Why Pakistan is an Overmatch for India

Summary

Highlights

• Pakistan's alignment with China's military significantly boosts its strategic depth 🇵🇰🇨🇳.
• India's military has not upgraded its war concepts since 1986, affecting its readiness ⚔️.
• Pakistan's ISI stands out as a formidable intelligence entity with historical learning 🕵️.
• Pakistan maintains an operational advantage due to cohesive strategic-level planning 🎯.
• India's army is bogged down with counter-terror operations, causing limited strategic updates ⚔️.
• The integration of Chinese military technology and support enhances Pakistan's operational capabilities 🔄.
• Potential for a 'one-front reinforced war' with deep interoperability between Pakistan and China 🇵🇰🇨🇳.
• India's divided military focus between Pakistan and China poses strategic challenges ⚔️.
• Political interference in India's military strategies contrasts with Pakistan's military-driven policies 🏛️.
• The video suggests India's strategic diplomacy should aim for peace with China to alleviate potential war scenarios 🕊️.

Key Takeaways

• Pakistan's military potentially outmatches India's due to strategic alignment with China 🇵🇰🇨🇳.
• India's focus on counter-terrorism has hindered modern military upgrades ⚔️.
• Strategic-level coherence gives Pakistan an operational edge over India 🎯.
• Air-land battle concept used by India may not be optimized for modern conflicts 🛩️.
• ISI's intelligence capabilities significantly bolster Pakistan's military strategy 🕵️.
• Interoperability with China enhances Pakistan's readiness and strategic depth 🔄.
• A two-front war scenario presents challenges for India's military assets 🇮🇳.
• Political and bureaucratic interference weakens India's strategic military planning 🏛️.
• A need for strategic peace and cooperation with China is emphasized to mitigate conflict risks 🕊️.

Overview

Chapters

• 00:00 - 02:30: Introduction and India's War Strategy The chapter 'Introduction and India's War Strategy' opens with a bold assertion. The author, referencing their previous work titled 'Dragon on Our Doorstep,' expressed the view that India is not in a position to defeat Pakistan in a military confrontation. The statement is further reinforced by the author's belief that in any forthcoming conflict, the Pakistani military would decisively outperform the Indian military.
• 02:30 - 05:00: Levels of War The chapter titled 'Levels of War' opens with a bold statement about the military dynamics between India and Pakistan, particularly highlighting events related to Jammu and Kashmir on August 5th, 2019. Before delving into the reasons behind this statement, the chapter reflects on a prediction made five years ago regarding India's inability to defeat Pakistan in a war. This sets the stage for a deeper exploration of the strategic and historical context surrounding the ongoing tensions in the region.
• 05:00 - 07:30: India's Tactical Level War Focus The chapter delves into India's focus on the tactical level of war. It describes the tactical level as the stage of war where battles are directly fought, emphasizing force-on-force engagements and the concept of attrition. The discussion highlights the significance of asset counting, such as the number of tanks and guns each side possesses, which becomes crucial during these engagements.
• 07:30 - 10:30: Strategic Strength of Pakistan Military This chapter discusses the operational level of war, emphasizing that it extends beyond the collective outcomes of individual battles. It is more comprehensive because it is significantly influenced by the strategic level of war, the highest tier in the hierarchy. The strategic level dictates that there must be harmony and synergy between the political and military leadership to effectively manage and utilize military resources and strategies.
• 10:30 - 13:00: Inter-service Coordination and Challenges in India The chapter discusses the strategic level of war that significantly influences the operational level. The importance of strategic decision-making in warfare is emphasized, with a comparison between the military strategies of India and Pakistan. It is highlighted that at the strategic level, Pakistan's military holds a stronger position compared to that of India. The chapter aims to further explain and elaborate on these strategic differences and their implications on inter-service coordination and challenges within India.
• 13:00 - 17:30: Operational Parity and Historical Context This chapter discusses the strategic importance of maintaining operational parity and how historical context plays a role in military outcomes. It highlights that losing a critical level in military operations can result in losing an entire campaign or war. Furthermore, the chapter delves into the Indian military's concept of war, which is based on a strategy termed as 'land battle', an approach coined by the American military in 1986. A key point of discussion is why the Indian military has not updated its war strategy since adopting this American concept in 1986.
• 17:30 - 22:30: Post-2019 Geopolitical Changes The chapter discusses the involvement of the Indian army in counter-terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990, highlighting their continuous presence in the region for over 30 years. Meanwhile, it notes the evolution of war concepts by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China, India's northern neighbor with whom they have a disputed border.
• 22:30 - 28:30: Interoperability to Combined Operations The chapter discusses the evolution of military operations from network-centric to informationalized and now to intelligence-sized warfare, which includes the use of artificial intelligence and robotics. It highlights that while India missed engaging in these developments, Pakistan focused on strengthening at the operational level of war, identifying India as its primary adversary.
• 28:30 - 35:30: Valley Situation and Alienation The chapter titled 'Valley Situation and Alienation' delves into the dynamics of the Indian military, specifically focusing on its ability to operate effectively at the intermediate level of war. A significant portion of the discussion is dedicated to the concept of 'air land battle', which emphasizes tactical engagements at the lowest level of warfare. The text outlines the critical roles of both the air and land domains, spotlighting the core competencies of the army and air force in executing these tactical missions.
• 35:30 - 43:00: Two-front War Scenario and Conclusion This chapter discusses the core competencies of two military branches: the army and the air force. It highlights the army's focus on combined arms operations, which involves the integration of artillery, armor, and infantry to achieve optimal outcomes in warfare. This is recognized as the fundamental operational strategy for armies globally. The chapter also begins to touch on the air force's core competencies, though it does not elaborate within this transcript.

