Why Trump's tariff chaos actually makes sense (big picture)

Summary

Highlights

• Trump's tariffs are seen as the first step in a grand plan, not just random chaos. 🚀
• The idea is to reorient global economic relations to benefit the U.S. strategically. 🌍
• Negotiation leverage is key, starting with high tariffs to partners and foes alike. 🤝
• Future goals include reciprocal tariffs to create a level playing field in trade. ⚖️
• Trump's team envisions new global trade agreements similar to Bretton Woods. 🔗
• Critics argue the plan demands a trust level that might be tough to achieve internationally. 🌐

Key Takeaways

• Trump's tariffs aren't random; they're part of a grand plan to reshape global trade. 📊
• The chaotic tariff approach is designed to create negotiation leverage for the USA. 💪
• Trump's vision includes re-industrializing the U.S. and maintaining the dollar's supremacy. 💵
• The strategy draws historical parallels with the Bretton Woods system and seeks new agreements. 🕰️
• Economists are skeptical about the feasibility of such a plan, especially regarding trust. 🤔

Overview

Chapters

• 00:00 - 00:30: Introduction to Trump's Tariff Chaos The chapter introduces the chaotic nature of Donald Trump's tariff policies, emphasizing the inconsistency and unpredictability in his decision-making. It highlights Trump's tendency to frequently change his stance, even within the same day. Questions are raised about his intentions, particularly regarding imposing tariffs on close allies and seemingly disregarding the potential negative impact on the stock market. Despite the apparent confusion, there is an assertion that Trump does have a plan, as mentioned by his new Treasury Secretary, Scott Benson.
• 00:30 - 01:00: Reorienting International Economic Relations The chapter discusses the role of tariff policies in transforming international economic relations. It highlights that the initiation of tariff chaos is a deliberate strategy by the US to overhaul the global trading system, which it originally helped establish. This approach marks a significant shift in economic strategies, only paralleled twice in history, once beginning in 1944.
• 01:00 - 01:30: Historical Context: Bretton Woods and Neoliberal Order The chapter discusses the establishment of the Bretton Woods system and its eventual transition into the neoliberal order led by figures like Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s. As of 2025, the world is speculated to be on the brink of a new global order emerging from current turmoil, categorized into three groups or 'buckets'—green, yellow, and red—as described by Scott Bassett, indicating a further segmentation of countries.
• 01:30 - 02:00: China's Industrial Rise and US Concerns The chapter titled 'China's Industrial Rise and US Concerns' explores the potential implications of a new global order as envisioned by former President Donald Trump's closest economic advisers. The proposed plan appears to involve restructuring globalization dynamics, whereby some countries might benefit from low tariffs, military protection, and possibly preferred access to the U.S. dollar, while others may not receive such benefits. The chapter seeks to understand whether this plan aligns with the 'Make America Great Again' ethos and evaluates its feasibility.
• 02:00 - 02:30: Impact of Deindustrialization The chapter titled 'Impact of Deindustrialization' begins by questioning whether certain economic goals are realistic or merely fanciful aspirations driven by misguided individuals and their supporters. It suggests that understanding the Trump administration's economic ambitions requires understanding its key figures and motivations. The chapter introduces Scott Bessent, who was appointed as the Treasury Secretary under Trump. Bessent is described as an ultra-wealthy hedge fund manager renowned for his collaboration with George Soros in the early 1990s, when they managed to destabilize the Bank of England. This sets the stage for examining the economic strategies and intentions of Trump's team.
• 02:30 - 03:00: Historical Analysis: Global Orders The chapter titled 'Historical Analysis: Global Orders' explores the themes based on discussions featuring experts in economic history, including a former Yale professor and a new economic advisor to President Trump, Steven Miran. The dialogue addresses critical concerns concerning deindustrialization as a significant threat to the United States. The chapter brings into focus the need to restructure the global trading system, a topic that has recently garnered attention across Wall Street, underscoring the urgency and significance of these economic threats and proposed reforms.
• 03:00 - 03:30: Bretton Woods Economic and Security Order The chapter titled 'Bretton Woods Economic and Security Order' discusses the appeal of Donald Trump's campaign promise to restore the United States as a manufacturing powerhouse, as it was in the 1950s when manufacturing value added comprised 28% of output. However, it notes that by the present day, this figure has fallen to 10%, and Trump's initial trade war did not significantly alter this trend.
