 and that the Europeans include plus Canada probably are uh committed to helping Ukraine actually uh if not win at least be in a much stronger position. And when you add together the economies and the populations and the military of all of Europe's countries plus including Great Britain and Canada, it dwarfs Russia. I mean, I'm sick and tired of hearing uh this whining coming from European leader European countries
• 19:30 - 20:00 about, oh, you know, we can't do this without the US. Nonsense. Nonsense. Uh the only thing that's missing is uh is some self-confidence from our European allies. Now um so the other assumption is that Ukraine is not going to accept any outcome regardless of what the US and the and uh Russia may decide. Ukraine is not obligated to do any of that nor is UK or any other country. So
• 20:00 - 20:30 um I think we have to look at this in in three sort of phases. Phase one is where we are now. This is the preparation phase and I have to give credit to President Stuba Finland. He I heard him use this framework at the Munich Security Conference and it helped me appreciate things. Uh the first phase is the preparation phase. That's all this stuff that's going on in Brussels, in London, in Paris, in Kev, in Riad, in the Oval Office. They're not all joined up, but they're all activities that are
• 20:30 - 21:00 trying to get to a ceasefire and and some kind of force that could compel Russia to comply with a ceasefire. The Ukrainians know that the Russians cannot be trusted at all. Zero. So they're not going to be willing to negotiate anything until they see that Russia will comply with a ceasefire that is enforced and backed up by European countries. So phase one is preparation. Phase two is the ceasefire
• 21:00 - 21:30 which will include the deployment of some kind of ceasefire implementation force. Not a peacekeeping force, a ceasefire implementation force. something that you would recognize from 1995 when the NATO I4 went into Bosnia. And then the third phase that would be the those would be the actual negotiations about the long-term outcome, the sovereignty of Ukraine, uh whether or not sanctions are lifted on Russia, peace, uh security guarantees
• 21:30 - 22:00 for Ukraine, those kind of things. That's that's months away. That's months away. assuming assuming that UK and France and hopefully Germany and others will finally um rediscover their strategic uh backbone and the political will necessary to put together a ceasefire implementation force that has unity of command, robust rules of
• 22:00 - 22:30 engagement, and the capabilities required to deter Russia from violating a ceasefire. So, how do you see this coalition of the willing coming together and what what do you think they're going to be doing on the ground, which is a very unfair question to ask when we don't have a peace agreement? Um, but you to my mind, it ranges from just taking the training packages that we're giving to the Ukrainians in different countries and bringing that into Ukraine so that we've got a presence on the ground through to some form of monitoring force that could
• 22:30 - 23:00 be watching what's going on. But at the same time, we get and I don't know whether you saw General Kellogg's plan that seemed to um split Ukraine up into different regions where there was a you know effectively a coalition of the willing region. There was Ukrainian region and then the whole of the east seemed to be shaded as something that the Russians would get control and therefore it was almost seemed to be and it may be misinterpreting what he was putting down but seemed to be giving the Russians everything that they wanted without them having to fight for it.
• 23:00 - 23:30 Yeah. Uh, General Kellogg's uh what what is attributed to him was a total dog's breakfast. Um, I mean I who who the hell is he to offer to give up Ukrainian territory and and I don't understand why this administration start their start point is giving up Ukrainian territory. I mean that that has never made sense to me. Um, and I mean, look, Russia after
• 23:30 - 24:00 11 years, 11 years, they still only control about 19% of Ukrainian territory. With every advantage, they still only control 19% of Ukrainian territory. The Great Black Sea Fleet has a really cool name. It is nowhere in sight. Uh the Russian Air Force with all of its technical advantages and numerical superiority has failed the two most important tasks for any air force. Air superiority and interdiction of the other side's lines
• 24:00 - 24:30 of communication. They have not destroyed a single train or convoy bringing equipment and ammunition from Poland into Ukraine in three years. So, um I I I don't understand why, uh the start point for the administration is Ukraine has to give up territory for what? And so, uh to your very fair question, you know, what do what would we want this uh ceasefire implementation force to do? First of all, we have to
• 24:30 - 25:00 assume that Russia is really probably not going to agree to a ceasefire outright. They've Lavrov has said from the beginning, no European troops in Ukraine. Who is he? Ukraine is a sovereign country and we we should quit acting like these guys. These are the old Soviet Union with massive formations and they're going to crush the rest of us. That's not going to happen. They can't defeat Ukraine. And so this is where I think uh we need to demonstrate.