Why Pakistan is an Overmatch for India Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 good morning five years ago in the book dragon on our doorstep i wrote and this was the opening line let alone china india cannot beat pakistan in war today i believe that in the next war the pakistan military will convincingly outmatch the indian
• 00:30 - 01:00 military this is making a big statement and i'm aware of this and there are three reasons why i'm saying this and all the three reasons are linked to what happened in jammu and kashmir on the 5th of august 2019 but before i explain those three reasons it is necessary that we review what i said five years back why did i say that that india cannot beat pakistan in war so to understand this we have to go back
• 01:00 - 01:30 to the basics of war any war it should be fought at three levels there is a lowest level called the tactical level of war this is where the battles are fought this is about force on force engagements this is about attrition because it is about attrition it is about mean counting of assets how many tanks how many guns each side has it matters at the tactical level of war which is where the battles are fought now the second level the intermediate
• 01:30 - 02:00 level is called the operational level of war this level of war is much more than the sum total of all the battles happening in the tactical battle space at this it is why it is much more is because it is heavily influenced by the third the uppermost level of war which is the strategic level of war it is at the strategic level of war that synergy between the political and the military leadership should be there
• 02:00 - 02:30 should be supposedly there and it is at that level that the nation decides on the military strategy and it is at this level that the pakistan military is very strong as compared to the indian military i will explain this strategic level in a while but here i would say is first of all the operational level of war is influenced by the strategic level of war and the importance of this level intermediate level is that the war
• 02:30 - 03:00 outcome is determined at this level if you lose this level you lose the campaign or you lose the war now second thing we need to address is what is the indian military's war concept how do they fight a war so their war concept is what is called a land battle it's a american concept enunciated in 1986. so the question is why the indian military did not upgrade it since 1986
• 03:00 - 03:30 the reason is that the indian army as the lead service of the three of the indian military has been involved since 1990 in counter-terror operations in jammu and kashmir and it has been there for the last 30 years and still keeps doing that now in these 30 years the pla which is our northern neighbor with which again we have a disputed border they upgraded their war concept
• 03:30 - 04:00 three times from network-centric operations to informationalized war to now intelligence-sized war which is also called the robotic war which is about artificial intelligence and autonomy indian military missed all this as far as the pakistan military is concerned because they identify india as their sole enemy it was only important for them that they remain strong at the operational level of war they should
• 04:00 - 04:30 remain matched to the indian military at the intermediate level of war which they have been able to do now when we talk of air land battle first of all what is it about air land battle is about battles that means the entire focus is on the tactical level of war the lowest level of war and when at the lowest level there are two physical domains there is air and there is land that means army and the air force each service has its core competency
• 04:30 - 05:00 the army's core competency is combined arms operations what this means is that instead of the artillery fighting its war armor doing going its way infantry going its way everything is combined it's a combined operation for a for optimal outcome effect so this is the core competency of the army anywhere in the world as far as the air force is concerned their their core competency is about
• 05:00 - 05:30 speed lethality range and flexibility entirely different core competencies therefore when we are talking of the battle we are talking of the tactical level it is a good idea to have synergy at the planning stage between the army and the air force when there are only two physical domains available that means at the planning stage there should be jointness but at the execution stage there should
• 05:30 - 06:00 be coordination jointness should not be done at the execution state for the simple reason that in a two domain war physical domain war then you curtail the core competency of one of the service between these two the air force core competency optimization of its core competency will be curtailed which is not a great idea therefore general
• 06:00 - 06:30 bipin rawat the cds reforms which is about integrated theater commands where he talks about creating a joint force of the air force in the army is not a good idea at all because he is looking at jointness at planning and execution both that will not give the optimal result but this is not really the thing that i want to i'm talking here in this video now i said that the pakistan military scores heavily at
• 06:30 - 07:00 the strategic level of war at the highest level and the reason for that is the pakistan army chief he controls the nation's nuclear policy security policy defense policy and he broke no interference from the political leadership or the bureaucracy which is not the case with india in india there is constant interference from the political leadership and the bureaucracy the latest example of the political
• 07:00 - 07:30 leadership is once prime minister modi came to power in his first combined commander's conference in october 2014 he told the combined commanders that the threat is known but the enemy is invisible now threat he meant pakistan enemy he meant terrorist so what he was telling the indian military is that you fight the enemy that means you fight terrorism you continue doing the counter-terror operations and the military leadership accepted this