• 03:30 - 04:00: US Exorbitant Privilege and Its Consequences This chapter discusses the issue of deindustrialization in the United States and its consequences. It explains why the Trump administration was concerned about the state of the American industry. Key points include the economic decline in the industrial heartland, a region that heavily supported Trump electorally, and the strategic disadvantage posed by a weakened industrial base compared to global powers like China, especially in the context of potential conflicts where industrial capacity is crucial.
• 04:00 - 04:30: Neoliberal Order and Trade Dynamics The chapter titled 'Neoliberal Order and Trade Dynamics' discusses the implications of US deindustrialization on military strategy, particularly in the context of potential conflict with China over Taiwan. It highlights concerns about China's growing industrial capacity compared to the United States, pointing out that a Chinese state-owned firm recently built more commercial ships in a single year than the US has produced since the end of World War II. This situation raises concerns about the strategic vulnerabilities that may arise from diminished American industrial capabilities. The discussion reflects on how these elements influence both the military and political considerations of the US regarding its stance towards China.
• 04:30 - 05:00: The End of Neoliberal Order and US Trade Wars The chapter discusses the Trump administration's approach to reindustrializing the United States, with a focus on imposing tariffs broadly, including on close allies. The rhetoric used highlights themes of loss and exploitation by both friends and foes of the US, emphasizing a narrative of reclaiming jobs, wealth, and resources. This stance challenges long-standing international relationships and highlights the dominant position the US has held globally for decades.
• 05:00 - 05:30: Trump's MASTER Plan for Reindustrialization The chapter 'Trump's MASTER Plan for Reindustrialization' discusses the United States' role in shaping the global trading system, which is now facing dissatisfaction. The chapter explores the history behind the US-led global order and explains how two specific global systems, both initiated by the US, influenced this trend. The first system mentioned is the Bretton Woods system, which lasted from 1944 to 1973.
• 05:30 - 06:00: MAGA Tariff Strategy: Reciprocal Tariffs The chapter explores the neoliberal world order, which is believed to have lasted from the early 1980s, starting with Reagan's presidency, until Trump's first term in 2016. The time between these presidencies is seen as an adjustment period. The chapter underscores the importance of understanding the Bretton Woods system, established in the 1940s, to comprehend Trump's economic strategies. It mentions the establishment of economic rules during the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in 1944.
• 06:00 - 06:30: Future Scenario: Mar-a-Lago Accord This chapter discusses the 'Mar-a-Lago Accord,' part of the broader Bretton Woods Economic and Security Order established post-World War II. Countries that joined this order had to fix their currency's value to the US dollar, which was linked to gold, and rely on US military protection. The order was rooted in the Bretton Woods Conference and several security agreements, including the creation of NATO and the US-Japan Security Treaty.
• 06:30 - 07:00: Challenges to a New Global Order The chapter discusses the strategic moves by the US in establishing a new world order post-World War II. It highlights three key points: Firstly, the US offered military protection and even hosted military bases in allied countries. Secondly, it helped these countries build competitive industries, even at the expense of its own. Thirdly, through the Marshall Plan, the US opened its market to these recovering allies while allowing them to protect their markets from US companies. This arrangement divided countries into 'green, yellow, and red buckets' with allies receiving benefits, whereas neutral countries did not, unless they signed individual agreements.
• 07:00 - 07:30: Conclusion and Speculative Insights The chapter discusses the history and impact of the Bretton Woods economic system, emphasizing its exclusion of communist countries. It highlights how the system appeared advantageous for Europe and Japan but suggests that this perception is misguided for several reasons.
• 07:30 - 08:00: Further Reading and Subscription Offer The chapter discusses the strategic measures taken by the United States in the global fight against communism, emphasizing the economic side of these strategies. It highlights how U.S. industries benefited through export markets by aiding its allies economically and also discusses the significant role of the US dollar as a global reserve currency. This status of the dollar, termed as an 'exorbitant privilege' by French Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing, underscored the economic dominance the U.S. acquired globally.