• 25:00 - 25:30 I mean, this is Europe's moment because of the failure of the US. This really is Europe's moment to demonstrate that it is no longer a vassel of the United States and that it has capability or it never will. I mean, that that's all there is to it. And so, um, I I think that we need a force that can that is capable of deterring Russia and the Russians will test it immediately. But, you know, Captain Haj is there. I need to have the authority
• 25:30 - 26:00 uh to shoot down any Russian drone that violates whatever the ceasefire is. Shoot it down immediately. Not have to call back to Brussels or Paris or London or Berlin or wherever to ask permission, but immediately shoot it down. Those, by the way, were the rules of engagement that the NATO I4 had that immediately, you know, a Serbian or Bosian soldier could be uh you could hit them immediately if they even looked like they were going to threaten a NATO soldier. Yeah. Well, exactly. And it's
• 26:00 - 26:30 getting those robust rules of engagement. It's all things that people don't discuss too much that's out there. But do you think a lot of this pressure then on Europe from um pus is to is in recognition that there are three major conflicts around the world at different stages. We've got Europe, Russia, Ukraine, we've got the Middle East that seems to be falling apart even more and we've got brewing um conflict in Southeast Asia and actually he needs Europe to step up because we cannot it's unfair of the world to ask the United
• 26:30 - 27:00 States to take on all three simultaneously. um and therefore he's he's forcing the conditions to do that because European countries didn't wake up themselves um whenever he was president first time around. Well, so uh thank you for saying that. This is uh the the United States by itself does not have the capability or capacity to do it by itself even if we wanted to both from in terms of intelligence sharing of maritime p sea power air power land
• 27:00 - 27:30 power special forces all these things is just not enough we can't do it alone and so the United States has always depended on allies um this is not some new thing um and I think it is fair for the president of the United states to say, "Hey guys, you know, we're shifting our priorities over here, but we still have interests in Europe, and we need you to help protect not just our interest, but our collective interests." I think that's fair. Now, the fact is there are
• 27:30 - 28:00 only about 80,000 US personnel in Europe total. 80,000. That's Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, uh, assigned as well as rotational. I mean, that would not even fill up Wimblem Stadium. So, we're not talking about a huge number of AR sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines. Um, and not so much of that would necessarily be shifted to the Pacific because it doesn't have those are not
• 28:00 - 28:30 capabilities that that would be needed there necessarily. But there's no doubt that for financial reasons, the US presence in Europe is going to start to come down here in the U this year and next. Um, our army, the big what we call the big army, um, is probably going to take about a 20 to 25% cut here over the next three years. I mean, that's that's a gigantic chunk of the of our landpower is going to be gone. Now, in order to uh meet the air and naval requirements for
• 28:30 - 29:00 the Indo-acific region. Now, as you correctly point out, there are multiple places where there are challenges. I think I think we should do what uh Churchill and FDR agreed back in the Arcadia conference of January 1942 at a time when no Americans wanted to get involved in a land war in Europe, but our fleet was on fire or underwater in Pearl Harbor. Um, and so Americans
• 29:00 - 29:30 were ready to go to war. But Churchill and Roosevelt both realized that they had to defeat Nazi Germany first uh, in order to make sure that Great Britain, which was all alone by itself right now at that time. And there was not much reason for optimism that we had to keep Great Britain in the war and then we could go take care deal with the Empire of Japan. So the strategic priority was Germany first, the U and then and Roosevelt was able to sell that to the
• 29:30 - 30:00 American people. Uh and then one year later at the Casablanca conference in January of 43, they agreed on a strategic objective of uh unconditional surrender. Not get to a better negotiating position, but unconditional surrender. So that strategic priority and strategic objective is what enabled us to do what we had to do to win the collectively the second world war. So if we think about Russia first defeat
• 30:00 - 30:30 Russia, Iran has no friends. I mean Iran has zero friends in the world. And so if if they are isolated by the defeat of Russia, that really undermines the uh Hezbollah, the Houthis, and what's left of Hamas. And then the Chinese would be thinking, huh, okay, these guys are serious. I mean, they've got allies, they've got political will, they got industrial capacity and military capability. So I think this prioritization of Russia first would not
• 30:30 - 31:00 only isolate Iran, it also would be an effective deterrent against China. That's, you know, that's uh as a planner, strategic planner, that's how I would want to approach it. Um but I don't know that we've got the right leader in place in Washington to approach it that way. Yeah. No. Interesting. Well, you fi finally and briefly, I just want your thoughts on this. you are we almost certainly going back to a cold war too no matter what
• 31:00 - 31:30 scenario that we get in in Ukraine um or do you think it could become a hot war in Europe or worse still are we on a path where we could see a hot war globally so if Ukraine fails then I would predict within two or three years you know we'll have a war between Russia and some other European countries u whether that's Georgia, Muldova, uh, or do they, uh, go ahead and attack maybe a NATO country to
• 31:30 - 32:00 see because they'll be confident if we allowed Ukraine to fail, that would mean that the US had turned its back and that Europe could not get its act together. And so for Russia, the dream has always been to wreck NATO. And if they can attack a NATO country and you don't get an article 5 response, then that's end of the alliance. So, but that the the necessary precursor for that was failure in Ukraine. If Ukraine doesn't fail and
• 32:00 - 32:30 Europe does get its act together, whether or not the United States um contributes in in a meaningful way, then Russia clearly will not have the wherewithal to open up a new a new phase, a new a new front somewhere else. they're going to be a long time recovering from the damage they have suffered now. Um, but you know, as we said at the beginning, folk, the uh this this
• 32:30 - 33:00 particular administration, there's nothing conventional or or traditional about it. Uh the president has gone about wrecking a system that while not perfect, we the United States benefited from it more than anybody. And uh even if the Trump administration is over in three and a half years and there's a completely new Democratic administration, it will be hard to put all those pieces back together again.
• 33:00 - 33:30 Well, hard to put pieces back together again. General Ben, that's a a good point for us to stop um this particular edition of Front Line. It's been a real pleasure talking to you. Thank you. Well, thank you very much for the privilege. I love coming on this program. Thank you for watching another episode of Front Line with me, Philip Ingram. Um, if you want more great content, please sign up for Times Radio membership and then you can leave comments and ask questions which we'll endeavor to answer in other shows. Um, and if you want to be kept up to date with day-to-day events, please tune in to Times Radio. Thank you.