• 07:30 - 08:00 not realizing that terrorism is not the enemy terrorism is a military strategy of the pakistan army when you fight a military strategy you never will and that is what is going on as far as bureaucratic interference is concerned constitutionally the civilian defense secretary he is responsible for the defense of india now if this be so then the bureaucrats
• 08:00 - 08:30 are interfering everywhere it's well known for example their interference is enormous in the operational sustenance system procurement of arms ammunition all this which is not the case with the pakistan military now when the pakistan military is strong at the strategic level for all these reasons they have wider choices they have good choices options for planning an option for execution and they have initiative at the
• 08:30 - 09:00 operational level of war it is at this level i said that the war is won or lost so they are better off because of this having a very strong strategic level of war now the other thing what the pakistan army has done is because until ladakh happened indian army which was about 12 lakhs was completely focused on the line of control against pakistan so one of the dilemmas because it concerns force on force
• 09:00 - 09:30 engagement of the pakistan army wars how do the pakistan army how does the pakistan army with a strength of six lakh match an adversary with double the strength so this they resolved by the isi their isr inter services intelligence isi is responsible in pakistan both for the internal as well as the external intelligence and at the end of the day
• 09:30 - 10:00 is responsible only to the pakistan army chief in my assessment this is one of the best intelligence services in the world because they learned very fast from the first war of kashmir in 47 the use of tribals with with regular soldiers and since then they have been able to match up the numbers or the double the numbers of the indian army by the use of irregulars
• 10:00 - 10:30 which are also called mujahids and also by their paramilitary force their paramilitary force are the rangers the rangers though being paramilitary they have officers of the regular army and hence they have ethos of the regular army this is the reason because of this mujahid that the pakistan army chief general musharraf in the 1999 cargill conflict said
• 10:30 - 11:00 that they are my first line of defense but actually they are the first line of offense and that is how they make up for the less numbers of the pakistan of the indian army at the tactical level so and this is the reason that the pakistan army because it has always matched uh the indian army and the indian military at the operational level of war that it has never been defeated in the west in any of the wars that have been fought
• 11:00 - 11:30 whether it was the first war of kashmir whether it was 65 or 71 because we know that there was a ceasefire line created after the first war of kashmir which was converted renamed as line of control with a given take of territory after the 71 war but this military line was never obliterated it was because they have made sure of being maintaining a parity at the operational level of war so to say that
• 11:30 - 12:00 conventionally their inferior is complete nonsense pakistan military is not inferior in war fighting because of the reasons i have explained to the indian military now the situation has changed drastically as i said how it has changed is for three reasons the first reason is that after the happenings of 5th august 2019 when india created ladakh union territory came out with new maps china
• 12:00 - 12:30 objected that china said that we do not accept ladakh as a union territory so what happened in turn was their earlier core concern was arunachal pradesh which they called south tibet now they added ladakh also as their core concern now here there was china which had ladakh as the core concern and pakistan always had traditionally had kashmir as the core concern in this that means
• 12:30 - 13:00 now the things have moved or in the next war they will move in ladakh from interoperability to combined operations let this sink in intraoperability to combined operations let me explain interoperability has four steps for step number one is commonality of equipment we know that today maximum equipment with the pakistan military is of chinese
• 13:00 - 13:30 origin the second step is about operational sustenance that means your arms your ammunition your spare parts now assemblies when you have commonality of equipment that means you are also assured a regular supply a regular supply of operational sustenance from the chinese which cannot be said for the indian military in other words in a short swift war whereas the indian side will be very
• 13:30 - 14:00 conservative in the use of fire power will not be the case with the pakistan military because they can go for the intense rates of fire being completely mindful that we have a short regular supply of ammunition spare parts everything coming from china the third step in interoperability is training together now this they have been doing for the last 10 years the pakistan air force along with the
• 14:00 - 14:30 pla air force they've been doing the shaheen series of exercises since 2012. similarly the two special forces have been doing the warrior series of exercises again since 2012. now the next step or the final step is planning for war after what india did as far as the two sides are concerned they have identified the theater also
• 14:30 - 15:00 planning for war in which theater the theater will be ladakh kashmir pok pakistan occupied kashmir gilgit pakistan and siachen now this is the theater we are looking at this is one theater we are looking at where both the militaries which have already uh interoperability the last step was accomplished by the definition of this new theater and as we