Why Trump's tariff chaos actually makes sense (big picture) Transcription

• 00:00 - 00:30 I always say tariffs is the most beautiful word to me in the dictionary. The tariff on this is a direct attack. Donald Trump, who changes his mind between, you know, breakfast elevenses lunch and supper time. What the heck is going on? Why is Trump hitting his closest allies with tariffs? Why does he no longer care about crashing the stock market? Does this guy actually have a plan? Yes. Believe it or not, I'm here to tell you that. Yes. As Trump's new Treasury secretary, Scott Benson, recently put it, President Trump's
• 00:30 - 01:00 tariff policies had begun the process of reoriented reorienting our international economic relations. That's right, he says. Tariffs have begun the process. In other words, his tariff chaos is just the start of a much bigger plan, a plan that aims to upend the entire world trading system that the US itself created. This has really only happened twice before, once in 1944, marking
• 01:00 - 01:30 the start of the Bretton Woods system, and then in the early 80s, with Reagan and Thatcher marking the beginnings of the neoliberal world order. So here we are today. 2025 is this the start of a completely new global order, a new US centered or the that will emerge right after the current chaos in which countries are divided in three groups, or, as Scott Bassett calls it. I think we should make it very clear that there is a green, a yellow and a red bucket and we let everyone know where they are
• 01:30 - 02:00 in these buckets. It will become very clear that some countries get low tariffs, military protection, and maybe even some preferred U.S. dollar access. Well, others are left to fend for themselves. At least that's the picture I got from going through all of the speeches and papers by Trump's closest economic advisers that I could find. So let's get into it. What is this MAGA master plan for a new global order? And is this plan actually feasible?
• 02:00 - 02:30 Or is it just a pipe dream of a madman and his stooges? To answer these questions, let's start with getting into the MAGA mindset and ask ourselves, what does the Trump team actually want? To answer that question, first, a bit about Trump's new economic team. First, we have Scott Bessent the new Treasury secretary and ultra wealthy hedge fund manager that famously worked with George Soros himself to break the Bank of England in the early 90s.
• 02:30 - 03:00 And he used to teach economic history classes at Yale. Then there's Steven Miran Trump's new top economic advisor, a Harvard business and hedge fund strategist who recently got all of Wall Street talking with his new paper, A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System. Both men have written and talked extensively about one single mortal threat to the United States deindustrialization. So, of course,
• 03:00 - 03:30 they were drawn to Donald Trump's campaign with its goal of make the United States into a manufacturing powerhouse like it used to be many years ago. Many years ago. Indeed. If you look at this chart, we can see that in the 1950s, the US used to be a manufacturing powerhouse and manufacturing value added accounted for 28% of output. Today, that number is only 10%. Trump's first trade war did not significantly change that trajectory, though.
• 03:30 - 04:00 But why is this such a big problem? America's economy is bigger than ever, right? Why does the Trump team care so much about industry? Two reasons. First, deindustrialization has devastated America's industrial heartland, which overwhelmingly voted Trump in 2024. Second, U.S. industrial power is now far behind that of other comparable powers, especially China, putting it at a massive disadvantage in case of a war, given that historically civilian factories and knowhow
• 04:00 - 04:30 have been essential for rapid militarization. So the Trump team thinks a lot about China. What happens if they invade Taiwan? Yes, the US has a stronger fleet for now. But as Vice President JD Vance has noted, US deindustrialization has gotten so bad that one of Beijing's state owned firms built more commercial ships just last year then all of America has produced since the end of World War two. So I think in that light, that, yeah, it does make sense
• 04:30 - 05:00 that the Trump administration wants to re industrialize the US. But does he really have to slap tariffs on everyone at the same time and say stuff like this about his closest allies taking our jobs, taking our wealth, taking a lot of the things that they've been taking over the years. They've taken so much out of our country, friend and foe. And frankly, friend has been oftentimes much worse than foe. After all, the US has been the most powerful country on Earth for decades.
• 05:00 - 05:30 It literally designed the current trading system. So why is it so unhappy about it? The answer to that question. We need to go through the entire period of this graph. A brief history of the US led global order. After all, the realization of the US is a long historical trend and it happened under two specific global orders, both made by the US itself. The first is the Bretton Woods system from 1944 to 1973.
• 05:30 - 06:00 The second is the neoliberal world order that arguably lasted from Reagan's presidency in the early 80s to Trump's first term in 2016. The periods in between or, in my view, adjustment periods. So okay, let's start with the Bretton Woods system and why it is crucial to understand Trump's plan today. The Bretton Woods system was established in the 1940s. On the economic side, the rules were laid out in 1944, when the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held in
• 06:00 - 06:30 Bretton Woods in the United States. Meanwhile, on the security side, several conferences were signed that ultimately led to the creation of NATO and the US-Japan Security Treaty together. I'm going to refer to this all as the Bretton Woods Economic and Security Order. Joining this order for any country other than the United States meant the following three things. One, you would fix the value of your currency to the US dollar, which itself was tied to gold. Two you would rely on the US for military protection,
• 06:30 - 07:00 potentially even hosting US military bases. And three, the US would help your industries become competitive against their own. I provided Marshall Plan eight and by opening up its own market while allowing its recovering allies to shield their markets to a certain extent from US companies, notably getting back to Bessent's green, yellow and red buckets, all the allies would receive these benefits. Neutral countries did not get them, but they could sign individual deals.
• 07:00 - 07:30 While communist countries were essentially shut out of the Bretton Woods economic order. The history of the Bretton Woods system is really crucial because already here it seems like being a green country looks like a super good deal for these countries and not for the US. But I think that is misguided for at least three reasons. First, the US was really wary of creating another world war, and while it gave Europe and Japan an advantage in market access in return, it got really good allies
• 07:30 - 08:00 that it really needed in this global fight against communism. Second, U.S. industries also needed export markets themselves by making its allies rich. Key US allowed itself to get richer as well. Finally, this system really cemented the role of the US dollar as the global reserve currency issue, or in the world's reserve currency game, with what French Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing called an exorbitant privilege. This privilege meant that because the demand for U.S.
• 08:00 - 08:30 dollars as a reserve currency was so great, it allowed the US to spend much more internationally than it earned without facing a currency crisis. However, arguably giving Japan and Europe key market actors did already contribute a little bit to the initialization. However, as Steven Miran writes in this paper, this system inevitably led to a dilemma for the US. The so-called Griffin dilemma. You see, as the global economy grew, the need for dollars increased,
• 08:30 - 09:00 but the quantity of gold was relatively stable. So to keep the global economy growing, the US either needed to choose to keep creating more dollars, making the gold standard less and less credible, or to keep the gold standard and kill global economic growth by stopping the creation of new dollars that the world needed. This ultimately led to the following iconic announcement by President Nixon in 1971. I have directed Secretary Connally to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold
• 09:00 - 09:30 or other reserve assets, which was then followed by a period of global economic turmoil, after which the neoliberal world order was ushered in by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This neoliberal world order was character placed by number one, lower tariffs. Number two, lower barriers on investment around the world. Number three flexible exchange rates and.
• 09:30 - 10:00 Number four, the US guaranteeing security for everyone. That at least played somewhat nice with the United States in line with its free market principles, the neoliberal order was far less structured than the Bretton Woods order. There was no formal agreement now in which countries promised to use U.S. dollars. They just did so because it was the most convenient and most reliable currency out there. However, in this system, any non-U.S. nation had a very strong incentive to hoard US dollars by making it easy
• 10:00 - 10:30 to export to the US and making it harder to import from the US. Notably, despite praising the virtues of free trade, the World Trade Organization did actually allow developing nations to have higher tariffs against the US. Then the other way around, precisely because the US hope that by making the world richer, it would become friendlier, just as it has happened before with Germany and Japan. Compared to Bretton Woods, the number of green countries, so to say, got much bigger in the neoliberal order.
• 10:30 - 11:00 As long as you were willing to play by the rules of the World Trade Organization, you got good access to the massive U.S. consumer market. The US dollar banking system, and as a bonus, US Navy protection of global shipping. That sure sounds like a pretty good deal. But of course, the US again got something very, very big in return for it. With the fixed exchange rates of Bretton Woods gone. Stephen Miran writes that reserve demand for American assets pushed up the dollar,
• 11:00 - 11:30 leading it to levels far in excess of what would balance international trade over the long run. So thanks to flexible exchange rates, the US's exorbitant privilege arguably became even stronger. A strong dollar meant that the US could keep its massive military all over the world, despite becoming a far smaller economy relative to the rest of the world and relative to its dominance in the 50s. On top of that, the strong dollar made Americans in general much richer than they would otherwise have been.
• 11:30 - 12:00 However, on the flip side, it did make manufacturing in the US much more expensive, causing stable manufacturing jobs to leave the country, especially with China. Joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and something became known as the China shock. Meanwhile, a strong dollar mostly helped those Americans that already had a lot of dollars, thereby making inequality worse than in 2016. Increased inequality and a devastated industrial heartland helped to elect Donald Trump, who started his first trade war in 2016.
• 12:00 - 12:30 In hindsight, I believe this already marked the end of the neoliberal world order because it ended the very neoliberal idea that free trade is always good. This trade war was mostly about raising tariffs against China. However, China always retaliated, meaning that at the end of it, China still had a higher average tariff rate on the US than the other way around. Notably, this did not stop de-industrialization of the US.