• 15:00 - 15:30 know the reports have said that officers of the rank of colonel of the pakistan military now they are embedded with the pla's western theater command and with with its xinjiang military command which is responsible for ladakh so all this has been accomplished now we should be expecting what is called the combined arms operation and the military strategy is no longer what the indian military thinks it will be a two-front war in my assessment we should be looking at
• 15:30 - 16:00 in this theater a one-front reinforced war now what does this mean one front reinforced war that means there will be a deep sharing of various domains between the pla and the pakistan military for example in the cyber domain the pla is very strong in this domain in cyber warfare and cyber attacks
• 16:00 - 16:30 we should expect we is the indian military should expect and this will work to the advantage of the pakistan military that the mobilization plans of the indian army may not go as planned similarly the atc's the air traffic controllers may go erratic which will affect the the programs of the the sorties of the indian air force why because
• 16:30 - 17:00 the entire northeast are telecommunications our power grid you say it they all have i mean it's been going on for decades now they all have systems which we have bought from the chinese so cyber will be a big thing which will the chinese can do that and which will help the pakistan military then we are looking at as we are aware that one year after august 2019 in august 2020
• 17:00 - 17:30 the pakistan air force with the help of with deep help from the chinese from the pla they created what is called the center for artificial intelligence a center for artificial intelligence and computing now i expect this will be able to this will be able to deliver in at least two areas in the next war the first area should be air defense air defense traditionally the air
• 17:30 - 18:00 defense has been quite good in fact it has been reinforced also now from lot of equipment that they have bought from the chinese having said that if the chinese were to help them through this sent ac a center for artificial intelligence and computing then we could be looking at artificial intelligence in dissolved doable artificial intelligence and air defense that means the oda loop will get shortened uda is the observe
• 18:00 - 18:30 orient decide act loop which basically means that instead of a human monitoring the air defense it could be done by an intelligent machine so this will be a tremendous boost to the pakistan military the next area that i am looking at is electronic warfare electronic warfare and the management of electromagnetic spectrum the pakistan air force demonstrated this convincingly on the 27th of february 2019 in what is
• 18:30 - 19:00 what they call operation swift retort which was in answer to the indian air force balacode strikes they showed that they were better off in electronic warfare and the management of the electromagnetic spectrum and they already have identified in this center artificial intelligence and computing center cognitive electronic warfare as their top priority focus well they may not achieve that anytime
• 19:00 - 19:30 soon but certainly the electronic warfare will make some strides with artificial intelligence in that so this is another area then they can have lot of from the chinese they will get a lot of standoff specialized ammunition missiles all this will come from there in other words this we are looking at as i said the combined operations with the military strategy of one front reinforced war now coming to the second
• 19:30 - 20:00 reason i said second reason again linked to the events of august 2019 is about the situation in the valley let's accept that the situation in the valley is not good and a replay of what happened in the 1965 war in the 1965 war when pakistan unleashed operation gibraltar they brought in the irregulars in the valley the kashmiris helped us
• 20:00 - 20:30 the kashmiris helped the indian army in nabbing those irregulars those foreigners and hunted them over to the army and the police it will not happen this time the kashmiris are alienated this will be a big boost for the isi now not only that please remember even the indian army numbers are divided because a lot of indian army will be available not be available on the pakistan front for the simple reason they will be on the chinese front so
• 20:30 - 21:00 less numbers and a hostile population in valley will certainly work to the advantage big advantage of the isi and the pakistan army and the military that is my second reason my third reason is the assets will get divided divided i mean we are actually looking at in the next war if it happens which go god forbid it should not happen is a two-front war scenario in which the assets will be decided
• 21:00 - 21:30 divided the air force will have to look at the lc it will have to look at the lac against china now against china the indian military if you see that deployments you see the deployments of the army you know from the deployments that they are simply trying to hold the line of contact they actually believe that there will be a war at the tactical level they don't seem to realize that in the pla's war concept tactical level is a side issue
• 21:30 - 22:00 it is irrelevant the pla war will finish an end at the operational level of war that is where they will fight not at tactical level moreover what general naravi had said recently about boots on the ground ravath keeps saying boots on the ground no if you just think apply yourself with imaginative war concepts which is what the pla will do they can actually occupy huge territory without bothering about
• 22:00 - 22:30 the line of contact so this war is not very clear or not clear at all to the indian military and on the other side what we face is now a pakistan military i gave you the reasons which which will convincingly outmatch the indian military so the overall situation appears very grim and this is the reality i'm not talking some fiction so the answer to this is we must make peace with china and we should look at
• 22:30 - 23:00 cooperation and a win-win situation with china thank you