• 12:30 - 13:00 It also did not stop the rise of China's mighty manufacturing industries, which are now threatening to upend the entire car industry. So Biden tried something new. He tried subsidizing U.S. industries on a massive scale, just as the Chinese had done before him. This led to a lot of new factories being built in the US. However, according to Bessent and Miran this was not all leading to a very high US government deficit. So here we are today, transitioning further and further away
• 13:00 - 13:30 from the neoliberal order in order that the US itself created and the Reagan in order, which kept the US the richest and most powerful nation on earth by inflating the value of the dollar. But according to Trump's team, it led to such rapid deindustrialization that it has now become a national security threat. Which brings us to. The modern master plan for a new global order, a plan that is supposed to help re industrialize the US
• 13:30 - 14:00 while at the same time to keep the US dollar as the global reserve currency. Because, as Trump himself has said, and if you want to go to third world, if you want to go to third world status, lose your reserve currency. We have to have that. We cannot lose it. So how do you keep your reserve currency status and re industrialized at the same time? Most economists think that this is simply not possible. But Stephen Miran he published a paper that says, yeah,
• 14:00 - 14:30 this is actually possible. You can have your cake and eat it too. But to be clear, the paper that Miron has written is not a plan in itself. It is a cookbook with options at the time of recording, but it also has not presented a full plan that includes his green, yellow and red country structure. So for the three step Mega master plan that I am about to present to you, I had to dive deep into what both Miran and Bessent have revealed so far.
• 14:30 - 15:00 And no, sadly, I was not added to a U.S. government signal group by accident. So for each step, I'll tell you exactly where I got my information from. Okay, here we go. Step one tariff chaos. This is the step that we are in now. In this step, the administration shows that it means business. It no longer cares about the stock market crashing. It no longer cares about the economy temporarily doing poorly. It just applies a lot of high tariffs to foes and friends
• 15:00 - 15:30 alike, to create negotiating leverage. I'm basing this on the fact that Bessent has said that while he didn't initially view tariffs as negotiating two Mr. Trump, he's added a third leg to the store and he uses it for negotiating. My second piece of evidence to suggest the current chaos is temporary is that before being part of the administration, Myron said that the policies that he proposed would likely be pursued later in an administration
• 15:30 - 16:00 after tariffs had produced this sufficient negotiating leverage. So both Miran and Bessent are essentially telling us that the current tariff chaos is just about creating leverage that can be used when implementing the rest of the plan. Which brings us to step number two, reciprocal tariffs. Remember this graph where China reacted to Trump's tariffs by ever increasing its own tariffs? If you really have reciprocal tariffs, that dynamic is theoretically gone.
• 16:00 - 16:30 It will just be. Look you can keep going up but we'll always miss you. So there's always a level playing field. This is the long term goal of the tariffs or in Bessent's words. This is what tariffs are designed to address. Leveling the playing field such that the international trading system begins to reward ingenuity, security, rule of law and stability, not wage suppression, currency manipulation,
• 16:30 - 17:00 intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers and draconian regulation. But here, economists have often criticized the administration for wishful thinking because historically, trade wars such as those in the 1930s just made everyone worse off and led to war. But here, Mirren has said that they've only got the United States to sell to. There's no alternative. So they're the ones who will bear the burden of this, of these tariffs. This is a really tricky point to understand.
• 17:00 - 17:30 But what he essentially means is that due to everyone wanting to export to the US to obtain dollars, the US has a truly unique negotiating position in the trade war. Trump's first trade war failed because China just increased exporting to countries like Mexico and Vietnam, which is then exported to the US. So by extending tariffs to all countries, Miran writes that President Trump views tariffs as generating negotiating leverage for making deals.
• 17:30 - 18:00 It is easier to imagine that after a series of punitive tariffs, trading partners like Europe and China become more receptive to some manner of currency accords in exchange for a reduction of tariffs, a currency accord. That's right. This brings us to the final step in the Mega master plan. Step three eight Mar a Lago accord. Yes, a mar a Lago accords that will go into the history books to rival the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, or a 1985 plaza
• 18:00 - 18:30 accord with Japan and the US and European countries came together to collectively raise the values of the yen and European currencies versus the dollar. But how does that relate to Bessent's green, yellow and red buckets? After joining the Trump administration, Myron has gotten much more quiet about this Mar a Lago accord. Which makes sense because he doesn't want to give away too much. But still, he did tell us that if the dollar were able to weaken to equilibrate trade,
• 18:30 - 19:00 then we wouldn't have a lot of the to balance trade deficits. Then we wouldn't have a lot of the problems that tariffs and other policy measures are designed to address, because US export U.S. exports would be more competitive on the global stage, and we wouldn't be as cheated by other countries. So I suspect that to avoid ruining the negotiations, they cannot talk about this as freely anymore as before. But that the ultimate goal is still to weaken the dollar while keeping it as a reserve currency.
• 19:00 - 19:30 In his paper, Miran talked about some wacky options that the US could use to do this on its own, such as charging reserve currency users a user fee. But I think that they will not go for these options because it will be far too risky. Instead, I think the Mar a Lago accords that the Trump team ultimately will push will look a lot like the Bretton Woods system, just minus the link to gold. I could even imagine that in this new world order, green countries peg their currencies to the dollar with a deal that whenever
• 19:30 - 20:00 the dollar gets too strong, they appreciate the currencies against it. In return, they get access to the largest consumer market in the world, as well as security benefits and good access to the US dollar system. But unlike in Bretton Woods, I expect the US once countries to pay tribute for that security, making them essentially vassal states. Yes, this is speculative from my side. But listen to this recent speech by Bessent and please
• 20:00 - 20:30 tell me if you hear the elements that I just talked about. The international trading system consist of a web of relationships military, economic, political. One cannot take a single aspect in isolation. This is how President Trump sees the world not as a zero sum game, but as inner linkages that can be reordered to advance the interests of the American people. And this is why I think Trump's current economic chaos makes sense.
• 20:30 - 21:00 The Trump team believes that the current international order is no longer in the best interests of the American people. They have already told us that the current tariff chaos is just a means to create negotiating leverage. They've already told us that they aim to use reciprocal tariffs to even the playing field for red and yellow countries. And they have hinted that if a currency deal can be made, tariffs can be much lower. And yeah, I do believe that if enough countries join the new MAGA world order as green countries that peg their currency to the US dollar.
• 21:00 - 21:30 This does indeed mean that Trump can have his weaker dollar while maintaining its status as a reserve currency. This could help re industrialize the US at least to a certain extent in theory. But of course, all of this depends on the US making it attractive enough for countries to become a green country. In the new MAGA international order. This, I believe, is the real problem with the plans of people like Myron.
• 21:30 - 22:00 They're clearly smart people. They have studied history extensively. But to voluntarily commit to raising your currency's value compared to the dollar, to continue to rely on US military protection, but now to pay for it, that essentially makes you a vessel, states subordinate to a great power to submit yourself to the US in such a way that requires an enormous amount of trust. Trust that the US has plenty of countries tied to Bretton Woods agreement, or when they went along with Reagan's Plaza Accord in 1985.
• 22:00 - 22:30 But if you tear up a trade agreement that you yourself signed, like the one with Canada, Mexico, or if you threaten to annex your closest ally or the territory controlled by one of your most loyal European allies, then how can you expect countries to ever want to join your new MAGA economic and security order? And if no one actually joins your new economic order, then you do have to choose. Either you give up your reserve currency status and the wealth and power that comes with it,
• 22:30 - 23:00 or you keep the dollar and its power and accept that you need to rely on Mexican, European and Japanese manufacturing capabilities. But yeah, that is my take. Obviously, there's much more to talk about. And the last part was a bit speculative for sure, but I do hope that it gave you some good insights into how Trump's economic advisors see the world and what they will likely advise Trump to do next. Now, if you want to know more about Scott Bessent's
• 23:00 - 23:30 vision for the international trading system, I highly, highly recommend you check out his essay in The Economist in this folder of this video. And if you're hungry for an alternative big picture idea that recognizes that the current global order is not sustainable, but argues that you don't need tariffs to change it. Check out this essay by two ex Biden advisors in The Economist as well. Indeed, if you want to go get the best insight into this rapidly changing economic order, then I highly recommend you use the link below
• 23:30 - 24:00 to get yourself an annual subscription to The Economist for a 20% discount. Whether you prefer to enjoy the print edition over a cup of coffee or their Digital Weekly edition, you always stay on top of the latest global developments no matter where you are. So don't miss out! Click the link in the description below or in the top comment below and head over to economist.com/MoneyMacro to claim your exclusive 20% discount today.